Have you ever wanted
to know much more about Iraq, and gain real background in depth to the current
war and its worldwide repercussions? But perhaps you don't have the time to
read lengthy history books? All the same, you probably realise that history
doesn't just "happen"; it occurs against a wider backdrop of personalities,
policies, cultures and attitudes. Plus of course past events, whether very
recent or from decades, centuries or even millennia ago.
In the age of the
high-speed Internet and unprecedented access to previously obscure information
and source documents, it is now possible to combine history and current events
in a way impossible in the past. By
drawing from an unparalleled variety of worldwide resources and then compressing
informed conclusions into a condensed HTML Web e-book, we offer below a unique
resource, periodically updated. Below you'll find the only brief, online and
current history of Iraq now available on the Web.
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A brief
modern political
History of Iraq
by Bruce Preston


1900 -1920
1921 -1929 1930
-1939 1940 -1958 1959
-1970 1971-1979
1980
-1988 1989
-1991 1992 -1996
1997-2000 2001-April
2003
May 2003 - June 2004
July 2004 - 6 April 2005 7
April 2005 plus
Origins
The land now known as Iraq and
once called Mesopotamia played a critical role in the development of
human civilisation. Apart from Egypt, no ancient land can begin to compare
to it in significance. Here seven thousand and more years ago were some of
the first human settlements as we know them in
the modern sense. Nearly six thousand years ago the first city states emerged
here. Here was the first writing and alphabet, the first written law, the
first astronomy, philosophy, mathematics and science, even the invention of
the wheel.
In this land of the two rivers,
Euphrates and Tigris, developed the fabled "Ur of the Chaldees", the
territories of the Sumerians, and the legendary city of Ninevah. Here was
the first Empire - the dominion of the Akkadians - which under Sargon I reached
to the Mediterranean. It was followed by the greater empires of Babylon and
Assyria. The names of their rulers, such as Ashurnasirpal, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar
and Assurbanipal, were names that brought panic in Egypt, Israel and Persia,
all of which were at times conquered from here.
But as the poet says, "the glories
of our blood and state are shadows, not substantial things", and the
conquerors of antiquity were themselves next to be conquered, in this most
strategic crossroad of the ancient world. First the Persians overran the land,
under their own legendary ruler Cyrus the Great. His successor Darius I reached
through the land of two rivers to campaign as far as the Danube in Europe,
and menaced the Greek civilisation of the Mediterranean. Against heroic odds
the Greeks held the Persians at bay, and later their military hero Alexander
the Great was to storm through Mesopotamia and shatter the might of Persia
into impotence here, at the battle of Gaugamela (331BC).
After Alexander, the Romans in
their turn seized Mesopotamia for the West, but encountered
perpetual resistance from a resurgent Persian Empire under the Parthian and
Sassanid dynasties. Throughout ages the struggle for this land continued,
and here more than seven hundred years after the birth of Christ the remnant
eastern half of the Roman Empire, the Byzantines, and the Persians,
battled each other to exhaustion. Neither, though, was the victor. For from
the south a new power seized upon this moment of weakness to sweep into the
land and capture it. This was the new Islamic Empire of the Arabs. The Arab
onslaught toppled not only Byzantine rule in Mesopotamia but struck
east to overthrow the Persian Empire itself, an event not forgotten on either
side. The Sunni fear of Iran manifest today in Iraq is deeply rooted in history,
both in religion and in Arab nationalism.
The Arabs were no mere casual occupiers
of Mesopotamia. From 762 AD they made Baghdad, and
for a time Samarra, their capital, the seat of the Caliph, the Sultan, who
as the successor of Mohammed was at least in theory the temporal and spiritual
ruler of all Islam. And in this new era of
the Abbasid caliphate, in which the terms "Arab" and "civilisation" were to
become synonyms, Mesopotamia
entered its era of greatest glory. Baghdad was not just the hub of a huge
empire but also the location of a wondrous outburst of learning and culture;
of art, literature, medicine, mathematics and much more.
But Mesopotamia as a purely Arab
land was always a fiction, for peoples of the older eras and their religions
remained within its borders. And about three centuries later a new people,
the Seljuk Turks, were to pour across from Iran and enter Baghdad in 1055
AD. The change was not momentous
though, for the institutions of state and religion continued much as before.
A much greater change came in 1258
AD, when the Mongols, under Hulagu, the grandson of Ghengis Khan, seized the
land and sacked Baghdad, slaying the last Abbasid sultan. The focus of the
Arab and Islamic worlds moved elsewhere, and Baghdad never recovered its prominence
when the Mongols were finally ejected. In the sixteenth century AD the Ottoman
Turks conquered the land between the two rivers, while the Caliphate moved
to Constantinople. Mesopotamia became a backwater of the Ottoman Turkish Empire,
and slumbered on as such until the beginning of the twentieth century.
1900-1920
*In
1900, three provinces of the Turkish Empire are based around Baghdad, Mosul
and Basra. They derive from ancient Mesopotamia, the land between the two
rivers (Euphrates and Tigris), the cradle of all human civilisation.
*During World War I, British Imperial
forces invade Mesopotamia (1914), as part of their campaign against the Turkish
Empire. The British tell the inhabitants of Basra that they come as "liberators,
not conquerors" (a handy line, dusted off for re-use in 2003). After several
setbacks - the Basra cemetery
contains thousands of British war dead from this period - they defeat Turkish
forces in the south and centre,
and finally occupy Baghdad (1917). After an armistice with Turkey in October
1918, British forces enter Mosul the next month. However the last is regarded
by the Turkish government as a betrayal of agreements reached.
* Soon (1920) Iraqis stage an
extensive revolt against British occupation, and are suppressed. About
6,000 Iraqis and 500 British Imperial troops are killed in the fighting. Later
that year Britain gains a limited "mandate" from the League of Nations (forerunner
to the UN), to rule Mesopotamia & bring it to independence.
|

1921-1929
· In 1921 Britain "allocates"
Mesopotamia (now called Iraq) a Hashemite king, Feisal I.
(click here for his origins). Britain also
"gives" neighbouring Transjordan -another nearby Arab portion of
the former Turkish Empire - as a kingdom to Feisal's brother, Abdullah.
The imposition of Feisal in Iraq is widely unpopular. However a numbers
of wealthy families, such as the Chalabis, side with the King and the
British, in return for various privileges.
· Iraq is now a country,
but not a united one. Various ethnic, religious and social groups view
each other with suspicion and/or resentment. The larger groups include
Arabs of the Sunni and Shi'ite religious persuasions, Kurds (who are
non-Arabs & mainly Sunni Moslems), Assyrians (Christians who have recently
fled from Anatolia), Turkomen (ethnic Turks), Chaldean Christians, and
Jews. In addition, new creeds such as communism, socialism, and pan-Arab
nationalism are making inroads and causing ferment.
· Throughout Iraqi history
there is always a "Kurdish issue". The Kurds are a non-Arab people who
are spread among several nations (principally Turkey, Iraq, Iran &
Syria), and dream of an independent Kurdistan. However promises of freedom
or at least autonomy made to them by governments and outsiders are regularly
dishonoured. 1920's revolts by Iraqi Kurds and other Iraqis are brutally
suppressed by British forces, whose tactics include the use of poison
gases sprayed from the air.
· The first Iraqi oil concession
is granted in 1925. Oil is to become critical to Iraq's further history.
· An Iraqi government is
formed in 1926, but Britain retains veto power over legislation. The
British also continue to maintain military forces and air bases in Iraq,
to ensure overall British control.
· Britain trains and equips
an Iraqi army to help maintain security. During the 1920s and 1930s
the Army is the only real unifying force in Iraq. It continues to grow
in influence, and becomes a focus for intrigue.
|

1930 - 1939
*In 1930 Britain induces the Iraqi
government to sign a 25 year Anglo-Iraqi treaty, promising independence. However
the treaty also effectively maintains overall British dominance, with permanent
British bases, British military and economic privileges & British control
of Basra. King Feisal, a foreigner with little popular support, describes
himself as "an instrument of British policy".
*In 1932 the British "mandate"
is formally ended. Iraq is declared independent, & becomes a member of the
League of Nations. Kurds object to the lack of any guarantees for them in
the independence treaty, and revolt. Britain sends RAF planes to attack the
rebellious Kurds, whose uprising collapses.
*In 1933 King Feisal I dies, &
is succeeded by his 21 year old son Ghazi. However Ghazi is unlike his father,
& attempts to assert more Iraqi independence. His anti-colonial stance becomes
more effective when he encourages army officers to oust a Government particularly
subservient to Britain (1936). An unstable series of administrations follows,
as nationalism continues to spread in the Iraqi Army. Ghazi founds a defiant
"Radio al Jazeera" in his palace, but is aware that British imperial power
threatens any bolder move.
*In 1934 the export of oil begins.
Oil is fully controlled by Western interests, but royalties are soon a major
source of revenue for the Iraqi budget. Iraq is later found to have the second
largest reserves in the world of easily extracted oil.
*In 1939, possibly motivated
by the threat of war with Germany, the British Government moves actively to
get rid of King Ghazi. The British Ambassador Maurice Peterson tells King
Ghazi's brother-in-law Prince Abdul Ilah (brother of the estranged Queen),
that the king "must either be controlled or deposed". British Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs R. A. Butler (later a Conservative Foreign Secretary &
British Deputy Prime Minister), tells Iraqi Prime Minister Tawfiq as-Suwaidi
that the king is" playing with fire and might get his fingers burned". A few
days later, Butler discusses with Ambassador Peterson the "relative merits"
of other members of the royal house as monarchs "in case any emergency might
arise".
*About a week later the young King
is found dead in an "automobile accident", in a virtually undamaged car. Two
others originally in the car have disappeared without trace. Anti-British
riots erupt, & the British Consul is assassinated in Mosul.
*The apparent regicide is widely
believed to have been organized in the interests of the British by the perennial
Iraqi politician, Nuri al Said. Corrupt and generally detested, Nuri is reputed
to have plotted with Prince Abdul Ilah and the prince's sister, the King's
estranged wife Queen Aliyah. The latter is the mother of the small child now
proclaimed king as Faisal II.
*Abdul Ilah is appointed regent,
but the royal family is tainted in the public eye. A Nuri al Said government
is later described by the British Intelligence service as an "oligarchy of
racketeers".
|

1940 - 1958
*The Army has become
steadily more powerful behind the scenes. In 1941 a coup by anti-British,
nationalist army officers takes place. The regent, Prince Abdul Ilah,
& Prime Minister Nuri al Said flee the country. Britain lands reinforcements
in Basra. Iraqi forces attempt to resist them, but in thirty days British
forces rout the army of the new Government, & re-install Abdul Ilah
and Nuri al Said.
*As 1948 begins, Abdul Ilah
and Nuri al Said are secretly re-negotiating a new version of the 1930
treaty with Britain, to be known as the Portsmouth Agreement. This news
breaks at a time of heightened Arab nationalistic feeling, due to public
sympathy in Iraq for the plight of Palestinian Arabs. Angry mass demonstrations
occur, and some protesters are shot.
*The regent Abdul Ilah then
disowns the new treaty. However riots spread into an uprising, and hundreds
are reported killed as Government forces suppress the rebels. The current
Prime Minister flees to Britain, and is replaced. In response, the Iraqi
Parliament votes to reject the new treaty, and Iraq moves to support
the Palestinian Arabs. Communists are blamed for the disturbances, and
several communist leaders are hanged and their bodies strung up in public.
*The Jewish community,
associated with Babylon for over two thousand years, numbers around
2.6% of the Iraqi population in 1947. However they feel an enormous
backlash to the Palestinian Arab defeat in 1948. Hostility worsens when
Iraqi troops dispatched to support the Palestinians are accused of inaction,
and by some, of having been betrayed from within the government.
*The government of Muzahim
al-Pachachi then collapses, and Nuri al-Said is again Prime Minister.
Seizing an opportunity for some cheap popularity, Nuri threatens the
Jewish community with expulsion if Palestinian Arabs are not allowed
to return to their homes. In the end, strongly encouraged by the Israeli
government - which sends agents to induce them to migrate to Israel
- most Jews use a 1950 law to leave Iraq permanently. By 1952
the "exiles who remained by the waters of Babylon" have finally "remembered
Zion". Of a once thriving community, only a few now remain in
Iraq.
*In 1951, in Saudi Arabia,
the al-Saud dynasty secures a new agreement with the Aramco oil company,
introducing a favourable 50-50 profit sharing arrangement. Meanwhile
in Iran the oil industry is nationalised. Threatened by unfavourable
comparisons, Nuri al Said re-negotiates with the Western-owned Iraq
Petroleum Company. He secures a 50-50 deal also, with other fringe benefits.
As a result, and thanks to much higher production due to a booming world
oil demand, Iraqi government oil revenues increase sixfold by 1958.
A basis for future Iraqi prosperity is now established.
*In 1953 the young King
Faisal II comes of age, and formally assumes the throne. However the
regent Abdul Ilah now assumes the title of Crown Prince, and continues
to dominate the monarchy.
*In 1954 Nuri al Said,
Prime Minister again, dissolves all political parties. After making
"communist sympathies" an imprisonable offence, and suppressing all
his other opponents, he stages an "election" in which 85% of the candidates
are his unopposed supporters.
*Liking the cut of Nuri's
"anti-communist" coat (the communist party in Iraq was by now the most
successful in the Arab world), the US begins to become directly involved
in Iraqi affairs. The 1955 Baghdad Pact groups Iraq in a pro-Western
alliance. This pact is created at the instigation of US Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, although the US is technically not a full
member. In 1956 the US lends "military assistance" to the Iraqi
Government.
*Following a failed British-French
intervention at Suez in 1956, revolutionary trends of pan-Arabism sweep
the Middle East. They are led by the charismatic figure of the young
Egyptian leader, Colonel Abdel Gamal Nasser. In 1958 Egypt and Syria
attempt to give pan-Arabism concrete reality by combining to form the
United Arab Republic. As a Hashemite counter, the Iraqi & Jordanian
governments decide to merge as "the Arab Union". Nuri al Said is to
be its first Prime Minister.
*Meanwhile, Nasserites,
Ba'athists (an "Arab renaissance" movement that began in Syria), and
Communists alike have been organizing in the Iraqi army and in Iraqi
society generally. The declarations of the "United Arab Republic" and
the "Arab Union" polarise opinion, and a secret group of Army figures,
the "Free Officers", launches a coup on 14 July 1958.
* The coup leader is
Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem, with Colonel Abdul Salam Aref as his deputy.
They declare Iraq a republic. Enormous crowds throng the streets of
major cities, amidst enthusiasm comparable to that of the French revolution.
The royal family is gunned down at the Rihab palace, and premier Nuri
al Said flees, dressed in woman's clothes. He is detected and slain.
In Baghdad, over a hundred thousand people gather to tear down the statues
of King Feisal I and General Maude (the British "conqueror of Baghdad").
* Many close collaborators
of the British occupation are forced to flee. Among these are the Chalabi
family, wealthy secular Shi'ites who manage to take much of their money
and their 13 year old son Ahmad with them. In 2003 he is to be flown
back into Iraq by the US, as the Pentagon's intended "brave new leader".
|

1959 - 1970
· The new Government declares Iraq
non-aligned, and withdraws from the Baghdad Pact. The oil industry is later
to be nationalised. British dominance is abruptly ended.
· General Kassem, now President,
purges Nasserite officers, including his deputy Colonel Aref, who is dismissed
from all posts, then arrested. In March 1959 northern officers supporting
Aref attempt a coup, but are crushed. Kassem is assisted by a Communist
militia force in this suppression. However his temporary alliance with the
communists is purely tactical. Aref is sentenced to death, but the sentence
is not carried out.
· In October 1959 a special unit
of the growing Ba'ath Party attempts to assassinate President Kassem, as part
of a coup plot. A key member of the group is a young Ba'athist thug from Tikrit,
named Saddam Hussein. General Kassem is badly wounded, but escapes. The Communist
party again helps him foil the coup attempt.
· The Communist Party then demands
some positions in the Government. Alarmed, the British Government now reverses
its hostility to Kassem and resumes arms sales to Iraq for its army, to support
Kassem against the Communists. Kassem then manages to split the Communist
Party, and isolate it from any real power.
· In 1960 five political parties
are legalised. However the Communists remain officially banned from formal
politics. Meanwhile Kassem promotes land reform and other anti-oligarchical
economic and social changes. These include: taxes raised for the rich, working
hours regulated, the minimum wage raised, decent housing, schools and medical
centres built for the poor, and tariffs introduced to protect fledgling local
industries. These measures are greeted with hostility by powerful circles
in the US.
· In 1961 Britain relinquishes
its protectorate over Kuwait, which becomes an independent emirate under its
traditional rulers, the al-Sabah family. Iraq then reconfirms a formal claim
to Kuwait, an old Iraqi assertion. In response to an erroneous intelligence
report of an imminent Iraqi invasion, Britain rushes troops to Kuwait in July.
The British troops are later withdrawn. ·
·Also in 1961, the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP) leader, Mustapha Barzani, demands autonomy for the Kurdish area,
as promised in the new constitution. When his call goes unheeded, fighting
breaks out; first among Kurdish factions and then with the Iraqi Army. A Kurdish
revolt in Northern Iraq, demanding an independent Kurdistan, seizes control
of much territory and ties down a large portion of the Iraqi military. Fighting
is to continue intermittently until 1975, when the Kurds are defeated, some
fleeing and some accepting amnesty. ·
· In February 1963 the Nasserite
Colonel Abdul Aref, who is free again, leads a coup against General Kassem,
along with the anti-Communist Ba'athists. Kassem is captured, tried & executed.
Colonel Aref becomes President.·
·According to various sources
(including the late King Hussein of Jordan), the coup-plotting Ba'athists
are in close contact with the CIA, which meets repeatedly with a Ba'athist
delegation in Kuwait. ·
· On the day of the coup the CIA
radios to the Ba'athists a list of names and addresses of key Iraqi Communists.
Thousands of Communists are arrested and executed. This action apparently
inspires General Suharto of Indonesia (again with CIA support & lists), to
conduct an even larger-scale massacre two years later, when more than half
a million people are killed. The future Ba'athist President al Bakr later
admits that the 1963 Ba'athist coup succeeded "using an American locomotive".
· The new government is dominated
by Ba'athists in an anti-communist coalition. However in October 1963, pro-Communists
gain control of the Ba'ath party congress in Damascus, Syria. In November
the principal party founder, Michel Aflaq, responds by mobilizing military
supporters, who storm a following meeting and ensure an anti-communist leadership
is voted in at gunpoint. A segment of Ba'athists in Baghdad opposes the decision,
and attempts a quasi-rebellion. So President Aref decides to isolate the Ba'athists,
and expels them from the Iraqi government.
· Michel Aflaq then takes temporary
personal control of the Iraqi wing of the Ba'ath Party. He appoints the army
officer Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as head of the dominant military Committee, and
effective leader. As Secretary of another party wing he appoints al-Bakr's
cousin & rising Ba'athist figure, the young Tikriti Saddam Hussein. Together
they restructure the party and purge its far-left element.
· However another failed Ba'ath
coup attempt in late 1964 leads to Saddam's arrest. He is imprisoned until
1966. Released, he is appointed deputy-Secretary-General of the Ba'ath Regional
Command by his cousin, Hasan al-Bakr. Saddam devotes himself completely to
organising the Ba'ath party, and seeks a mass following willing to take to
the streets, with "anti-communism" as a theme.
· In 1966 President Aref dies
in a helicopter crash, & is replaced by his brother General Abdul Rahman Aref.
The latter releases jailed Ba'athists, believing the party to be no longer
a threat to the Government. His error is to determine Iraq's future for nearly
four decades.
· On 17 July 1968 another
coup occurs. It is jointly organized by the Ba'athists and non-Ba'athist dissident
military officers. President Aref is exiled. The Ba'athist military leader,
General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, becomes President, but shares power uneasily
with non-Ba'athist officers. On 30 July the Ba'athist group stages a second
coup, seizing full power. They then purge their opponents, 50 of whom are
executed.
· The ideology of the Ba'ath
Party reflects many of the
influences founder Michel
Aflaq was exposed to as a
student in Europe in the late 1920s, political currents that were to dominate
the turbulent 1930s. These include notions of a superior civilisation & culture
(from France & Britain); a superior race and nationalism, & the triumph
of the will (Germany, Nietzsche, Hitler); transcendent, semi-mystical historical
forces (Manifest Destiny, USA); inevitable historical processes and the subjectivity
of truth, and socialism (Marx, Lenin, Soviet Russia) ; fascism (Mussolini
& Franco, Italy, Spain); and progress though brutal evolutionary selection
(social Darwinism & raw capitalist economic theory).
· The resultant brew is
as heady as that which stirred the Japanese militarists during their rise,
and just as disastrous if taken too seriously. The essential Ba'athist theme
is the previous glory of the Arabs and a modern quest to revive it. The Ba'athists
are also keen on party organisation, and adopt features from both the Nazi
& Communist parties to that end.
· When Shi'ite religious leaders
refuse Government pressure to condemn Iranian territorial claims, restrictive
and punitive measures are taken against religious Shi'ites, while 20,000 of
Iranian descent are expelled. Conflict grows with Shi'ite leaders such as
Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim. After the latter's death in 1970, Ayatollah Baqir
al-Sadr takes up the anti-Ba'athist Shi'ite struggle (he is finally to be
executed by Saddam in 1980, but these family names are to be heard again in
2003).
· The Ba'athists now try to cultivate
selected Shi'ite leaders and make some concessions to them, to "buy off" the
boiling Shi'ite religious hostility to the secular, but Sunni-dominated, Ba'ath
government.
· In 1970 the foreign-owned Iraq
Petroleum Company (IPC) is nationalised. This has the effect of substantially
increasing Iraq's income in a period when oil prices are soon to boom. Iraq
is on the verge of an era of prosperity.
· Relations sour further with
Iran in 1970, when the Shah's government is accused of complicity in an attempted
coup, which fails.
· Relations also sour with Syria
in the same year, after the Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party is taken over
by a military faction led by Hafez al-Assad, who becomes President of Syria
& institutes a personal dynasty. Party founder Michel Aflaq flees to Baghdad,
where he becomes the eminence grise of the Iraqi Ba'athists. The two
Ba'ath parties split permanently.
|

1971- 1979
· In its "twilight of Empire"
Britain withdraws military forces from "east of Suez", formally ceding
leadership of the Western Alliance to the United States. Three British-held
islands controlling access to the Persian Gulf, now vacated, are then
occupied by Iran (1971), in an action the Iraqi government feels was
a plot against it. Iraq breaks diplomatic relations with Iran & Britain.
· In alliance
with the Shah of Iran, the United States now militarily dominates
the Persian Gulf, through its massive fleet and an air base in Saudi
Arabia. Britain remains committed, however, to "the oil pump named Kuwait",
and nearby oil-rich sheikdoms.
· In the 1970s, with
the price of oil soaring and the oil industry itself now under local
control, the Iraqi people's standard of living rises dramatically. Iraq
is becoming a prosperous, secular society, perhaps the only example
of both features in the Middle East. The regime becomes genuinely popular
for a time with at least the Sunni population, but crushes any who oppose
it.
· Iraq now signs a
treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, & legalises its remnant
Communist Party, to gain access to Russian largesse, arms, expertise
and technology. These actions alarm the US government.
· In 1973 Iraq joins other
Arab states in the war with Israel, and also joins an oil export boycott
against states supporting Israel.
· The less militant wing
of the Communist Party is officially brought into the Iraqi Government
in 1973. Saddam Hussein, however, is now in charge of the Iraqi security
apparatus. He is in fact busy eliminating remaining Communist influence
in Iraq behind the scenes, prompting charges that he is a secret American
agent. Saddam is steadily becoming the real power in the Ba'ath leadership.
· In 1974 there are heavy
armed clashes with Iran. The UN brokers a ceasefire.
· The Shah of Iran, with
US support, has been supplying the "'Kurdish Democratic Party" of Mustapha
Barzani in northern Iraq with money and weapons, to destabilise the
Iraqi regime. Renewed Kurdish attacks in 1974, with Iranian assistance,
are now effective. Saddam Hussein is sent by the alarmed Ba'ath Party
to a meeting in Algiers, where a secret deal is reached with the Shah's
representatives. Iraq makes territorial concessions to Iran, while Iran
withdraws support from the Iraqi Kurds and seals the border. The Kurds
are betrayed, and their resistance rapidly collapses in 1975.
· The Iraqi Kurdish rebel
movement now splits. The KDP is still led by Mustapha Barzani, but
a new grouping, the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), is headed by Jalal
Talabani.
· To hamstring any future
Kurdish revolts, Saddam deports large numbers of Kurds living near the
Iranian & Turkish borders to southern Iraq. He also encourages Arab
Iraqis to move north and settle in key areas such as the oil zone of
Kirkuk, to dilute Kurdish strength there.
· By now leader behind the
scenes, & soon to promote himself to the rank of General (though not
a genuine army officer), Saddam Hussein still lacks personal legitimacy
or recognition. He dreams of mass popularity among the Arabs like the
late Colonel Nasser, and of military glory like the Saladdin who defeated
the Crusaders, or the ancient Babylonian kings whose ruins he is soon
to rebuild.
· However, to be a player
on the world stage Saddam need some recognition from America. But the
US government backs his enemy the Shah of Iran, and is hostile to the
pro-Russian tilt of the Iraqi government, a tilt that has netted Iraq
useful aid, weapons and influence. Saddam now decides to play
the other way, and woo the US in its turn.
· Previously, Iraq had given
shelter in Najaf to an anti-Shah Iranian Shi'ite cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. In October 1978 Saddam orders him expelled from Iraq. As well
that year, he removes the token Communists from the Iraqi government
and executes more communists. He also purges pro-Syrian elements from
the Iraqi Ba'ath party. The stage is set for a rapprochement with America,
but the US still prefers the Shah as "their man" in the area.
· In mid July 1979 Saddam
induces his cousin President Al-Bakr to retire, and assumes the formal
leadership of Iraq. Within two weeks he massively purges the Ba'ath
Party leadership, alleging a plot against him. Many leading figures
are shot, and the remainder cowed. It is a "pre-emptive strike" against
any who might later oppose him.
· From his new European exile,
Ayatollah Khomeini has meanwhile been rapidly fomenting rebellion against
the unpopular Shah in Iran. Early in 1979 a Shi'ite revolution
imbued with anti-American fervour sweeps Iran. The Shah is deposed and
flees to Egypt. US opinion feels humiliated by a long "hostage crisis"
at the US embassy in Teheran, & a failed US rescue attempt.
· Ayatollah Khomeini calls
for Islamic revolution throughout the Muslim world, but finds little
support in countries where the rival Sunni strain of Islam is predominant.
However the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf - with large Shi'ite
populations - fear revolution, while the house of Saud in Saudi Arabia
feels threatened by this new & militant regional rival.
· US power-brokers look
for a strong new regional leader to oppose Khomeini, and help them avenge
their own perceived humiliation. (They ignore the fact that it is precisely
their own previous meddling in Iran that has largely created anti-American
sentiment there in the first place). There is one obvious candidate
-Saddam in Iraq.
· Ayatollah Khomeini
denounces the US as "the great Satan", and the secular Iraqi Ba'athist
regime as a lesser but no less "Satanic" force that is oppressing Shi'ite
"true believers" in Iraq. He calls for the overthrow of the Iraqi government.
In response, some Iraqi Shi'ite militants make an unsuccessful attempt
to assassinate Saddam's Premier Tariq Aziz, and other Ba'athist leaders.
·
· Saddam reacts with fury,
and suppresses pro-Iranian southern Iraqi Shi'ites. He executes some
pro-Khomeini Shi'ite clergy, and also expels thousands of perceived
Shi'ite militants to Iran. Tensions rise, as the two regional powers
call for the downfall of each other's regime.
· Saddam now decides to humiliate
and if possible overthrow his new mortal enemy, Khomeini, with a "lightening
war". He is confident of an easy victory, because he believes the Iranian
army to be without effective leadership, because of the purging of the
Shah's generals and the jailing of many officers.
· Like President Bush in
2003, Saddam believes a quick, successful war is a "sure winner". His
tick list is large. It will rally Iraqis behind him, & give his leadership
legitimacy and popularity. War will make him adored in the Middle East
as an Arab champion against the Persians. It will strike dumb the Syrian
Ba'athists, who are openly scoffing at him, and it will secure him American
support, by acting as a US proxy against the Iranian militants. In all
of these except the last he miscalculates badly.
|

US Special
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld greets Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Dec. 20 1983

1980 - 1988
· In September 1980 Saddam renounces
the 1975 border agreement with Iran, and declares his intention to regain
the lost territory by force. Iraqi armed units cross the border, & their planes
bomb Iranian air bases.
· A quick victory proves elusive.
After initial defeats the Iranians free their imprisoned officers and rally
their army, as nationalism & ethnicity soon outclass religion and politics
as motivating forces in both countries. A greater population & resource base
gives Iran advantages in the longer term. The "lightening war" is soon bogged
down into an "unwinnable morass".
· The war drags on for eight
years. After less than two years, the rest of the Ba'ath leadership in
Baghdad has had enough. They overrule Saddam, and require him to offer Iran
a ceasefire, on the "call it quits" basis of a return to the 1975 agreement.
But Ayatollah Khomeini wants to defeat and overthrow the Iraqi Ba'athists
instead, and rejects the offer. The war continues.
· In June 1981 Israeli jets, in
a sudden, unexpected attack, destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak,
eliminating Iraqi hopes of developing nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
The Israelis regard Iraq as potentially the most dangerous of their Arab adversaries.
· In 1982 Iranian counter-attacks
are successful, pushing Iraqi forces back out of Iran. Iraq is now in danger
of the war being fought inside its own territory, as begins to happen in some
areas.
· By 1984 Saddam himself
wants an end to the fighting, his dreams of glory evaporated. He personally
requests a ceasefire. The Ayatollah will not budge. So the war grinds on,
with appalling casualties on both sides. Neither army can gain a decisive
edge, as the battle lines flow endlessly back and forth.
· Iraq's difficulties are compounded
by cynical outside interventions. Ba'ath neighbour Syria openly supports the
Iranians, as does Colonel Gaddafi of Libya. "Arab unity" becomes a derisive
catcall. Meanwhile Israel, avowedly Iran's worst enemy, secretly offers the
Ayatollah's forces spare parts for tanks and jets. The Iranians accept these
with equal cynicism, while still lambasting Israel in public. President Reagan's
administration in the USA also covertly sells the Iranians weapons to gain
the cash to fund counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua, but news leaks out,
and the resulting scandal, known as the "Contra affair", rocks the US government.
· Gradually the Iraqis seem
to be losing the brutal struggle. The US and Britain, happy for the two
neighbours to weaken each other indefinitely, now become alarmed. They do
not want the Ayatollah's militant regime to dominate the region. Both nations
(and other European states also) allow their arms merchants to sell Iraq powerful
weaponry. They also arrange for Saddam to be able to buy the precursors of
weapons of mass destruction, to enable him to make chemical weapons for gas
warfare, and to obtain germs (including anthrax and bubonic plague) to develop
biological attacks.
· Chemical gas attacks on Iranian
troops are a "great success", and kill thousands. The hard-pressed Iraqis
now begin to make some overall gains. A special US envoy, a Donald Rumsfeld,
visits Saddam to facilitate Iraqi war progress. On December 20 1983 he is
photographed shaking Saddam's hand, and tells the Iraqi dictator that the
US would regard "any major reversal of Iraq's fortune's as a strategic defeat
for the West". Full diplomatic ties are now resumed.
· The US and British Governments
do not object to Saddam's successful use against Iran of the weapons of mass
destruction capability they have allowed him to buy. The US has another "regional
pal", and some media friends of the Reagan administration perform amazing
verbal contortions as they describe how such a brutal dictator as Saddam is
quite a good guy, really.
· Finally a pro-forma statement
against chemical warfare in general is made by the US State Department on
5th March 1984. However the statement then goes on to contrast Iran's "intransigent"
regime with "the legitimate government of neighbouring Iraq". The message
is clear. Saddam is onside, and a favoured US ally against Iran.
· In 1985 Iraq launches Scud missiles
against Iranian cities, hoping to damage morale. However Iran responds in
kind, and the tactic is abandoned. Both sides now use their air power to attack
each other's oil facilities and shipping.
· The US and Britain, fearful
of oil supplies, move to militarily dominate the Gulf waters with powerful
naval flotillas. US forces clash repeatedly with Iranian naval vessels, and
destroy much of Iran's naval capacity. They also shoot down an Iranian civilian
airliner (never apologized for, in another unedifying example of great power
double standards).
· The US now appears to be directly
intervening to support Iraq. America is also supplying the Iraqi military
with detailed satellite information, helping tip critical battlefield situations
in Iraq's favour.
· Despite the US interventions,
in 1986 the tide turns again. Iran now advances to capture Iraq's al-Faw peninsula,
and menaces Basra. The Iranians hope for a decisive military push. However
the Iraqi defensive line holds, and the war bogs down again.
· Meanwhile in the main Kurdish
region, the Kurds take advantage of the war to make a tactical alliance with
Iran, and once more stage a revolt. By late 1986 they control most of the
Iraqi Kurdish countryside, and isolate the Government-controlled towns.
· Saddam prepares a counter-strike,
and sends his cousin Ali Hasan al Majid (Chemical Ali) to suppress the Kurds.
The ruthless attack begins in 1987, but is launched in a systematic way in
February 1988. Rebel Kurdish villages are burned to the ground, and thousands
slaughtered, in a "pacification" campaign that recalls those of the infamous
English duke, "Butcher" Cumberland, in Scotland, centuries before.
· In March 1988, Iranian
forces advance to support the Kurds at the town of Halabja. In a ferocious
response (the infamous Halabja incident), "Chemical Ali" gasses
the town, killing up to 5,000 civilians. Many Kurds now flee their homes to
escape further massacre. By the end of August 1988, organized Kurdish resistance
is at an end.
· When US Senators unanimously
pass a "Prevention of Genocide Act", to penalise Iraq for such behaviour,
the Reagan White House campaigns against the bill, and succeeds in having
it rejected in the US House of Representatives. Leading the White House campaign
against the bill is then National Security Advisor, a General Colin Powell.
His 2003 speech to the UN as US Secretary of State shows that - as with Donald
Rumsfeld - where Bush Administration operatives and Iraq are concerned, hypocrisy
knows no bounds.
· By 1988 the Iraqis, their armories
bulging, are ready for major offensives. In April Iraqi forces recapture the
al-Faw peninsula, & then successfully advance in other areas. It is clear
that earlier Iranian hopes of final victory through a war of attrition now
have no basis in reality. The Ayatollah's regime swallows a bitter pill and
offers to accept an earlier UN ceasefire offer (Resolution 598 of 1987). Iraq
quickly agrees, and the long war is over.
· Both sides now claim a victory
of sorts. In reality however, Iraq and Iran alike are suffering from devastated
economies, enormous human casualties, and mutual exhaustion from their gruelling
and pointless eight-year slugfest. They have been set back a generation, and
the flower of their youth are dead, maimed or embittered.
· However the US, British &
Israeli Governments are quite pleased with the overall outcome.
Iran's revolutionary Islamic militancy has been decisively blunted, and henceforth
becomes token and defensive. Iraq meanwhile is apparently now an ally of the
West, & in any case is in no shape to cause trouble.
· Or so the US and Britain believe.
Late in 1989 the new US Republican President, George Bush snr, overrides objections
from three government departments and orders still closer ties with Saddam's
regime, plus a billion dollars of aid.
· The Kurds: After his
devastating "pacification", Saddam now looks to the politics beyond. In September
1988 his mailed fist becomes an outstretched hand. An amnesty is declared,
and Kurdish survivors are allowed to return to whatever, if anything, remains
of their homes.
|

1989 - 1991
*In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini
dies. Of his ten years at the helm of the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
eight were consumed by a disastrous war. The accidental fall of his
body from the coffin seems to symbolise the end of his larger world
dream.
*For his part, in Iraq,
Saddam Hussein in 1989 feels a deep sense of frustration. He knows all
too well how false his claims of a great victory are. As a calculating
sociopath, he has no qualms about replacing the war with a gigantic
expansion of his "cult of personality", to soothe his own wounded ego
and help maintain his political grip. It becomes impossible in Iraq
to escape from depictions of his manic grin in every possible medium.
*Also in 1989, Ba'ath Party
founder Michel Aflaq dies, aged 79. He is the one senior Ba'athist who
Saddam always revered.
*Contrary to later propaganda
that he is a madman, Saddam is in fact a sane but rat-cunning, ruthless
political operator, with a strong sense of personal survival and a highly
developed ability for political & personal manipulation. Contrary again
to "coalition of the willing" propaganda, the Iraqi dictator does not
rule by terror alone, but strives to charm and manipulate as a first
line of advance. He finesses the careful use of rewards for loyal adherents
and demotions for the more ambivalent. The hostile, however, better
look to their funeral arrangements.
*Saddam wants to
be loved by the people, who he believes worship his strength (as some
do). He is also a risk-taker when under threat, an attitude reinforced
by the precepts of the ideology he has adopted wholesale from his mentor,
Ba'ath founder Michel Aflaq. Where his charisma and preferment skills
fail him, then intimidation, brutality, torture or execution are second
nature for Saddam. Ba'athist "ends justify the means" principles provide
convenient cover for his amoral personality type. Basically, however,
he is a political hoodlum hoping to fly high, and stay there indefinitely.
* Saddam drapes himself in
the mystical ideology of the Ba'ath in much the same way as Stalin did
the Marxism of Lenin, and with apparently equal cynicism in practice.
But Saddam has a fatal flaw at his lesser helm, one that will sink his
hopes of now strutting the international stage as a respected leader.
As a small-town Mafioso writ large, he is devoid of military genius
or intellectual range. He can parrot the Ba'athist style in speeches
and writings, and has great organisational ability, but
lacks the depth and cross-cultural understanding needed to deal successfully
with the still wilier operatives of the great powers. The latter are
soon to box him in from his ambitions. And in the end, to haul him triumphantly
from a pit in the ground, to prove it is in fact they who can tell the
biggest lies, and get away with it (so far).
*Donald Rumsfeld again
visits Iraq on unspecified business, as do many US corporate executives
in search of post-war deals. Deals are done, but Saddam has a larger
problem.
*Following the peace with
Iran, Iraq faces extreme financial difficulty. The government begins
to default on its debt
repayments. There are many large bills to pay, and much rebuilding to
do. Iraqi debts are in fact over $US80 billion, and in 1990 debt repayment
alone amounts to over 50% of Iraqi oil income. The people also need
appeasing. They had become very prosperous by regional standards under
the post-monarchical regimes, and look to a return of the good times.
*Saddam asks the Gulf sheikdoms
and Saudi Arabia to "forgive" the $40 billion they lent him
for the war, and also, to contribute extra to Iraqi reconstruction.
He feels they owe him this for protecting them from Iran, & that being
rich they can afford it anyway. He is rebuffed.
*Another factor working against
Saddam is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
his immediate usefulness to the West, he can no longer play the great
powers against each other for continuing largesse. There is now some
American aid, but he needs a lot more money, quickly, to bolster his
rule. What he can least afford now is a large drop in oil prices. When
it happens, he is furious.
*Saddam
believes the price of oil is falling because Kuwait & the Gulf States
are exceeding their OPEC quotas, to selfishly make more money at his
expense (in fact they are trying to insulate themselves from a price
decline already in progress, but the effect is the same). He also believes
Kuwait is cleverly stealing oil from an underground reservoir that crosses
under their common border.
*Iraq has long held a
claim to Kuwait. Now it seems to Saddam, smarting from the
drawn-out fiasco of war with a populous and resourceful Iran, that seizing
Kuwait is by contrast the perfect military excursion. No serious resistance
could be offered by the minuscule Kuwaiti armed forces. In one stroke,
achievable within hours, he would have a genuine victory at arms. More
importantly, he could easily solve all his financial problems, by quickly
& with little effort taking over this immensely rich mini-State, so
conveniently situated right on his doorstep.
*To a thug like Saddam, the
thought is suddenly irresistible. Now he is in America's good books,
who would oppose him? The old bete noire Britain, traditional
protector of the al-Sabah
sheiks of Kuwait, will splutter but do nothing. For Britain these
days defers to America in the Middle East, as it has done since 1956
in Suez, when British leaders humbled themselves to US will. As long
as the US does not oppose him, there is no problem.
*Saddam talks about his difficulties
with Kuwait to the American ambassador, Ms April Glaspie. As in nearly
all his dealings with great powers and other cultures, Saddam misreads
the signals. Even the fact that the US has sent him a woman as Ambassador
appears to his small-town tribal mind to be a concession. For if the
US still had serious reservations about him, surely they would have
sent a man?
*The inept Ambassador Glaspie,
(who has understandably since failed to write her memoirs), tells Saddam
she "understood" his "concerns", and that inter-territorial disputes
should be solved by the parties concerned. Saddam, who has seen how
the US solved the problem of a pint-sized irritant near its border by
force (Grenada), wrongly takes these statements as a green light to
annex Kuwait. In fact it appears that the (first) Bush administration's
intention was only to allow him to pressure Kuwait into some concessions
on the oil issue.
*Saddam then presents
Kuwait with a rigorous list of demands, which the Kuwaitis reject. The
next day (2 August 1990) Iraqi forces cross the border, and capture
Kuwait in short order.
*The US rejects the occupation,
which most Kuwaitis also oppose. Since Kuwait is a member of both the
Arab League & the UN, no other states are prepared to openly support
Saddam. Only Hashemite Jordan, possibly motivated by a unique long-term
dynastic agenda, and definitely wary of its own, large, pro-Saddam Palestinian
population, is at all sympathetic
*Various negotiations fail
to achieve a diplomatic solution. Saddam, now playing in the major league,
repeatedly misreads his opponents. US President George Bush Snr successfully
involves the UN, and patiently gathers a large coalition of nations
into a huge multi-national expeditionary force. The mainly US force
even includes military units from some Arab states, notably Syria.
*Meanwhile the UN has imposed
a total trade & economic blockade on Iraq, & its oil export
pipelines are cut off. Iraqi funds abroad are frozen. It is now impossible
for Iraq to profit from the seizure of Kuwait.
*Saddam realises his mistake,
and offers to withdraw conditionally, but his evasive, face-saving tactics
only enrage his opponents instead. Saddam is always obsessed with the
notion that a direct and obvious loss of face would mean the end of
his rule. By thinking he can deal to impose conditions or extract benefits,
his delays instead ensure a devastating military attack. Hoping always
for a last-minute extrication, Saddam misplays all his gambits.
*In the Gulf War of 1991
the US-led force, under General "Stormin' Norman" Schwarzkopf, launches
Operation Desert Storm. The US military and its allies massively bombard
Iraq for six weeks from January, wreaking enormous damage to Iraqi civilian
infrastructure as well as military targets. In February, the attackers
then drives Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in a quick assault. Iraq's military
casualties are huge, while the US suffers hardly any. Iraq rapidly signs
a peace agreement on 28 February 1991, after US forces are in a position
to advance on Baghdad.
*The
US encourages Shi'ites in southern Iraq to rebel against Saddam. However
when they do so (early March 1991), the US fails to support them. Saddam,
down but not out, uses Republican Guard divisions in a ferocious suppression
of the Shi'ite rebellion. Within two weeks the uprising is utterly crushed.
More Shi'ites suffer terribly from Saddam at this time than in all the
rest of his rule, but the US fails to assist them, a decision leading
to future mistrust.
*The northern Kurds also
misjudge the moment as a green light to rebel yet again. They are initially
successful, and even capture Kirkuk. However a furious regime counter-
attack defeats them. Again, the US fails to intervene.
*Fearing reprisals similar
to 1988, hundreds of thousands of Kurds flee to dangerous winter-bound
border areas. Suffering from acute criticism for its inaction towards
Shi'ites & Kurds, the US now imposes no-fly zones, which inhibit the
Iraqi army from advancing further into Kurdish areas.
*Saddam responds by launching
a "charm offensive", appointing a Shi'ite as Prime Minister & reconciling
with Kurdish PUK leader Jalal Talabani.
*In April 1991,
UN Security Council resolutions 687 & 688 lay down the victorious coalition's
conditions & demands upon Iraq. The next month, UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission on Disarmament) begins to work to identify and ensure
the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Saddam, as later
evidence is increasingly to show, in fact orders the destruction of
his stockpiles of such weapons anyhow, while hoping to retain the ability
to eventually develop them again.
*However, in order not to
appear supine, he also creates varying degrees of obstruction to the
work of the inspectors , sometimes provoking crises where new military
threats are made against him. He appears to wish to retain the image
of a difficult & dangerous leader, who may have hidden stockpiles. Above
all he seeks to avoid at all costs the appearance of being humbled before
the West, which situation he sees - possibly correctly - as likely to
lead to his overthrow.
*In 1991, after the Gulf
War, US President George Bush Snr signs a presidential order directing
the CIA to launch a covert operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
|

1992 - 1996
*The economic sanctions imposed
against Iraq before the war are kept in place by US & British pressure, with
little resistance from other states. Iraq is deprived of nearly all legitimate
income from trade. A long list of conditions in the sanctions resolution can
be used to extend them indefinitely. The idea is to "contain" Saddam by depriving
him of the means to rebuild and grow powerful again, but it is ordinary Iraqi
people who suffer most, and terribly.
*As a result of prolonged sanctions,
the once prosperous middle class in Iraq is pauperised. Malnutrition & disease
increase, & child mortality rises steeply. In a cruel gesture, sanctions even
forbid the import of parts to restore the electricity & water purification
systems. The moral injustice of this policy of harming civilians, coupled
with the failure of the US to demand that Israel implement UN resolutions
concerning the plight of the Palestinian Arabs, contributes to anti-Western
radicalisation in the Arab world. Among the Wahabi movement of Sunni Islam
in particular, militant leaders rally many adherents to believe in the justice
of counter-strikes against the unrighteous behaviour of the "crusader West".
*Through a degree of smuggling
& sanctions busting, Saddam is able to obtain enough income to continue to
reward his key supporters, & maintain opulent lifestyles for regime leaders.
Obsessed with maintaining a strong image and regional credibility, he prevaricates
and argues about UN resolution compliance. As a result he ruins his chances
of building enough worldwide support to deeply embarrass the US, which displays
nil interest in ending the sanctions.
*Sensing possible danger from stronger
Islamic currents in the Arab world, Saddam now adds a religious dollop to
his speeches and writings and takes some steps to appear more supportive of
Islam. Neither the secular Ba'athists who support him, nor his religious opponents
who despise him, are taken in however.
*The Kurds, for once, surprise
themselves by doing relatively well. For the first time they are able to maintain
a quasi-independence without being attacked by the Iraqi government. Initially,
Saddam enforces his own economic blockade of their autonomous area. Later
a modus vivendi is reached, in which the Kurds draw revenue as middlemen
from mostly illegal trade & outright smuggling, between Iraq and both Turkey
& Iran. As long as the Kurds do not claim formal independence, Saddam decides
he can live with this indefinitely.
*In May 1992 elections are held
in the Kurdish zone, for a regional assembly. However old rivalries reassert
themselves, and in December 1993 fighting breaks out between the KDP & the
PUK. By December 1994, the PUK has gained the upper hand, & seizes the key
KDP town of Arbil. Both parties then seek outside backers, the KDP looking
to Turkish support & the PUK to Iranian assistance.
*In June 1992, an umbrella grouping
of Iraqi exiles, the "Iraqi National Congress", is officially founded
in Vienna. In fact the INC is organised by American PR company the Rendon
Group, hired by the CIA in furtherance of President Bush's directive mentioned
above. Rendon names the group, and funds it with $US12 million of CIA money
between 1992 and 1996.
*Controversial figure Ahmad
Chalabi, last in Iraq in 1958, is appointed to head the INC. He is heavily
promoted by leading US neo-conservatives, such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz,
over the next decade. They even refer to him with a straight face as the "George
Washington of Iraq". But Chalabi's dismal performance, unsatisfactory accounting
for finances, & alienation of other Iraqi exiles, lead to the new Clinton
Administration's support for a rival group, the Iraqi National Accord, in
which former Ba'athist Iyad Allawi is a prominent figure. The latter is also
ineffective, however.
*In October 1992 the INC establishes
offices in the independent Kurdish zone near Arbil. However it soon falls
victim to Kurdish politics, and is wiped out there when the KDP invites Iraqi
troops to assist it in 1996.
*In 1993, in reprisal for an Iraqi
revenge plot to assassinate US President Bush during his visit to Kuwait,
the US launches a missile strike on Baghdad.
*In Nov.1994 Iraq recognizes the
sovereignty and independence of Kuwait, ending the longstanding Iraqi claim.
This fulfils another condition towards ending sanctions.
*Fratricidal fighting continues
among the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Finally, in 1996 the desperate KDP turns
to Saddam, for help against the PUK. Saddam relishes this opportunity to re-establish
his influence in the north and annoy Washington. Thirty thousand Iraqi troops
join an assault, which retakes Arbil for the KDP.
*The alarmed US launches more
missile strikes against Iraq, and extends the southern no-fly zone. On the
diplomatic front, the US mediates with the Kurds, & finally the Washington
agreement of September 1998 restores peace to Iraqi Kurdish areas, in a power-sharing/zone
division arrangement between the KDP and the PUK.
*UN economic sanctions against
Iraq continue, causing great hardship and suffering. In 1996 UN resolution
981 allows some limited & strictly controlled Iraqi oil sales, to purchase
quantities of essential civilian supplies. Saddam had earlier rejected such
offers because they included war reparations, but these are now deducted from
Iraqi revenue anyway. It is later to emerge that corruption in the administration
of the oil sales allows Saddam to siphon off large amounts of
revenue for his own purposes.
|

1997-2000
· In 1997 in the United
States a number of Washington hardliners and neo-conservatives form
a group called the "Project for the New American Century"(PNAC).
Closer examination of the PR euphemisms used by the group show that
it is in fact arguing for a belligerent US foreign policy, pitched at
total US world supremacy throughout the 21st century. Their aims include
direct action against Iraq, to overthrow the regime there and bring
Iraq and its oil under a US sphere of influence.
· The PNAC group is officially
founded by, and has as chairman, one William Kristol. Kristol also edits
the Weekly Standard, an influential right-wing Washington insider's
newspaper that is funded by billionaire global media magnate, & former
Australian, Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch openly advocates seizing control
of Iraq's oil, to support Western economic interests.
· The PNAC brings together
some of the most powerful people on the right of US society. They are
drawn mainly from the corporate sphere of the super-rich, from neo-conservative
Republican political circles, from the military, from Zionists linked
with the Likud party in Israel and with "settler" parties to the right
of it, and from leading neo-conservative writers and publicists. (NB:
some members fit in more than one category).
· Members of the PNAC
include: future US Vice President Dick Cheney; future Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld; future Deputy Defence Secretary & 2003 Iraq War architect
Paul Wolfowitz; former CIA director James Woolsey; senior Pentagon advisor
Richard Perle; senior Republican House of Representatives political
leader Newt Gingrich; former Republican Vice President Dan Quayle; Florida
Governor, former President's son & future President's brother Jeb Bush;
retired generals Downing, Glosson and McCaffrey; former Secretary of
Education William Bennett; future National Security Council member &
convicted Contragate felon Elliott Abrams; billionaire publisher Steve
Forbes; and a large assortment of lesser luminaries. After the Presidential
election in 2000, members of the group will dominate the foreign policy
of the United States. Some analysts are later to claim that the group
"runs" future President George W. Bush as their front man.
From the beginning, the group has Iraq in its target sights.
· In 1998 the US & Britain
again bombard Iraq, for four days (Operation Desert Fox), to punish
Saddam for unsatisfactory compliance with UNSCOM inspectors. Inspectors
are withdrawn before the bombardment, & afterwards the nettled Saddam
refuses to let them return, and refuses further cooperation.
· Also in 1998, after heavy
lobbying by the PNAC, the US Congress passes the Iraq Liberation Act.
This law provides nearly $100 million for Iraqi opposition groups such
as the INC to overthrow the regime in Iraq, but given their fractured
& ineffectual nature has little chance of success. The traditional politics
of Iraq are of dominance, exclusion and conspiracy, rather than cooperation,
consensus or compromise. The INC is a failure, while its leader Ahmad
Chalabi receives worse reviews still in Washington. However the neo-conservatives
of the PNAC, in particular Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, maintain
their support for both Chalabi and the INC.
· From 1999, US and British
planes regularly bomb Iraqi military positions in the no-fly zones,
claiming that the Iraqis are firing on them or planning to.
|

2001- April 2003
*January 2001. Republican
Party candidate George Bush jnr is declared US President-elect, with a minority
of the nationwide popular vote, after an unprecedented delay from November
2000 caused by a controversial ballot count in the state of Florida. According
to some sources, Administration operatives immediately commence planning for
a possible invasion of Iraq. The issue is clearly high on the agenda of many
Administration figures.
*September 11, 2001. Suicide
squads of Al-Qaeda, an anti-western terrorist group of extreme Muslim fundamentalists,
simultaneously hijack four US airliners within the continental United States.
One is crashed into the supposedly protected Pentagon, two demolish the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and the fourth, apparently intended
for the US Congress, crashes in a field, after passengers resist the hijackers.
Despite later Bush Administration concern with weapons of mass destruction,
the hijackers are in fact armed only with their beliefs and the most primitive
hand weapons.
*The attacks are clearly a symbolic
as well as actual strike against US military, economic & political power.
They have been launched by religious extremists with both a profound sense
of grievance and a sophisticated network of support. President Bush is hidden
at an air base, in a momentarily stunned and frightened America.
*None of the hijackers are Iraqi
citizens, and the majority are in fact from US ally Saudi Arabia. Despite
this, nine days after "9/11", the PNAC sends an
open letter to President George W. Bush. The group calls for action not
only against Al Qaeda, but also against the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon,
against Iraqi neighbours Iran and Syria, and, notably, for war with Iraq.
*Al Qaeda is led by Arab
veterans of the US-supported war against the Russians in Afghanistan, guerillas
who have been previously trained & supplied by Pakistan and the United States,
with much funding from Saudi Arabia. The organisation recruits from militant
Sunni fundamentalist Islamists in many nations, but is based on extreme members
of the dominant Wahabi sect in Saudi Arabia, & its foreign adherents, and
is lead by Saudi millionaire & Afghan war veteran Osama bin Laden. The latter
has denounced Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and his secular Ba'athist state
in the fiercest terms.
*Bin Laden claims to be partly
motivated by the "defiling" presence of US military forces at bases in Saudi
Arabia, the Islamic holy land containing the sacred Muslim shrines of Mecca
and Medina. He is currently based in Afghanistan, where the governing Taliban,
or party of religious scholars, shelter Al Qaeda forces and their bases in
operations against the West. The Taliban have been promoted to power by Pakistan,
with US acquiescence, to overcome a messy military stalemate between rival
guerilla mujahadin factions, after the latter's success in driving out the
Russians.
*The Bush administration, recovering
its nerve and hot for revenge, soon bombs Afghanistan, and assists Northern
Alliance forces to overthrow the primitive Taliban regime. They drive bin
Laden and his supporters from their forward bases, and the militants are forced
to hide out in wild tribal regions along the Afghan and Pakistani borders.
However a chance of dealing
Al Qaeda a fatal blow later, after a major defeat for the group in the siege
of Tora Bora, is to be missed. Key personnel hunting bin Laden and his cohorts
are withdrawn, in preparation for an operation elsewhere. It is the invasion
of Iraq.
*Meanwhile an obsession with "terrorism"
and an allegedly "changed world" is promoted by the Bush Administration in
America. A series of dramatic, highly coloured "alerts" repeatedly alarms
the population, raising emotions and fears; but all prove false. There are
very real dangers, including a home-grown anthrax attack, but they are deliberately
over-stressed by the "War President's" repetitive rhetoric. The effect is
to prepare the ground for a roll out of the PNAC master plan, of which the
next primary focus is not the defeat of Al Qaeda but war against the nation
state of Iraq.
*The new US domestic atmosphere,
intimidating voices of reason and perspective, is supported by draconian legislation,
such as the "Patriot Act". The US population is mostly unaware that it is
being primed for the kind of war previously deemed immoral and illegal. Namely,
a "first strike" on a weaker nation that has made no hostile move against
its attacker. Iraq has been "boxed in" and steadily debilitated for more than
a decade, and has offered no external threat to other nations in that time.
It does happen to have a huge supply of oil deemed important to the US economy
in a government analysis, and a leader who the US President's family have
a personal grudge against.
*In February 2002, it is
reported that the Rendon Group is now working for the Pentagon, to help develop
a new propaganda agency, the "Office of Strategic Influence" (OSI). When it
is reported that the OSI's charter will allow it to feed false news stories
to the media, an outcry causes its official disbandment. However the Rendon
Group's contract with the Pentagon for "information" services continues. It
becomes apparent that the group is working to support a "war on Iraq" PR campaign.
*In March 2002 it is claimed in
the New Yorker magazine that INC-supported groups in Iraq have launched
sabotage operations, including a rocket attack on the Baiji oil refinery complex.
*2002 also sees President Bush
announce a strategy which he characterizes as a "war on terror" in response
to September 11 2001. On closer examination, the real import of the plan is
a design for American world hegemony, and a new pre-emptive military doctrine
justifying unprovoked attacks on any country deemed appropriate by the President.
Indeed the strategy is actually one designed before "9/11", by the PNAC.
It is in fact based on a PNAC report, blandly entitled "Rebuilding America's
Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century", published in
the year 2000.
*This PNAC programme is intended
to assure unchallengeable US global dominance, by force, deception and ruthless
manipulation as necessary, throughout the 21st century. The President has
accepted the neo-conservative's blueprint. It allows him to characterise the
invasion and occupation of Iraq as a "defensive" act, in the interests of
"peace".
*Most non-Americans abroad are
not deceived, however, and many intelligent, open-minded Americans, too, are
alarmed. However the Bush Administration, dominated by corporate executives
not averse to mingling their business and governmental agendas, are not interested
in dialogue with the rest of the world about why the USA has become so widely
resented. Instead they begin to push closed strategies to promote PNAC objectives,
and to try and mould world opinion in support of those by elaborate PR campaigns.
The immediate focus of these is Iraq.
*The US administration now openly
prepares an invasion of Iraq. False claims are repeatedly made by US leaders,
such as Vice-President Dick Cheney, alleging links between Saddam's secular
Ba'athist regime & the militantly fundamentalist Al Qaeda, when the two are
in fact hostile to each other.
*The one piece of evidence offered
to support the claimed link, an alleged meeting in Prague between later hijacker
Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi official, collapses when the FBI discovers that
Atta was actually in the USA, in Virginia, on the day in question. A man who
resembled him in Prague was in reality a used car dealer from Germany, doing
some sort of (shady?) car deal with the Iraqi official concerned. Frustrated,
Bush Administration officials carefully fail to release the facts they are
now aware of, and continue to promote belief in the false Atta story, as part
of a propaganda web of deception.
*From July 2002, detailed
planning begins in the White House for a campaign to "sell" a war on Iraq
to US politicians, media and the public. A specially created "Office of Global
Communications" (OGC) is also allocated $US200 million for a "PR blitz", to
gather support worldwide for the forcible overthrow of the Iraqi government
by means of a US-led invasion. The Rendon PR Group is reported again involved
in these lucrative contracts. On
September 12 2002, President Bush appears before the UN asking for a Security
Council resolution that would in effect authorize such a war.
*In September 2002 it is also reported
that a split has occurred among Iraqi exiles over oil. The Chalabi-headed
Iraqi National Congress (INC) wants Iraq's oil industry to be taken over by
Western oil interests including Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil and BP. However
the principal Shi'ite Iraqi opposition movement, SCIRII, (The Supreme Council
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) wants continued State control, and profits
to be retained for Iraq, if the Ba'athists are overthrown.
*As war preparations intensify,
A PNAC-devolved group, the "Committee for the Liberation of Iraq "(CLI) begins
working with the White House in November 2002. Some well-known Democrats are
invited into the group for window dressing. The CLI's advisory board is however
chaired by former Republican Secretary of State George Schulz, who says the
CLI "gets lots of impetus from the White House".
Interference by PNAC members
in intelligence operations leads to incorrect US WMD assessments. An *"Office
of Special Plans", overseen by another Administration PNAC supporter, Douglas
Feith, is set up in the Pentagon to bypass the established intelligence agencies.
Vice-president Cheney directly supports it. False reports, often sourced via
PNAC protégé Ahmad Chalabi, are accepted, while other intelligence is distorted
or exaggerated. Intelligence questioning these claims is simply ignored. A
number of known falsehoods are trumpeted in Administration speeches, and all
qualifications or doubts suppressed.
*"Repeat the lie often enough and
the people will believe it" appears to be the Bush Administration's strategy.
This variation of Josef Goebbel's doctrine of propaganda is now aided by a
largely compliant or supportive "patriotic" US mass media, particularly
the TV networks and Murdoch-owned newspapers. The latter promote a war on
Iraq worldwide, & in some major cities are the only significant print news
source. Such media present as keen to serve the corporate interests of their
now concentrated ownership, rather than genuine impartiality in news and a
diversity of opinion. Their Iraq war coverage is to be carefully sanitised,
and some, such as Fox TV, display overt jingoism and direct bias.
*A similar process of politicised
& misrepresented intelligence on Iraq occurs in Britain and Australia. Political
leaders are later to attempt to blame the intelligence community for the embarrassment
of public awareness that they have misled their respective nations about WMD,
in order to obtain support for war against Iraq. In reality, revelations from
a long line of participants make it increasingly clear that it was the political
leaders themselves who sought presentation of any shred of intelligence of
any calibre, to support a war already decided upon.
*An example in Australia
is how an Office of National Assessments (ONA) report on Iraq changes substantially
a day after the previous one, without convincing explanation as to why. The
changes are evidently in response to behind-the-scenes political pressure,
although those responsible are careful not to write down their directives.
Evidence is to steadily mount, however, of interference in intelligence matters
in the US by Vice-president Cheney and other PNAC members in the Government.
*In Britain, similar
revelations are to profoundly damage the credibility of PM Tony Blair. An
example is the British "dodgy dossier", soon to be praised at the UN by US
Secretary of State Colin Powell. This document is later found to contain no
genuine independent intelligence input at all. Instead it has been mostly
just plagiarised from the Internet. It contains material that generally covers
a period no more recent than 1991, plus some interpolations that are unsustainable.
*Alarmed by the US & British buildup
on Iraq's borders, Saddam Hussein agrees to readmit UN weapons inspectors,
and allows them free access to wherever they wish to go. He agrees to destroy
some missiles judged marginally illegal, and does so. The inspectors, under
Hans Blix, find no banned WMD, and ask for more time to continue to search.
*The US and Britain, however, allow
no credit for any of the concessions made by Saddam. It soon becomes clear
to observers that the two nations have already decided to invade Iraq, no
matter what. Australian Prime Minister John Howard is meanwhile so eager to
participate that he dispatches Australian troops to the scene before he claims
he has even made a decision on the matter.
*Major powers France, Germany,
Russia and China are all opposed to an invasion, as are many other states.
Undeterred, the Bush Administration seeks a UN Security Council mandate to
attack and occupy Iraq, but is rebuffed. The US, however, finds a large number
of allies among smaller governments, who agree to support the project verbally
and in other ways not involving dispatching troops to an invasion force.
*However in nearly every case,
the clear majority of the population in these other countries is strongly
opposed to their government's policy, according to opinion polls. The US has
never in its history been so isolated and unpopular, worldwide, in a planned
act of foreign policy, as for its intended attack on Iraq.
*On 20 March 2003, without
the support of the UN, and against a backdrop of unprecedented millions of
people demonstrating worldwide in protest, a "coalition of the willing" invades
Iraq. It is made up of US, British, and a few Australian forces. They win
a quick military victory, and occupy Baghdad by April 9.
*In Baghdad, a crowd of 200 then
gathers as American soldiers topple a statue of Saddam Hussein for Iraqis
to rejoice over and attack, in an event carefully staged for the media, within
a square ringed by US tanks. However the crowd expresses annoyance when a
US soldier drapes the American flag over Saddam's face. The contrast with
1958 is instructive.
*The neo-conservative's protégé,
Ahmad Chalabi, is flown into southern Iraq by the US in April 2003. He is
later to admit he had supplied false intelligence to encourage a US attack.
Before the war, he tells the US its forces will be everywhere garlanded with
flowers and showered with sweets. The reality is starkly different.
*As Baghdad is occupied, "coalition"
forces rush to secure the oil ministry, and oil installations elsewhere. Other
government ministries are allowed to burn however, and occupation forces stand
by as much of Iraq's priceless cultural heritage - a legacy for all humanity
- is smashed, burned or looted.
*Despite claiming fears of a dangerous
Iraqi nuclear weapons programme as one of their war justifications, coalition
forces make no attempt to secure nuclear installations. The threat of Iraqi
nuclear materials being passed to terrorists, sternly claimed by President
Bush earlier as one of the most serious terrorist threats posed by Iraq, suddenly
ceases to be a matter of concern. Village children play with nuclear wastes
unadmonished, in now unguarded installations, until the revealing scandal
is reported.
*The easy victory of the "coalition"
has qualifications. Regime leaders were not captured, and Saddam Hussein himself
has disappeared. His last coherent Republican Guard forces in the north were
not defeated, but have instead melted into the local population.
|

May 2003
- 27 June 2004
*To their evident surprise,
the occupying forces are soon bogged down in a vicious guerilla war
of resistance. The attacks are blamed on "Ba'athist remnants", but it
becomes apparent that other groups are involved as well. Al
Qaeda allies & sympathisers, various militant Wahabist groups,
and others, soon begin to launch their own attacks, responding to a
call to arms from Osama bin Laden and other militant leaders. They are
eager to avenge an invasion and occupation they see as an intolerable
insult to Arab and Sunni Muslim pride.
*US losses in personnel and
equipment soon overtake those suffered during the "major fighting" earlier.
A defiant President Bush challenges the insurgents to "bring it on",
and they obey with relish. The conventional war may be over, but a guerilla
war continues to worsen. November 2003 is a "horror month" for the US,
as their forces are repeatedly attacked with deadly effect, and even
helicopters and tanks are lost.
*However key elements of
the situation are about to change. There is soon to be an eclipse of
hope for Ba'athists wishing to restore an elusive but still garrulous
and publicity-seeking Saddam. The latter's long-winded messages from
hiding have surfaced regularly, but it becomes more and more doubtful
that he is controlling significant military operations.
*The US invasion has
in fact attracted a new "terrorist infrastructure" into Iraq, through
the nation's previously well-controlled but now porous borders. Meanwhile,
as the prospects of the former regime dim, volatility stirs as traditional
groups begin to position themselves for a political struggle.
*While "traditional" Sunni
resistance focuses on attacking the US military and those it arms, the
Al Qaeda-aligned rebels, led by elusive Jordanian militant Abu Mussab
al-Zarqawi, create a horrific "resistance of terror bombs", in which
military and civilians, perceived collaborators and hapless innocents
alike, are blown apart indiscriminately.
*Many attacks are also launched
against Shi'ite civilians and their religious leaders, appearing to
confirm the Wahabist origins of such assaults. Many Wahabists are believed
to have crossed from Saudi Arabia to support the campaign, reminding
the Shi'ites, who have long memories, of the bloody sack of Karbala
by Wahabist intruders in 1801. The relationship between Shi'ites and
Sunnis becomes more difficult as a result.
*"Winning the peace", meanwhile,
has proved extremely difficult for the "coalition" forces. Instead they
grow increasingly unpopular in many areas, particularly in the cities.
They appear slow to come to grips with repairing damage to Iraq's infrastructure
caused by the invasion, the long sanctions regime, and the six weeks
of concentrated bombing in the first Gulf War. Decisions such as those
to disband the large Iraqi Army also cause mass unemployment, and trigger
great resentment.
*Under the occupation, most
of Iraq's economy is soon declared to be open in future to takeovers
from Western corporate interests. Many contenders are linked with figures
in the Bush Administration. Only control of oil, very much in the spotlight,
is discreetly left alone, at least for the time being.
*As the "playing card
pack" of former regime leaders is steadily hunted down, Saddam's
vicious sons Uday and Qusay "go down in a blaze of Ba'athist glory",
when overwhelmingly outgunned by US land and air forces in a shoot-out
in Mosul. However guerilla resistance continues. Saddam Hussein himself,
always a survivor, suffers an ignominious capture in a bolthole near
his home town of Tikrit in December 2003, after managing to elude his
relentless US pursuers for an astounding eight months. Again, resistance
still continues.
*The guerilla campaign against
coalition troops is now overshadowed by a nightmare of bombing atrocities,
which make the US promise to bring security and peace to Iraq via its
invasion and occupation the worst of bad jokes.
*2004 brings an evaluation
that is sobering to the "coalition of the willing". The excuse for invasion,
weapons of mass destruction, has unravelled, and US, British & Australian
leaders are soon reduced to appointing committees of enquiry in order
to transfer blame to the intelligence community for providing them with
the types of reports they required of it in the first place.
*President Bush has by
now realised that "the mess in Iraq" threatens his re-election prospects,
and that without evidence of a credible "exit strategy" leaving a pro-US
regime in place, his political goose may be cooked. The "Coalition Provisional
Authority" (CPA) under US administrator Paul Bremer has appointed an
"Iraq Governing Council". Now the CPA hastens to produce some kind of
political plan to show evidence of progress towards "withdrawal", but
finds that agreement is difficult to obtain.
*Shi'ite leaders are refusing
to accept the US plan for selecting a government to "hand power to",
and occasion abandonment of several proposals. The objecting Shi'ites
are well aware that such a government, which evidently will not have
the authority to ask coalition troops to leave, will be dependent on
the "transformed" occupying armies for an indefinite period.
*The US now rotates its armed
forces, making it clear that a "de facto" occupation will continue in
reality after the official occupation formally ends. Plans for a US
troop reduction are later shelved due to a deteriorating security situation,
and Reserve and National Guard units are needed to maintain the US force.
The end of the "official" occupation now has a date however, given by
the US as June 30, 2004.
*By 10 March 2004, an
interim constitution has been agreed to, by members of the US-apppointed
"Iraq Governing Council". The document goes far to guarantee individual,
religious and ethnic rights in theory. However the constitution does
not say to whom power will be handed in the interim, nor does it resolve
the essential issues of the federalism it defines, or the borders thereof. Moreover
the constitution's veto provisions for the highest executive level,
intended to prevent any community dominating any other, may in fact
lead to political paralysis & as a result, a coup d'etat or inter-communal
violence.
*Supreme Shi'ite leader Ayatollah
al-Sistani indicates that the majority Shi'ites are unhappy with the
document, and will press for changes later. The "Governing Council"
now invites UN representatives to help formulate a means of interim
power transference. Ayatollah al-Sistani signals that the Shi'ites will
not accept the UN deciding on this matter. Beyond this the senior Shi'ite
leadership bides its time, however.
*Bloody fighting erupts
in several cities in April 2004 nevertheless, between "coalition"
forces and a more radical Shi'ite group. Although the majority of Shi'ites
are not involved, the difficulties posed indicate that US hopes of arranging
a representative political outcome in Iraq to its liking may represent
wishful thinking rather than a sober assessment. Indeed the installation
of a client regime serving US purposes but lacking credibility appears
to be the only US option at this juncture, under its existing policies.
* Meanwhile a punitive US
attack in the town of Falluja leads to heavy civilian casualties, but
fierce and effective resistance causes substantial US losses also. April-May
2004 is the worst period of the war so far for US casualties. The Middle
Eastern "hero town" status of Sunni Falluja threatens a strategic
political defeat for the occupation forces, and an eventual tactical
US withdrawal avoids further confrontation. Radical Shi'ite resistance
is militarily ineffective by comparison, but continues into June. Meanwhile
the US finally pulls back from operations in the Shi'ite holy cities
that threaten another strategic political loss. A threat to eliminate
militant Shi'ite leader Moqtada Al Sadr is quietly forgotten.
*"Coalition" moral
capital is badly diminished at this point by a major prisoner abuse
scandal involving mostly US forces, especially at the grim Abu Ghraib
prison near Baghdad. With reconstruction faltering due to a declining
security situation, the occupation seems to have slid into a morass.
Both the US world image and the popularity of the Bush administration
in the USA now reach record lows. Also in June 2004, the official investigation
into the "9/11" attacks reports no "credible evidence" that
Iraq helped Al Qaeda in any attacks, while by late June a USA Today/CNN/Gallup
poll shows 54 per cent of Americans think the invasion of Iraq was a
mistake.
*The Bush administration
seems at this point to pin its hopes on a favourable perception of political
developments boosting the acceptability of its Iraq policy. By the end
of May 2004 an Iraqi "political consultation" by UN envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi is over, and an interim appointed government, dominated
by exiles, is soon announced. The key executive position of Prime Minister
is a focus of concern for US policy-makers. However the nominee originally
favoured by US neo-conservatives & the Pentagon, "Governing
Council" member Ahmad Chalabi, is now dramatically disowned by
the CPA occupation authority, and is instead accused of betraying secrets
to Iran.
*The alternative US- proposed
figure is Iyad Allawi. Allawi is head of the Iraqi National Accord,
another CIA-supported exile grouping like the INC. The INA is dominated
by former Baathists and military officers, and has been a rival to Chalabi's
Iraqi National Congress. Allawi is also a secular Shi'ite like Chalabi,
with scant support inside Iraq but possibly more credible than his repeatedly
discredited rival. Chosen as interim titular president is Sheikh Ghazi
Yawar, a Sunni Muslim tribal leader who has spent much of his life abroad.
*The US and Britain now
seek Security Council approval for a new resolution formalising
the altered arrangements. While US Secretary of State Colin Powell is
prepared to concede a theoretical right of the new interim government
to ask coalition forces to leave, his statement that he is "not
losing any sleep" over the possibility, and his insistence on effective
US command of all military forces, indicates that the new, exile-dominated
government is in fact largely a dependency of a continuing, though renamed,
occupation presence. The proposed new US Embassy of over 3,000 persons
in the same location also seems remarkably similar in reality to the
former "Coalition Provisional Authority".
*In June 2004 the official
investigation into the September 11, 2001 attacks reports no "credible
evidence" that Iraq helped Al Qaeda in any attacks against the United
States. By late June a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll also shows 54 per cent
of Americans now think the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.
*An examination of the situations
of the various communities in Iraq now reveals a political can of worms.
The majority Shi'ites, betrayed by the US in 1991, welcome the
exit of Saddam and the Ba'athists. Nevertheless they mostly see no joy
in the presence of American & British forces, whose values threaten
their religious beliefs, and who they suspect of wanting to thwart Shi'ite
political power. Many Shi'ites in fact want the coalition forces to
withdraw as soon as possible, but this has already been refused in negotiations.
*The Shi'ites themselves
have negotiated hard over an interim constitution, but are well aware
that paper guarantees do not necessarily translate into reality. Can
their own position, often one of misery and suppression in the past,
be assured without a decisive political dominance over all other groups?
They do not accept that Kurds or Sunnis should hold a permanent veto
over their political ascendancy. Their future relationship with the
formerly dominant Sunnis is unresolved in practice, and carries a profound
danger of degenerating into civil war. They also fear that the Kurds
want to seize Kirkuk for a capital, and its oil revenues for income,
both of which possibilities they reject.
*The perpetual Iraqi minority,
the Kurds, always expect to be betrayed, and usually are.
They have done well with positions in the new, unelected "interim
government", securing, besides a ceremonial vice presidency, the
positions of Deputy Prime Minister for National Security and two key
Cabinet posts (foreign affairs and defence) plus two lesser ministries.
This seems to indicate that the US places more trust in them than other
groups.
The trust is unlikely to
be shared by either main Arab community, and beyond that the Kurds must
rely on a promise on paper of a future promise concerning another piece
of paper, to guarantee they can hold onto their existing, hard-won,
autonomy. Nor are they satisfied with the territory they currently hold,
and resent the presence of Sunni Arabs where they feel the latter have
stolen lands and homes. They also worry about potential Shi'ite control
of an Iraqi state, while to their rear they fear traditional Turkish
claims to northern Iraq, believing Turkey may wish to detach the oil-rich
Kirkuk region for itself. Facing an uncertain future in all directions,
they bide their time and watch, knowing that armed rebellion is always
the Kurdish Plan B.
*Meanwhile, most Sunnis
see a presence of occupiers, lost jobs, poverty, national humiliation
and further hardships, after long years of suffering dictated by the
sanctions of the West. They have already lost their favoured position
under Saddam and previous regimes, and now fear a future where they
risk a to them insufferable domination by the Shi'ites. Many city Sunnis
also fear a loss of all their gains in modernity,secularism and women's
rights since 1958, if Shi'ites gain power. As well, many of their northern
brethren seem in danger of displacement by the Kurds, and they fear
that the latter may also seek to detach the northern oil regions from
Arab control, a potentially grievous future financial loss. It is not
an encouraging outlook overall, from their point of view.
*Of other minorities, the
Turkomen are anxious about Kurdish and Arab intentions towards
them. Even the Christian groups, whose position seems better,
fear a resentful backlash if their situation improves too much while
others face difficulties, and they are especially alarmed by Sunni Islamist
hostility towards them, already manifested in attacks on Christian churches
and businesses. Remnants of the Communist party, meanwhile, hope,
albeit forlornly in all probability, for a revival of their previous
strength. They are one of the few political groups to successfully cross
ethnic & religious divides, but in community-bound Iraq this virtue
has lead only to their near oblivion.
*Many individual Iraqis,
of course, show tolerance for other groups and express sincere hopes
of a united future for their country. However their voices risk being
drowned out if the political temperature rises much higher, as the prospect
of some genuine internal self-government now approaches.
*The US & Britain now
find they have few reliable friends in their occupation, and are in
fact sitting on a political time bomb, about which American leaders
in particular seems to understand little.
*Britain, which committed
a startling near-third of its Army to the invasion, is once again dominant
in Basra and southern Iraq, and is in a position to reap economic and
oil benefits from its substantial commitment. As a junior coalition
partner, however, the British risk being dragged down by American political
and military blunders to the north.
*Meanwhile the UK PM, Tony
Blair, has suffered huge political damage because of his unwavering
"me too" support of President Bush's policies, and faces a substantial
loss of credibility because of a growing perception that his Iraq policy
was founded on deceiving the British public.
*President Bush himself
now risks repeating the political fate of his father as a one-term leader,
if there is much more bad news from Iraq. His dilemma is that US disengagement
from officially occupying Iraq may put much potential bad news out of
any real hope of control. As there becomes some political power for
Iraqis to fight over, the likelihood of situations developing that will
make avowed US political aims in Iraq untenable, increases daily.
*But to abort the prescribed
Iraqi political process until after the US Presidential elections carries
equal, or greater, risk of electoral disaster. President Bush is now
between a rock and a hard place, with only the hope of the capture of
Osama bin Laden offering a good prospect of a temporary boost to his
sagging popularity. In the event, after briefly flirting with a "peace
President" tag, Bush decides to campaign as a strong, decisive
war leader, a strategy that is
to prove electorally successful given the growing mood of political,
moral and religious fundamentalism in the USA.
*Of the leaders of the
three nations that committed troops to the invasion of Iraq, only
Australia's Prime Minister John Howard shows no obvious signs of political
damage as a result. His clever terms of deployment, and sheer luck,
are to result in no Australian military fatalities by the time of the
Australian election, a valuable point in his favour to voters of whom
a majority opposed the commitment. Opinion polls throughout the world,
meanwhile, show however that the USA is now unpopular as never before,
even among the populations of traditional European allies whose governments
have slavishly supported the US over Iraq.
*An horrific terror bombing
occurs in the Spanish capital of Madrid in March 2004, and shows that
the Al Qaeda organisation still packs deadly clout. It further indicts
the Bush administration's decision to "fumble the ball" on
the terror group in favour of an attack on Iraq, despite the Administration's
alleged focus of a "war on terror". In Spanish domestic terms,
the outrage leads to an electoral backlash against the Government. A
political party that had positioned Spain in support of the invasion
of Iraq despite the overwhelming opposition of the Spanish people, is
now evicted from office.
*Suddenly the governments
of other US allies that have defied their population's opinion to also
support the US attack on Iraq now look electorally vulnerable for that
decision. Just as other countries have dramatically affected Iraq's
history up till now, Iraq has clearly itself become an active factor
in the domestic politics of many nations in 2004. However the resultant
outcomes are to defy prediction in several cases.
*The US-led coalition seems,
nevertheless, unprepared for what happens next. They have begun to experience
the realities that have always underpinned Iraqi politics since the
foundations of the modern Iraqi state, and which none of their leaders
seem to have understood very well. Their "adventure in neo-colonialism"
now threatens sooner or later to come back to haunt them.
*By the end of June 2004,
Iraq is in a position similar to that of the 1930s. It is no longer
formally under the control of Western occupiers, but will remain under
Western dominance, with foreign forces in a position of effective control.
The stated goal of the now unofficial occupiers is to bring Iraq to
full independence. However the foreign armies will still control the
"security" situation and command Iraqi forces, and the "independent"
government will not have the right to ask them to leave in reality,
whatever the diplomatic fiction. The occupiers have also stated that
they will not allow certain political outcomes. It is therefore clear
t |