1921-1929

· In 1921 Britain "allocates" Mesopotamia (now called Iraq) a Hashemite king, Feisal I. (click here for his origins). Britain also "gives" neighbouring Transjordan -another nearby Arab portion of the former Turkish Empire - as a kingdom to Feisal's brother, Abdullah. The imposition of Feisal in Iraq is widely unpopular. However a numbers of wealthy families, such as the Chalabis, side with the King and the British, in return for various privileges.

· Iraq is now a country, but not a united one. Various ethnic, religious and social groups view each other with suspicion and/or resentment. The larger groups include Arabs of the Sunni and Shi'ite religious persuasions, Kurds (who are non-Arabs & mainly Sunni Moslems), Assyrians (Christians who have recently fled from Anatolia), Turkomen (ethnic Turks), Chaldean Christians, and Jews. In addition, new creeds such as communism, socialism, and pan-Arab nationalism are making inroads and causing ferment.

· Throughout Iraqi history there is always a "Kurdish issue". The Kurds are a non-Arab people who are spread among several nations (principally Turkey, Iraq, Iran & Syria), and dream of an independent Kurdistan. However promises of freedom or at least autonomy made to them by governments and outsiders are regularly dishonoured. 1920's revolts by Iraqi Kurds and other Iraqis are brutally suppressed by British forces, whose tactics include the use of poison gases sprayed from the air.

· The first Iraqi oil concession is granted in 1925. Oil is to become critical to Iraq's further history.

· An Iraqi government is formed in 1926, but Britain retains veto power over legislation. The British also continue to maintain military forces and air bases in Iraq, to ensure overall British control.

· Britain trains and equips an Iraqi army to help maintain security. During the 1920s and 1930s the Army is the only real unifying force in Iraq. It continues to grow in influence, and becomes a focus for intrigue.

1940 - 1958

*The Army has become steadily more powerful behind the scenes. In 1941 a coup by anti-British, nationalist army officers takes place. The regent, Prince Abdul Ilah, & Prime Minister Nuri al Said flee the country. Britain lands reinforcements in Basra. Iraqi forces attempt to resist them, but in thirty days British forces rout the army of the new Government, & re-install Abdul Ilah and Nuri al Said.

*As 1948 begins, Abdul Ilah and Nuri al Said are secretly re-negotiating a new version of the 1930 treaty with Britain, to be known as the Portsmouth Agreement. This news breaks at a time of heightened Arab nationalistic feeling, due to public sympathy in Iraq for the plight of Palestinian Arabs. Angry mass demonstrations occur, and some protesters are shot.

*The regent Abdul Ilah then disowns the new treaty. However riots spread into an uprising, and hundreds are reported killed as Government forces suppress the rebels. The current Prime Minister flees to Britain, and is replaced. In response, the Iraqi Parliament votes to reject the new treaty, and Iraq moves to support the Palestinian Arabs. Communists are blamed for the disturbances, and several communist leaders are hanged and their bodies strung up in public.

*The Jewish community, associated with Babylon for over two thousand years, numbers around 2.6% of the Iraqi population in 1947. However they feel an enormous backlash to the Palestinian Arab defeat in 1948. Hostility worsens when Iraqi troops dispatched to support the Palestinians are accused of inaction, and by some, of having been betrayed from within the government.

*The government of Muzahim al-Pachachi then collapses, and Nuri al-Said is again Prime Minister. Seizing an opportunity for some cheap popularity, Nuri threatens the Jewish community with expulsion if Palestinian Arabs are not allowed to return to their homes. In the end, strongly encouraged by the Israeli government - which sends agents to induce them to migrate to Israel - most Jews use a 1950 law to leave Iraq permanently.  By 1952 the "exiles who remained by the waters of Babylon" have finally "remembered Zion".  Of a once thriving community, only a few now remain in Iraq.

*In 1951, in Saudi Arabia, the al-Saud dynasty secures a new agreement with the Aramco oil company, introducing a favourable 50-50 profit sharing arrangement. Meanwhile in Iran the oil industry is nationalised. Threatened by unfavourable comparisons, Nuri al Said re-negotiates with the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company. He secures a 50-50 deal also, with other fringe benefits. As a result, and thanks to much higher production due to a booming world oil demand, Iraqi government oil revenues increase sixfold by 1958. A basis for future Iraqi prosperity is now established.

*In 1953 the young King Faisal II comes of age, and formally assumes the throne. However the regent Abdul Ilah now assumes the title of Crown Prince, and continues to dominate the monarchy.

*In 1954 Nuri al Said, Prime Minister again, dissolves all political parties. After making "communist sympathies" an imprisonable offence, and suppressing all his other opponents, he stages an "election" in which 85% of the candidates are his unopposed supporters.

*Liking the cut of Nuri's "anti-communist" coat (the communist party in Iraq was by now the most successful in the Arab world), the US begins to become directly involved in Iraqi affairs. The 1955 Baghdad Pact groups Iraq in a pro-Western alliance. This pact is created at the instigation of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, although the US is technically not a full member.  In 1956 the US lends "military assistance" to the Iraqi Government.

*Following a failed British-French intervention at Suez in 1956, revolutionary trends of pan-Arabism sweep the Middle East. They are led by the charismatic figure of the young Egyptian leader, Colonel Abdel Gamal Nasser. In 1958 Egypt and Syria attempt to give pan-Arabism concrete reality by combining to form the United Arab Republic. As a Hashemite counter, the Iraqi & Jordanian governments decide to merge as "the Arab Union". Nuri al Said is to be its first Prime Minister.

*Meanwhile, Nasserites, Ba'athists (an "Arab renaissance" movement that began in Syria), and Communists alike have been organizing in the Iraqi army and in Iraqi society generally. The declarations of the "United Arab Republic" and the "Arab Union" polarise opinion, and a secret group of Army figures, the "Free Officers", launches a coup on 14 July 1958.

* The coup leader is Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem, with Colonel Abdul Salam Aref as his deputy. They declare Iraq a republic. Enormous crowds throng the streets of major cities, amidst enthusiasm comparable to that of the French revolution. The royal family is gunned down at the Rihab palace, and premier Nuri al Said flees, dressed in woman's clothes. He is detected and slain. In Baghdad, over a hundred thousand people gather to tear down the statues of King Feisal I and General Maude (the British "conqueror of Baghdad").

* Many close collaborators of the British occupation are forced to flee. Among these are the Chalabi family, wealthy secular Shi'ites who manage to take much of their money and their 13 year old son Ahmad with them. In 2003 he is to be flown back into Iraq by the US, as the Pentagon's intended "brave new leader".

1971- 1979

· In its "twilight of Empire" Britain withdraws military forces from "east of Suez", formally ceding leadership of the Western Alliance to the United States. Three British-held islands controlling access to the Persian Gulf, now vacated, are then occupied by Iran (1971), in an action the Iraqi government feels was a plot against it. Iraq breaks diplomatic relations with Iran & Britain.

· In alliance with the Shah of Iran, the United States now militarily dominates the Persian Gulf, through its massive fleet and an air base in Saudi Arabia. Britain remains committed, however, to "the oil pump named Kuwait", and nearby oil-rich sheikdoms.

· In the 1970s, with the price of oil soaring and the oil industry itself now under local control, the Iraqi people's standard of living rises dramatically. Iraq is becoming a prosperous, secular society, perhaps the only example of both features in the Middle East. The regime becomes genuinely popular for a time with at least the Sunni population, but crushes any who oppose it.

· Iraq now signs a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, & legalises its remnant Communist Party, to gain access to Russian largesse, arms, expertise and technology. These actions alarm the US government.

· In 1973 Iraq joins other Arab states in the war with Israel, and also joins an oil export boycott against states supporting Israel.

· The less militant wing of the Communist Party is officially brought into the Iraqi Government in 1973. Saddam Hussein, however, is now in charge of the Iraqi security apparatus. He is in fact busy eliminating remaining Communist influence in Iraq behind the scenes, prompting charges that he is a secret American agent. Saddam is steadily becoming the real power in the Ba'ath leadership.

· In 1974 there are heavy armed clashes with Iran. The UN brokers a ceasefire.

· The Shah of Iran, with US support, has been supplying the "'Kurdish Democratic Party" of Mustapha Barzani in northern Iraq with money and weapons, to destabilise the Iraqi regime. Renewed Kurdish attacks in 1974, with Iranian assistance, are now effective. Saddam Hussein is sent by the alarmed Ba'ath Party to a meeting in Algiers, where a secret deal is reached with the Shah's representatives. Iraq makes territorial concessions to Iran, while Iran withdraws support from the Iraqi Kurds and seals the border. The Kurds are betrayed, and their resistance rapidly collapses in 1975.

· The Iraqi Kurdish rebel movement now splits. The KDP is still led by Mustapha Barzani, but a new grouping, the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), is headed by Jalal Talabani.

· To hamstring any future Kurdish revolts, Saddam deports large numbers of Kurds living near the Iranian & Turkish borders to southern Iraq. He also encourages Arab Iraqis to move north and settle in key areas such as the oil zone of Kirkuk, to dilute Kurdish strength there.

· By now leader behind the scenes, & soon to promote himself to the rank of General (though not a genuine army officer), Saddam Hussein still lacks personal legitimacy or recognition. He dreams of mass popularity among the Arabs like the late Colonel Nasser, and of military glory like the Saladdin who defeated the Crusaders, or the ancient Babylonian kings whose ruins he is soon to rebuild.

· However, to be a player on the world stage Saddam need some recognition from America. But the US government backs his enemy the Shah of Iran, and is hostile to the pro-Russian tilt of the Iraqi government, a tilt that has netted Iraq useful aid, weapons and influence.  Saddam now decides to play the other way, and woo the US in its turn.

· Previously, Iraq had given shelter in Najaf to an anti-Shah Iranian Shi'ite cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In October 1978 Saddam orders him expelled from Iraq. As well that year, he removes the token Communists from the Iraqi government and executes more communists. He also purges pro-Syrian elements from the Iraqi Ba'ath party. The stage is set for a rapprochement with America, but the US still prefers the Shah as "their man" in the area.

· In mid July 1979 Saddam induces his cousin President Al-Bakr to retire, and assumes the formal leadership of Iraq. Within two weeks he massively purges the Ba'ath Party leadership, alleging a plot against him. Many leading figures are shot, and the remainder cowed. It is a "pre-emptive strike" against any who might later oppose him.

· From his new European exile, Ayatollah Khomeini has meanwhile been rapidly fomenting rebellion against the unpopular Shah in Iran.  Early in 1979 a Shi'ite revolution imbued with anti-American fervour sweeps Iran. The Shah is deposed and flees to Egypt. US opinion feels humiliated by a long "hostage crisis" at the US embassy in Teheran, & a failed US rescue attempt.

· Ayatollah Khomeini calls for Islamic revolution throughout the Muslim world, but finds little support in countries where the rival Sunni strain of Islam is predominant. However the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf - with large Shi'ite populations - fear revolution, while the house of Saud in Saudi Arabia feels threatened by this new & militant regional rival.

· US power-brokers look for a strong new regional leader to oppose Khomeini, and help them avenge their own perceived humiliation. (They ignore the fact that it is precisely their own previous meddling in Iran that has largely created anti-American sentiment there in the first place). There is one obvious candidate -Saddam in Iraq.

· Ayatollah Khomeini denounces the US as "the great Satan", and the secular Iraqi Ba'athist regime as a lesser but no less "Satanic" force that is oppressing Shi'ite "true believers" in Iraq. He calls for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. In response, some Iraqi Shi'ite militants make an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Saddam's Premier Tariq Aziz, and other Ba'athist leaders. ·

· Saddam reacts with fury, and suppresses pro-Iranian southern Iraqi Shi'ites. He executes some pro-Khomeini Shi'ite clergy, and also expels thousands of perceived Shi'ite militants to Iran. Tensions rise, as the two regional powers call for the downfall of each other's regime.

· Saddam now decides to humiliate and if possible overthrow his new mortal enemy, Khomeini, with a "lightening war". He is confident of an easy victory, because he believes the Iranian army to be without effective leadership, because of the purging of the Shah's generals and the jailing of many officers.

· Like President Bush in 2003, Saddam believes a quick, successful war is a "sure winner". His tick list is large. It will rally Iraqis behind him, & give his leadership legitimacy and popularity. War will make him adored in the Middle East as an Arab champion against the Persians. It will strike dumb the Syrian Ba'athists, who are openly scoffing at him, and it will secure him American support, by acting as a US proxy against the Iranian militants. In all of these except the last he miscalculates badly.

1989 - 1991

*In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini dies. Of his ten years at the helm of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, eight were consumed by a disastrous war. The accidental fall of his body from the coffin seems to symbolise the end of his larger world dream.

*For his part, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein in 1989 feels a deep sense of frustration. He knows all too well how false his claims of a great victory are. As a calculating sociopath, he has no qualms about replacing the war with a gigantic expansion of his "cult of personality", to soothe his own wounded ego and help maintain his political grip. It becomes impossible in Iraq to escape from depictions of his manic grin in every possible medium.

*Also in 1989, Ba'ath Party founder Michel Aflaq dies, aged 79. He is the one senior Ba'athist who Saddam always revered.

*Contrary to later propaganda that he is a madman, Saddam is in fact a sane but rat-cunning, ruthless political operator, with a strong sense of personal survival and a highly developed ability for political & personal manipulation. Contrary again to "coalition of the willing" propaganda, the Iraqi dictator does not rule by terror alone, but strives to charm and manipulate as a first line of advance. He finesses the careful use of rewards for loyal adherents and demotions for the more ambivalent. The hostile, however, better look to their funeral arrangements.

*Saddam wants to be loved by the people, who he believes worship his strength (as some do). He is also a risk-taker when under threat, an attitude reinforced by the precepts of the ideology he has adopted wholesale from his mentor, Ba'ath founder Michel Aflaq. Where his charisma and preferment skills fail him, then intimidation, brutality, torture or execution are second nature for Saddam. Ba'athist "ends justify the means" principles provide convenient cover for his amoral personality type. Basically, however, he is a political hoodlum hoping to fly high, and stay there indefinitely.

* Saddam drapes himself in the mystical ideology of the Ba'ath in much the same way as Stalin did the Marxism of Lenin, and with apparently equal cynicism in practice. But Saddam has a fatal flaw at his lesser helm, one that will sink his hopes of now strutting the international stage as a respected leader. As a small-town Mafioso writ large, he is devoid of military genius or intellectual range. He can parrot the Ba'athist style in speeches and writings, and has great organisational ability, but lacks the depth and cross-cultural understanding needed to deal successfully with the still wilier operatives of the great powers. The latter are soon to box him in from his ambitions. And in the end, to haul him triumphantly from a pit in the ground, to prove it is in fact they who can tell the biggest lies, and get away with it (so far).

*Donald Rumsfeld again visits Iraq on unspecified business, as do many US corporate executives in search of post-war deals. Deals are done, but Saddam has a larger problem.

*Following the peace with Iran, Iraq faces extreme financial difficulty. The government begins to default on its debt repayments. There are many large bills to pay, and much rebuilding to do. Iraqi debts are in fact over $US80 billion, and in 1990 debt repayment alone amounts to over 50% of Iraqi oil income. The people also need appeasing. They had become very prosperous by regional standards under the post-monarchical regimes, and look to a return of the good times.

*Saddam asks the Gulf sheikdoms and Saudi Arabia to "forgive" the $40 billion they lent him for the war, and also, to contribute extra to Iraqi reconstruction. He feels they owe him this for protecting them from Iran, & that being rich they can afford it anyway. He is rebuffed.

*Another factor working against Saddam is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of his immediate usefulness to the West, he can no longer play the great powers against each other for continuing largesse. There is now some American aid, but he needs a lot more money, quickly, to bolster his rule. What he can least afford now is a large drop in oil prices. When it happens, he is furious.

*Saddam believes the price of oil is falling because Kuwait & the Gulf States are exceeding their OPEC quotas, to selfishly make more money at his expense (in fact they are trying to insulate themselves from a price decline already in progress, but the effect is the same). He also believes Kuwait is cleverly stealing oil from an underground reservoir that crosses under their common border.

*Iraq has long held a claim to Kuwait. Now it seems to Saddam, smarting from the drawn-out fiasco of war with a populous and resourceful Iran, that seizing Kuwait is by contrast the perfect military excursion. No serious resistance could be offered by the minuscule Kuwaiti armed forces. In one stroke, achievable within hours, he would have a genuine victory at arms. More importantly, he could easily solve all his financial problems, by quickly & with little effort taking over this immensely rich mini-State, so conveniently situated right on his doorstep.

*To a thug like Saddam, the thought is suddenly irresistible. Now he is in America's good books, who would oppose him? The old bete noire Britain, traditional protector of the al-Sabah sheiks of Kuwait, will splutter but do nothing.  For Britain these days defers to America in the Middle East, as it has done since 1956 in Suez, when British leaders humbled themselves to US will. As long as the US does not oppose him, there is no problem.

*Saddam talks about his difficulties with Kuwait to the American ambassador, Ms April Glaspie. As in nearly all his dealings with great powers and other cultures, Saddam misreads the signals. Even the fact that the US has sent him a woman as Ambassador appears to his small-town tribal mind to be a concession. For if the US still had serious reservations about him, surely they would have sent a man?

*The inept Ambassador Glaspie, (who has understandably since failed to write her memoirs), tells Saddam she "understood" his "concerns", and that inter-territorial disputes should be solved by the parties concerned. Saddam, who has seen how the US solved the problem of a pint-sized irritant near its border by force (Grenada), wrongly takes these statements as a green light to annex Kuwait. In fact it appears that the (first) Bush administration's intention was only to allow him to pressure Kuwait into some concessions on the oil issue.

*Saddam then presents Kuwait with a rigorous list of demands, which the Kuwaitis reject. The next day (2 August 1990) Iraqi forces cross the border, and capture Kuwait in short order.

*The US rejects the occupation, which most Kuwaitis also oppose. Since Kuwait is a member of both the Arab League & the UN, no other states are prepared to openly support Saddam. Only Hashemite Jordan, possibly motivated by a unique long-term dynastic agenda, and definitely wary of its own, large, pro-Saddam Palestinian population, is at all sympathetic

*Various negotiations fail to achieve a diplomatic solution. Saddam, now playing in the major league, repeatedly misreads his opponents. US President George Bush Snr successfully involves the UN, and patiently gathers a large coalition of nations into a huge multi-national expeditionary force. The mainly US force even includes military units from some Arab states, notably Syria.

*Meanwhile the UN has imposed a total trade & economic blockade on Iraq, & its oil export pipelines are cut off. Iraqi funds abroad are frozen. It is now impossible for Iraq to profit from the seizure of Kuwait.

*Saddam realises his mistake, and offers to withdraw conditionally, but his evasive, face-saving tactics only enrage his opponents instead. Saddam is always obsessed with the notion that a direct and obvious loss of face would mean the end of his rule. By thinking he can deal to impose conditions or extract benefits, his delays instead ensure a devastating military attack. Hoping always for a last-minute extrication, Saddam misplays all his gambits.

*In the Gulf War of 1991 the US-led force, under General "Stormin' Norman" Schwarzkopf, launches Operation Desert Storm. The US military and its allies massively bombard Iraq for six weeks from January, wreaking enormous damage to Iraqi civilian infrastructure as well as military targets. In February, the attackers then drives Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in a quick assault. Iraq's military casualties are huge, while the US suffers hardly any. Iraq rapidly signs a peace agreement on 28 February 1991, after US forces are in a position to advance on Baghdad.

*The US encourages Shi'ites in southern Iraq to rebel against Saddam. However when they do so (early March 1991), the US fails to support them. Saddam, down but not out, uses Republican Guard divisions in a ferocious suppression of the Shi'ite rebellion. Within two weeks the uprising is utterly crushed. More Shi'ites suffer terribly from Saddam at this time than in all the rest of his rule, but the US fails to assist them, a decision leading to future mistrust.

*The northern Kurds also misjudge the moment as a green light to rebel yet again. They are initially successful, and even capture Kirkuk. However a furious regime counter- attack defeats them. Again, the US fails to intervene.

*Fearing reprisals similar to 1988, hundreds of thousands of Kurds flee to dangerous winter-bound border areas. Suffering from acute criticism for its inaction towards Shi'ites & Kurds, the US now imposes no-fly zones, which inhibit the Iraqi army from advancing further into Kurdish areas.

*Saddam responds by launching a "charm offensive", appointing a Shi'ite as Prime Minister & reconciling with Kurdish PUK leader Jalal Talabani.

*In April 1991, UN Security Council resolutions 687 & 688 lay down the victorious coalition's conditions & demands upon Iraq. The next month, UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament) begins to work to identify and ensure the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Saddam, as later evidence is increasingly to show, in fact orders the destruction of his stockpiles of such weapons anyhow, while hoping to retain the ability to eventually develop them again.

*However, in order not to appear supine, he also creates varying degrees of obstruction to the work of the inspectors , sometimes provoking crises where new military threats are made against him. He appears to wish to retain the image of a difficult & dangerous leader, who may have hidden stockpiles. Above all he seeks to avoid at all costs the appearance of being humbled before the West, which situation he sees - possibly correctly - as likely to lead to his overthrow.

*In 1991, after the Gulf War, US President George Bush Snr signs a presidential order directing the CIA to launch a covert operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

 

1997-2000

· In 1997 in the United States a number of Washington hardliners and neo-conservatives form a group called the "Project for the New American Century"(PNAC). Closer examination of the PR euphemisms used by the group show that it is in fact arguing for a belligerent US foreign policy, pitched at total US world supremacy throughout the 21st century. Their aims include direct action against Iraq, to overthrow the regime there and bring Iraq and its oil under a US sphere of influence.

· The PNAC group is officially founded by, and has as chairman, one William Kristol. Kristol also edits the Weekly Standard, an influential right-wing Washington insider's newspaper that is funded by billionaire global media magnate, & former Australian, Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch openly advocates seizing control of Iraq's oil, to support Western economic interests.

· The PNAC brings together some of the most powerful people on the right of US society. They are drawn mainly from the corporate sphere of the super-rich, from neo-conservative Republican political circles, from the military, from Zionists linked with the Likud party in Israel and with "settler" parties to the right of it, and from leading neo-conservative writers and publicists. (NB: some members fit in more than one category).

· Members of the PNAC include: future US Vice President Dick Cheney; future Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; future Deputy Defence Secretary & 2003 Iraq War architect Paul Wolfowitz; former CIA director James Woolsey; senior Pentagon advisor Richard Perle; senior Republican House of Representatives political leader Newt Gingrich; former Republican Vice President Dan Quayle; Florida Governor, former President's son & future President's brother Jeb Bush; retired generals Downing, Glosson and McCaffrey; former Secretary of Education William Bennett; future National Security Council member & convicted Contragate felon Elliott Abrams; billionaire publisher Steve Forbes; and a large assortment of lesser luminaries. After the Presidential election in 2000, members of the group will dominate the foreign policy of the United States. Some analysts are later to claim that the group "runs" future President George W. Bush as their front man. From the beginning, the group has Iraq in its target sights.

· In 1998 the US & Britain again bombard Iraq, for four days (Operation Desert Fox), to punish Saddam for unsatisfactory compliance with UNSCOM inspectors. Inspectors are withdrawn before the bombardment, & afterwards the nettled Saddam refuses to let them return, and refuses further cooperation.

· Also in 1998, after heavy lobbying by the PNAC, the US Congress passes the Iraq Liberation Act. This law provides nearly $100 million for Iraqi opposition groups such as the INC to overthrow the regime in Iraq, but given their fractured & ineffectual nature has little chance of success. The traditional politics of Iraq are of dominance, exclusion and conspiracy, rather than cooperation, consensus or compromise. The INC is a failure, while its leader Ahmad Chalabi receives worse reviews still in Washington. However the neo-conservatives of the PNAC, in particular Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, maintain their support for both Chalabi and the INC.

· From 1999, US and British planes regularly bomb Iraqi military positions in the no-fly zones, claiming that the Iraqis are firing on them or planning to.

May 2003 - 27 June 2004

*To their evident surprise, the occupying forces are soon bogged down in a vicious guerilla war of resistance. The attacks are blamed on "Ba'athist remnants", but it becomes apparent that other groups are involved as well. Al Qaeda allies & sympathisers, various militant Wahabist groups, and others, soon begin to launch their own attacks, responding to a call to arms from Osama bin Laden and other militant leaders. They are eager to avenge an invasion and occupation they see as an intolerable insult to Arab and Sunni Muslim pride.

*US losses in personnel and equipment soon overtake those suffered during the "major fighting" earlier. A defiant President Bush challenges the insurgents to "bring it on", and they obey with relish. The conventional war may be over, but a guerilla war continues to worsen. November 2003 is a "horror month" for the US, as their forces are repeatedly attacked with deadly effect, and even helicopters and tanks are lost.

*However key elements of the situation are about to change. There is soon to be an eclipse of hope for Ba'athists wishing to restore an elusive but still garrulous and publicity-seeking Saddam. The latter's long-winded messages from hiding have surfaced regularly, but it becomes more and more doubtful that he is controlling significant military operations.

*The US invasion has in fact attracted a new "terrorist infrastructure" into Iraq, through the nation's previously well-controlled but now porous borders. Meanwhile, as the prospects of the former regime dim, volatility stirs as traditional groups begin to position themselves for a political struggle.

*While "traditional" Sunni resistance focuses on attacking the US military and those it arms, the Al Qaeda-aligned rebels, led by elusive Jordanian militant Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, create a horrific "resistance of terror bombs", in which military and civilians, perceived collaborators and hapless innocents alike, are blown apart indiscriminately.

*Many attacks are also launched against Shi'ite civilians and their religious leaders, appearing to confirm the Wahabist origins of such assaults. Many Wahabists are believed to have crossed from Saudi Arabia to support the campaign, reminding the Shi'ites, who have long memories, of the bloody sack of Karbala by Wahabist intruders in 1801. The relationship between Shi'ites and Sunnis becomes more difficult as a result.

*"Winning the peace", meanwhile, has proved extremely difficult for the "coalition" forces. Instead they grow increasingly unpopular in many areas, particularly in the cities. They appear slow to come to grips with repairing damage to Iraq's infrastructure caused by the invasion, the long sanctions regime, and the six weeks of concentrated bombing in the first Gulf War. Decisions such as those to disband the large Iraqi Army also cause mass unemployment, and trigger great resentment.

*Under the occupation, most of Iraq's economy is soon declared to be open in future to takeovers from Western corporate interests. Many contenders are linked with figures in the Bush Administration. Only control of oil, very much in the spotlight, is discreetly left alone, at least for the time being.

*As the "playing card pack" of former regime leaders is steadily hunted down, Saddam's vicious sons Uday and Qusay "go down in a blaze of Ba'athist glory", when overwhelmingly outgunned by US land and air forces in a shoot-out in Mosul. However guerilla resistance continues. Saddam Hussein himself, always a survivor, suffers an ignominious capture in a bolthole near his home town of Tikrit in December 2003, after managing to elude his relentless US pursuers for an astounding eight months. Again, resistance still continues.

*The guerilla campaign against coalition troops is now overshadowed by a nightmare of bombing atrocities, which make the US promise to bring security and peace to Iraq via its invasion and occupation the worst of bad jokes.

*2004 brings an evaluation that is sobering to the "coalition of the willing". The excuse for invasion, weapons of mass destruction, has unravelled, and US, British & Australian leaders are soon reduced to appointing committees of enquiry in order to transfer blame to the intelligence community for providing them with the types of reports they required of it in the first place.

*President Bush has by now realised that "the mess in Iraq" threatens his re-election prospects, and that without evidence of a credible "exit strategy" leaving a pro-US regime in place, his political goose may be cooked. The "Coalition Provisional Authority" (CPA) under US administrator Paul Bremer has appointed an "Iraq Governing Council". Now the CPA hastens to produce some kind of political plan to show evidence of progress towards "withdrawal", but finds that agreement is difficult to obtain.

*Shi'ite leaders are refusing to accept the US plan for selecting a government to "hand power to", and occasion abandonment of several proposals. The objecting Shi'ites are well aware that such a government, which evidently will not have the authority to ask coalition troops to leave, will be dependent on the "transformed" occupying armies for an indefinite period.

*The US now rotates its armed forces, making it clear that a "de facto" occupation will continue in reality after the official occupation formally ends. Plans for a US troop reduction are later shelved due to a deteriorating security situation, and Reserve and National Guard units are needed to maintain the US force. The end of the "official" occupation now has a date however, given by the US as June 30, 2004.

*By 10 March 2004, an interim constitution has been agreed to, by members of the US-apppointed "Iraq Governing Council". The document goes far to guarantee individual, religious and ethnic rights in theory. However the constitution does not say to whom power will be handed in the interim, nor does it resolve the essential issues of the federalism it defines, or the borders thereof. Moreover the constitution's veto provisions for the highest executive level, intended to prevent any community dominating any other, may in fact lead to political paralysis & as a result, a coup d'etat or inter-communal violence.

*Supreme Shi'ite leader Ayatollah al-Sistani indicates that the majority Shi'ites are unhappy with the document, and will press for changes later. The "Governing Council" now invites UN representatives to help formulate a means of interim power transference. Ayatollah al-Sistani signals that the Shi'ites will not accept the UN deciding on this matter. Beyond this the senior Shi'ite leadership bides its time, however.

*Bloody fighting erupts in several cities in April 2004 nevertheless, between "coalition" forces and a more radical Shi'ite group. Although the majority of Shi'ites are not involved, the difficulties posed indicate that US hopes of arranging a representative political outcome in Iraq to its liking may represent wishful thinking rather than a sober assessment. Indeed the installation of a client regime serving US purposes but lacking credibility appears to be the only US option at this juncture, under its existing policies.

* Meanwhile a punitive US attack in the town of Falluja leads to heavy civilian casualties, but fierce and effective resistance causes substantial US losses also. April-May 2004 is the worst period of the war so far for US casualties. The Middle Eastern "hero town" status of Sunni Falluja threatens a strategic political defeat for the occupation forces, and an eventual tactical US withdrawal avoids further confrontation. Radical Shi'ite resistance is militarily ineffective by comparison, but continues into June. Meanwhile the US finally pulls back from operations in the Shi'ite holy cities that threaten another strategic political loss. A threat to eliminate militant Shi'ite leader Moqtada Al Sadr is quietly forgotten.

*"Coalition" moral capital is badly diminished at this point by a major prisoner abuse scandal involving mostly US forces, especially at the grim Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. With reconstruction faltering due to a declining security situation, the occupation seems to have slid into a morass. Both the US world image and the popularity of the Bush administration in the USA now reach record lows. Also in June 2004, the official investigation into the "9/11" attacks reports no "credible evidence" that Iraq helped Al Qaeda in any attacks, while by late June a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll shows 54 per cent of Americans think the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.

*The Bush administration seems at this point to pin its hopes on a favourable perception of political developments boosting the acceptability of its Iraq policy. By the end of May 2004 an Iraqi "political consultation" by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is over, and an interim appointed government, dominated by exiles, is soon announced. The key executive position of Prime Minister is a focus of concern for US policy-makers. However the nominee originally favoured by US neo-conservatives & the Pentagon, "Governing Council" member Ahmad Chalabi, is now dramatically disowned by the CPA occupation authority, and is instead accused of betraying secrets to Iran.

*The alternative US- proposed figure is Iyad Allawi. Allawi is head of the Iraqi National Accord, another CIA-supported exile grouping like the INC. The INA is dominated by former Baathists and military officers, and has been a rival to Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress. Allawi is also a secular Shi'ite like Chalabi, with scant support inside Iraq but possibly more credible than his repeatedly discredited rival. Chosen as interim titular president is Sheikh Ghazi Yawar, a Sunni Muslim tribal leader who has spent much of his life abroad.

*The US and Britain now seek Security Council approval for a new resolution formalising the altered arrangements. While US Secretary of State Colin Powell is prepared to concede a theoretical right of the new interim government to ask coalition forces to leave, his statement that he is "not losing any sleep" over the possibility, and his insistence on effective US command of all military forces, indicates that the new, exile-dominated government is in fact largely a dependency of a continuing, though renamed, occupation presence. The proposed new US Embassy of over 3,000 persons in the same location also seems remarkably similar in reality to the former "Coalition Provisional Authority".

*In June 2004 the official investigation into the September 11, 2001 attacks reports no "credible evidence" that Iraq helped Al Qaeda in any attacks against the United States. By late June a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll also shows 54 per cent of Americans now think the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.

*An examination of the situations of the various communities in Iraq now reveals a political can of worms. The majority Shi'ites, betrayed by the US in 1991, welcome the exit of Saddam and the Ba'athists. Nevertheless they mostly see no joy in the presence of American & British forces, whose values threaten their religious beliefs, and who they suspect of wanting to thwart Shi'ite political power. Many Shi'ites in fact want the coalition forces to withdraw as soon as possible, but this has already been refused in negotiations.

*The Shi'ites themselves have negotiated hard over an interim constitution, but are well aware that paper guarantees do not necessarily translate into reality. Can their own position, often one of misery and suppression in the past, be assured without a decisive political dominance over all other groups? They do not accept that Kurds or Sunnis should hold a permanent veto over their political ascendancy. Their future relationship with the formerly dominant Sunnis is unresolved in practice, and carries a profound danger of degenerating into civil war. They also fear that the Kurds want to seize Kirkuk for a capital, and its oil revenues for income, both of which possibilities they reject.

*The perpetual Iraqi minority, the Kurds, always expect to be betrayed, and usually are. They have done well with positions in the new, unelected "interim government", securing, besides a ceremonial vice presidency, the positions of Deputy Prime Minister for National Security and two key Cabinet posts (foreign affairs and defence) plus two lesser ministries. This seems to indicate that the US places more trust in them than other groups.

The trust is unlikely to be shared by either main Arab community, and beyond that the Kurds must rely on a promise on paper of a future promise concerning another piece of paper, to guarantee they can hold onto their existing, hard-won, autonomy. Nor are they satisfied with the territory they currently hold, and resent the presence of Sunni Arabs where they feel the latter have stolen lands and homes. They also worry about potential Shi'ite control of an Iraqi state, while to their rear they fear traditional Turkish claims to northern Iraq, believing Turkey may wish to detach the oil-rich Kirkuk region for itself. Facing an uncertain future in all directions, they bide their time and watch, knowing that armed rebellion is always the Kurdish Plan B.

*Meanwhile, most Sunnis see a presence of occupiers, lost jobs, poverty, national humiliation and further hardships, after long years of suffering dictated by the sanctions of the West. They have already lost their favoured position under Saddam and previous regimes, and now fear a future where they risk a to them insufferable domination by the Shi'ites. Many city Sunnis also fear a loss of all their gains in modernity,secularism and women's rights since 1958, if Shi'ites gain power. As well, many of their northern brethren seem in danger of displacement by the Kurds, and they fear that the latter may also seek to detach the northern oil regions from Arab control, a potentially grievous future financial loss. It is not an encouraging outlook overall, from their point of view.

*Of other minorities, the Turkomen are anxious about Kurdish and Arab intentions towards them. Even the Christian groups, whose position seems better, fear a resentful backlash if their situation improves too much while others face difficulties, and they are especially alarmed by Sunni Islamist hostility towards them, already manifested in attacks on Christian churches and businesses. Remnants of the Communist party, meanwhile, hope, albeit forlornly in all probability, for a revival of their previous strength. They are one of the few political groups to successfully cross ethnic & religious divides, but in community-bound Iraq this virtue has lead only to their near oblivion.

*Many individual Iraqis, of course, show tolerance for other groups and express sincere hopes of a united future for their country. However their voices risk being drowned out if the political temperature rises much higher, as the prospect of some genuine internal self-government now approaches.

*The US & Britain now find they have few reliable friends in their occupation, and are in fact sitting on a political time bomb, about which American leaders in particular seems to understand little.

*Britain, which committed a startling near-third of its Army to the invasion, is once again dominant in Basra and southern Iraq, and is in a position to reap economic and oil benefits from its substantial commitment. As a junior coalition partner, however, the British risk being dragged down by American political and military blunders to the north.

*Meanwhile the UK PM, Tony Blair, has suffered huge political damage because of his unwavering "me too" support of President Bush's policies, and faces a substantial loss of credibility because of a growing perception that his Iraq policy was founded on deceiving the British public.

*President Bush himself now risks repeating the political fate of his father as a one-term leader, if there is much more bad news from Iraq. His dilemma is that US disengagement from officially occupying Iraq may put much potential bad news out of any real hope of control. As there becomes some political power for Iraqis to fight over, the likelihood of situations developing that will make avowed US political aims in Iraq untenable, increases daily.

*But to abort the prescribed Iraqi political process until after the US Presidential elections carries equal, or greater, risk of electoral disaster. President Bush is now between a rock and a hard place, with only the hope of the capture of Osama bin Laden offering a good prospect of a temporary boost to his sagging popularity. In the event, after briefly flirting with a "peace President" tag, Bush decides to campaign as a strong, decisive war leader, a strategy that is to prove electorally successful given the growing mood of political, moral and religious fundamentalism in the USA.

*Of the leaders of the three nations that committed troops to the invasion of Iraq, only Australia's Prime Minister John Howard shows no obvious signs of political damage as a result. His clever terms of deployment, and sheer luck, are to result in no Australian military fatalities by the time of the Australian election, a valuable point in his favour to voters of whom a majority opposed the commitment. Opinion polls throughout the world, meanwhile, show however that the USA is now unpopular as never before, even among the populations of traditional European allies whose governments have slavishly supported the US over Iraq.

*An horrific terror bombing occurs in the Spanish capital of Madrid in March 2004, and shows that the Al Qaeda organisation still packs deadly clout. It further indicts the Bush administration's decision to "fumble the ball" on the terror group in favour of an attack on Iraq, despite the Administration's alleged focus of a "war on terror". In Spanish domestic terms, the outrage leads to an electoral backlash against the Government. A political party that had positioned Spain in support of the invasion of Iraq despite the overwhelming opposition of the Spanish people, is now evicted from office.

*Suddenly the governments of other US allies that have defied their population's opinion to also support the US attack on Iraq now look electorally vulnerable for that decision. Just as other countries have dramatically affected Iraq's history up till now, Iraq has clearly itself become an active factor in the domestic politics of many nations in 2004. However the resultant outcomes are to defy prediction in several cases.

*The US-led coalition seems, nevertheless, unprepared for what happens next. They have begun to experience the realities that have always underpinned Iraqi politics since the foundations of the modern Iraqi state, and which none of their leaders seem to have understood very well. Their "adventure in neo-colonialism" now threatens sooner or later to come back to haunt them.

*By the end of June 2004, Iraq is in a position similar to that of the 1930s. It is no longer formally under the control of Western occupiers, but will remain under Western dominance, with foreign forces in a position of effective control. The stated goal of the now unofficial occupiers is to bring Iraq to full independence. However the foreign armies will still control the "security" situation and command Iraqi forces, and the "independent" government will not have the right to ask them to leave in reality, whatever the diplomatic fiction. The occupiers have also stated that they will not allow certain political outcomes. It is therefore clear t