Iraq Page, 2008

http://www.iraqbodycount.net

The Iraqi civilian death toll caused by the Bush administration-led invasion and occupation continues to mount.
These figures are a conservative, verified minimum and probably far less than the true total.

Congratulations, President-elect Obama!

(George Bush, you're fired)

for December 2008 Editorials & updates click here

Including December lead editorial:

The Treaty Finale - an al Maliki win is hopefully a watershed

NO WAR : A memorable image that caught the imagination of millions...

December 2008 Editorials

1. The Treaty Finale - an al Maliki win is hopefully a watershed

Al Maliki makes his play

Treaty Drama- the Final Acts

Sunnis last gambit

The treaty passes

2.  Violence and politics in Iraq

By Other Means

3. War of Words over Kurds continues

4. Goodbye and Good Riddance, George Bush

 

 

 1. The Treaty Finale - an al Maliki win is hopefully a watershed

Al Maliki makes his play

When Iraqi PM Nuri al Maliki recently returned the November 6 latest " final text" version of the SOFA pact to Team Bush requesting yet further amendments, he was playing a form of hardball possibly learned from Team Bush itself. It was hardball, however, that exceeded the latter's own performance.

For in the dying days of their term in office the Bushites could only lose further face by a failure of the proposed SOFA security pact. Al Maliki however could play it either way and win out. He had, after all, the prospect of negotiation with President-elect Obama available as an appealing alternative.

The seven long months of treaty negotiations had involved a series of often humiliating and unprecedented concessions by the Team Bush side (Team Bush insisted to the end that it wasn't actually a treaty, a position that cut no ice within Iraq itself). The last "post-final" round won two more concessions for the Iraqis, deleting a provision allowing for an extension of the June 30 2009 date to withdraw US combat forces from Iraqi cities, and specifying that consultation on home raids and searches be with the Iraqi government rather than authorities of US choosing. With that, al Maliki changed his position and finally decided to endorse the agreement.

After drawing out negotiations for so many long months, al Maliki next proved how his "longwindedness" was merely tactical, becoming almost a blur of speed as he promptly threw all his resources into securing the pact's passage. His chief selling point was to characterise it as a date-certain "withdrawal agreement", the very opposite of what George Bush was originally proposing. Indeed the treaty has now officially mutated into an agreement "on the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq" and the "organization of their activities during their temporary presence", words that must be bitter fruit to Team Bush, given its earlier, adamant "we'll stay as long as we see fit" type declarations. 

Indeed the final version has very different conditions from the original ones, mandating fixed maximum date US pullbacks and final withdrawal by the end of 2011. In fact, Iraqi amendments also provide that either party can now insist on an earlier withdrawal, subject to one year's notice. This gives President-elect Obama the chance to make a significantly faster pullout if he honours his campaign commitments.

To be able to claim broad national consensus for the pact, though, al Maliki needed significant Sunni support. At first this seemed doubtful. "We cannot say yes and we cannot say no," said an Iraqi Islamic Party spokesman in a classic quote, rationalising his remark with a call for a national referendum. At least one Sunni faction, the National Dialogue Front (led by Saleh al-Mutlaq) declared hostility. Among the Shi'ites, Sadrist opposition was firm while the Fadhila party also joined the Sadrists in rejecting the agreement. Meanwhile the secular bloc led by former interim PM Ayad Allawi seemed divided. Clearly, the treaty would be a hard sell without some arm-twisting and horse-trading. But secret talks to gain enough support were soon under way.

By Friday 14 November al Maliki was ready to make his change of position public, first informing George Bush in a phone call. On Sunday November 16 the Iraqi Cabinet endorsed the revised pact on al Maliki's recommendation, the first of several political hurdles. Actually, not only a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) pact was approved but also another one outlining the framework for political, civil, economic, cultural and legal 'cooperation'.

After this al Maliki pulled out all the stops in a rush to push the SOFA treaty through. The very next day, 17 November, Iraqi MPs received copies of the final amended agreement to study. On 18 November al Maliki went on Iraqi TV to urge support for the pact, also saying "I confirm that there are no secret articles and no permanent military bases on the land of Iraq". He precluded any US attack on Iran from Iraq with the words "Iraq will never be a conduit or a staging ground for an attack on any other nation." He also hedged his bets a little by adding "I say to you with complete honesty that we have reservations about the agreement", but still advocated passing it.

Meanwhile Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the chief spiritual 'Guide' to Iraq's majority Shi'ites, seemed to harden his stance by saying that "any agreement that . . . diminishes Iraqi sovereignty, security or its economy, or that doesn't gain national accordance, cannot be accepted".  Al Sistani made it clear that his own sine qua non was for parties other than the Shi'ites to accept the deal. This put pressure on the Iraqi government to secure broad support in the Parliament including Sunni support, and made some sort of concession towards the Sunni parties inevitable. Al Maliki was now faced by the same difficulties for the treaty that Team Bush was earlier, i.e. selling something mistrusted to a wary, sceptical and sometimes hostile audience.

Treaty Drama - the Final Acts

The final parliamentary vote on the treaty was originally scheduled for Monday November 24, a week after MPs received copies of the agreement to study. A reading of the proposal on November 19 ended in chaos and a melee in which punches were thrown. The Sadrists led the physical opposition, and also tried to submit a bill that would require a two-thirds majority for parliamentary approval of the agreement instead of a simple majority. They also staged a mass rally against the pact in central Baghdad's Firdoos Square on Friday 21 November. None of these tactics worked however, although they did lead to a small delay.

The crunch question was, did al Maliki have the numbers?  It seemed doubtful at first, with only the Kurds and his own relatively small Dawa party unequivocally on board. Kurdish support was not in doubt even though the Kurds did not like all features of the agreement, because the pact meant that the day of US departure is postponed for some time yet, up to three years. US forces in Iraq are regarded by the Kurds as a major restraint on centralist Arab pressures against them, and indeed the Kurds are the only large Iraqi faction enthusiastic for an American military presence.

The key wildcard was the attitude of the powerful Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) faction, a Shi'ite group closely aligned with Iran and perhaps the most important Shi'ite party. Up till now ISCI had refused to back the treaty. However its leader Abdul Aziz al Hakim now threw his weight behind the agreement. He quickly visited Tehran, and gathered acceptance there from all but the hardest-line members of the Iranian regime not to oppose the revised pact any longer.

21 November was perhaps the crunch date. On that day the Iraq parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence voted to support the agreement, highly significant because the committee is headed by Hadi al Amiri, the leader of the Badr Corps, the former (?) armed wing of the ISCI party. This was an open statement that the political equation had changed and the treaty now had majority Shi'ite support, the largest hurdle to be passed.

The leaders of all political blocs except the Sadrists then took part in a "closed doors" meeting aimed at a general deal to pass the treaty. What carrots and sticks were brought out there is unclear, but the meeting appeared to end in broad agreement in principle that a treaty was desirable.

On Saturday 22 November parliamentary discussion resumed for a more orderly second reading. At the end of a six-hour debate parliamentary speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani declared that a final vote would now be taken on Wednesday 26 November.

Sunnis last gambit

At this point the Sunni factions decided to try and extract some last minute concessions. They knew that as they were now in a position to effectively sabotage the deal at the final post, and with no time left after that to rescue it in a new version, they could make strong demands and expect something substantial in return. Their manoeuvring delayed the Wednesday 26 vote, which was then postponed to 10am Thursday morning.

The Sunni bloc's tactics paid off for them. Their apparent gains were impressive. They obtained a three-page "Charter of Political Reform", approved by a vote on the Thursday. Most provisions of the charter have however been stated before, which led cynics to wonder how seriously it will be taken. Time alone will verify or invalidate that.

The major provisions of the Charter commit the government to integrating Awakening Council militias into the security forces or government employment; recruiting more Sunnis into the police and army; working to release Sunni detainees not charged with any crimes; a less confrontational approach to reformed insurgents and former Baathists; and allowing more Sunni participation in political decision- making.

The largest plum however was a pledge to put the SOFA agreement to a public referendum by the middle of next year. As the pact would have binding effect anyway at this year's end, it seemed unclear what practical effect any later rejection might have. Some claimed that legally it would not invalidate the treaty but merely be a statement of public approval or disapproval; others that it could force rapid US withdrawal if rejected. One thing was certain though, as a public relations gesture showing Sunni influence it sounded impressive.

The treaty passes

On Thursday 27 November the delayed vote finally took place. Of 275 MPs only 198 or 72% were in attendance, a poor showing for such a key decision. The absent included one Shi'ite party, the Fadhila (Islamic Virtue, with 15 MPs), who staged a boycott instead of voting against the bill. The treaty passed with 149 votes in favour. This was a scant 54% of total MPs, but 75% of those in attendance.

With only 49 votes cast against however, it was possible for PM al Maliki to claim broad support, with only one major bloc, the Sadrists, voting their 30 MPs unanimously against the pact. The three largest groupings, the (Shi'ite) United Iraqi Alliance, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the (Sunni) Iraqi Accord Front all voted in favour.

A final political hurdle is approval by the three-member Iraqi Presidential Council. However there did not appear to be any obstacle there once the referendum provision and the Charter of Political Reform were added to the deal, ensuring the support of Sunni Vice President Tariq al Hashemi. The Presidential Council's approval will bring the pact into law.

Remarkably Iran has now accepted the deal too, albeit grudgingly, although its extremist President Ahmadinejad still seems opposed (but mostly isolated) on the issue. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman declared on 1 December that Iran will fully support the pact if Iraqis approve it in next year's referendum.

However opposition is far from dead. Before the deal was voted on Mahdi Army leader Moqtada al Sadr upped the ante by naming a foreshadowed continuing armed resistance unit as the "Promised Day Brigade," whose members he said should attack remaining US occupation forces if the agreement he strongly opposes was signed. A rocketing of the Green Zone in the capital on 29th November, causing 17 casualties, seemed to be the first instalment of that.

Shi'ite spiritual "Guide" Grand Ayatollah al Sistani also seemed less than thrilled. Without rejecting the deal outright he said it gives the Americans the upper hand and does not do enough to protect Iraqi sovereignty; indeed that it provides "no guarantee" that Iraq would regain sovereignty; and might not protect Iraq's assets. However he indicated he would leave it to Iraq's voters to pass a verdict themselves in the proposed national referendum next year.

The treaty in its final form is a far cry from the Team Bush original. Hopefully its now unequivocal and date certain agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces (after an admittedly lengthy period, but one which may be accelerated); plus the removal of George Bush from the equation as US leader, and his replacement by a figure far more acceptable to Iraqis and indeed the rest of the world in general, will give it a chance to be useful. A chance indeed to contribute substantially towards healing the dreadful traumas inflicted on the unhappy land of Iraq by the arrogant and illegal invasion of a particular US President, one whose ruinous term in office the overwhelming majority of both US and world citizenry will now be happy to consign to the dustbin of history.

 

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2. Violence and Politics in Iraq

There were the usual slew of bombings in Iraq during November. A suicide car bomber in a minibus rammed a police checkpoint on the road to Baghdad airport on 5 November, killing six people including three policemen and wounding twelve. Two suicide vest bombers killed at least eight people and wounded 14 in an attack on a police headquarters just outside the al Anbar capital of Ramadi on November 8. Twenty-three people were killed and scores more wounded on 12 November in a third straight day of car and roadside bombings in Baghdad.

And so it continued. In the northern Iraqi town of Tal Afar on November 16 a bombing killed 10 people and wounded another 20. The same day, a suicide car bomb at a police checkpoint east of Baquba, provincial capital of Diyala province, killed at least 15 people, including seven policemen, and wounded 20 more. Three bombings in Baghdad on 24 November, involving two roadside bombs and a female suicide vest bomber, killed 19 and wounded 22, while a suicide bomber in a Shi'ite mosque in Musaib, in Babil province south of Baghdad, on 28 November killed nine people and wounded 15 more. 29th November brought a rocketing of the Green Zone in the capital, killing two contractors and wounding 15 - in this incident a Mahdi Army offshoot was suspected. In Mosul, still insurgency-ridden, there are up to a dozen bombings on most days.

This of course is the new, "less-violent" Iraq. Attacks in the capital now average "only" four a day, down 90% from the peak of the insurgency in 2006 according to the US command. Seventeen US service personnel died in Iraq during November. According to icasualties figures, Iraqi security forces lost 27, a recent low, but Iraqi civilians were unluckier with 290 reported killed in war-related violence, compared with 248 the previous month. That was the highest figure in four months, but still lower than all the figures in the three years prior to then. Iraq remains a very dangerous place, where life may be extinguished at any moment. "The peace of the just" there is, unhappily, still a long way off.

By Other Means

Apart from the SOFA treaty November brought another important announcement, on the 18th, when the Iraqi government revealed that long-awaited provincial elections will be held on Jan. 31st.

A little-noticed but highly significant second announcement was that there would also be a ballot on a measure to make Basra a regional government in its own right (like Kurdistan). The latter is an aim promoted by Abdul Aziz al Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), but is opposed by many Iraqi political blocs including PM al Maliki's Dawa party, the Sadrists and Sunni groups. According to the constitution any group of provinces can decide to form such a region.Such a measure if approved would decentralise Iraq and might lead to a third, Sunni region being formed, and thus in effect a tripartite "collection of statelets" instead of a unitary Iraqi state. With the future of Iraq as a nation at stake politicking on this issue can be expected to be intense.

On 3 November the Iraqi parliament also passed an amendment to allocate six seats in the provincial elections to smaller ethnic and religious minorities. This was only half as many as proposed in a UN recommendation however, and was described as an insult by the communities concerned (which have been subjected to many attacks and much persecution during the insurgency). It was at least something more than nothing though, and perhaps a greater degree of peace will eventually bring better days ahead for the groups whose antecedents in Iraq predate those of the majority.

Meanwhile…

The Shi'ite led government did pay most Awakening Council members in Baghdad, on the first test of its behaviour once it assumed control of them from the US command. A move to cut their salaries by a sixth (and much more for leaders) had already stirred anger, but the payment indicates that a feared collapse in the relationship between the government and the "Sons of Iraq" militias is at least postponed.

Elsewhere, Iraqi detainees in US custody fell to about 15,800 according to the US command. Over 17,500 have been released this year, and the release rate is reported as more than double the number of new detentions.

Meanwhile US Marine forces are reported moving out of the cities of Iraq to instead aggregate on large rear bases, in a deployment that may later see many of them deployed to Afghanistan instead. Hopefully this is a real beginning of the withdrawal of the US occupation army, as foreshadowed in the final version of the new treaty.

Other armed Americans are still arriving though. US company DynCorp International has been given a $US99 million contract by the US Defence Dept to send up to 128 of its "private security forces" as mentors and advisors to the Iraqi military and police. As mercenaries rather than official occupying forces the personnel will apparently be subject to Iraqi law for any illegal behaviour, a factor that may make their recruitment less easy.

Apart from them, movement of foreign forces is now very much towards the exit door.The "coalition of the willing" is itself now on the verge of extinction. Thirteen of the remaining contributing countries, which include many miniscule states like Tonga and Moldova, plan to withdraw their forces by December 31st. 76 Macedonians, 4 Lithuanians, 86 from Bosnia & Herzegovina and 150 Bulgarians are among those leaving.

Once they're gone, apart from the US only Britain will still have a significant contingent left behind next year, with speculation rife that nearly all of those will also leave before mid-2009.

Romania, Estonia and El Salvador will apparently keep their small units in Iraq however. The US government approached the al Maliki government to ask those states to remain on non-combat tasks, apparently as a symbolic handful reminding people of its once multi-member MNF force.

The truth is, though, that in nearly all the nations arm-twisted by Team Bush to join the 'willing" coalition there was massive public opposition and outcry against the deployments. Their practical effect, apart from contributing to many politicians and parties being ousted from office as "Bush casualties", was to arouse huge international resentment against George Bush's government and help propel world opinion of America to unheard of depths. It is now up to President-elect Obama to rescue his country's image from the thrashing it took under the arrogant and ignorant administration of George Walker Bush.

 

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 3. War of Words over Kurds continues

The tense verbal and physical standoff between Arabs and Kurds in the north of Iraq continued during November. Kurdish federal politicians including Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Iraqi Parliament deputy speaker Aref Tayfour joined Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barazani in denouncing plans to form sahwa "Awakening" tribal councils in Mosul, Kirkuk, and other disputed areas containing significant Kurdish populations. Tayfour said the Councils in such areas "will fan the flames of sectarian and ethnic tensions."  Barzani described al Maliki's gambit as "playing with fire", declaring "The Support Councils…are not possible in Kurdistan or in disputed areas."

Meanwhile the largest Shi'ite party the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) also denounced such groups in the south of Iraq. ISCI leaders fear groups loyal to al Maliki could threaten its power base there, and imperil the ISCI project for a southern Shi'ite statelet. Al Maliki's Dawa party and allies will now run against the ISCI grouping in the Southern provinces.

Iraqi PM al Maliki riposted with the statement that the councils are "pivotal" to maintain security and stability, and called on the Kurdish parties to avoid media "escalation". In a snipe at Kurdish separatist ambitions he charged that "some selfish people saw that the Support Councils started to threaten their projects when they conflicted with the higher national interest."

In a counter-attack, President Talabani wrote a letter to al Maliki dated Nov. 18 in which he criticised "support councils" personally loyal to al Maliki that are being set up in a variety of areas. He declared "It is our constitutional duty to demand that you intervene and order the relevant authorities to suspend the work of these councils until we arrive at an agreement that provides them with legal and administrative cover." Both events are unlikely to happen. Talabani was supported by his two Presidential Council deputies, vice presidents Tariq al Hashemi, a Sunni Arab from the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Shi'ite rival to al Maliki.

On November 20 al Maliki fired back again. He strongly criticised the Kurdish leadership, accusing it of "constitutional violations" in four separatist ways, by opening diplomatic missions, deploying military forces to confront federal governmental forces, spending government funds to support tribal movements and signing oil contracts with foreign companies. Al Maliki also made it clear he intends to push for constitutional amendments that would strengthen the position of the central government.

This series of verbal clashes indicates difficult times ahead, both between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, and between al Maliki and his Shi'ite and Sunni rivals. For the moment at least though, al Maliki seems to be in the box seat and gaining further momentum.

 

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4. Goodbye and Good Riddance, George Bush

The top US military commander in Afghanistan Gen.David McKiernan has declared he needs (many) more troops "as quickly as possible". He won't get them though. Meanwhile incoming CENTCOM commander Gen. Petraeus says the Afghan war is trending "in the wrong direction", a polite way of saying that the US-led effort has been losing for some time. That's no surprise. To the extent that such a war could ever be fought effectively, it's clear that this failure is partly because US commanders in Afghanistan have never had really effective levels of troops since 2003, despite the steady resurgence of the Taliban. The forces they wanted have been in Iraq instead.

In fact the U.S. military began shifting resources out of Afghanistan as long ago as early 2002, as preparations for the "Bush war" in Iraq began. Even former US officials themselves admit the Bush blunder. Says John O. Brennan, a former deputy executive director of the CIA and a former chief of the US National Counterterrorism Centre ""Iraq was a fundamental wrong turn. That was the most strategically negative action that was taken… the collective effort in the government required to go after an individual like bin Laden -- the Iraq campaign consumed that."

You also have to wonder just why in late 2005 the CIA disbanded Alec Station, its special unit dedicated to tracing bin Laden. Was it because Bush wanted to mollify the Saudi bin Laden family that had promoted his own political career?

Because of "Iraq commitments", the generals trying to confront the Taliban and seeking put an end to the central command structure of Al Qaeda remain frustrated. Allowing for withdrawals that will likely outweigh the one Marine battalion being added in November, an extra Army combat brigade being deployed in January 2009 may only add a net 1,200 or so extra troops. That's nowhere near enough to seal the border with Pakistan from increasing attacks. So the US military is forced to hope that Pakistani Army assaults on militant strongholds in the frontier agency provinces, tribesmen rising up against Taliban thuggery and their own handful of remote Predator missile attacks will instead save them from President Bush's strategic incompetence.

But does the present White House incumbent really care?  Many believe that Bush has always pulled his punches when it came to bin Laden, on purpose. Very many declare that it is beyond belief that with its enormous surveillance capabilities the Pentagon still does not know where the Al Qaeda head is after all this time. That after seven years bin Laden and his garrulous deputy are still free, active and apparently unsighted "does not compute". History will judge Bush harshly for this, and so it should.

By launching his macho diversionary war in Iraq despite Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda cohorts continuing to thrive in their Pakistani lairs, and by gifting Al Qaeda the oxygen and volunteers that such an attack provoked, George Bush has proved a menace to the security of both America and the wider world. In his own country the man deserves a Congressional Medal of Dishonour for disservices rendered. Many will agree that he should have been impeached years ago.

And so he ends his term of office amidst the economic chaos for which he bears considerable responsibility, what with his trillion dollar war, casual resort to ruinous Federal deficits and crony appointments to government by which the robbers of Wall Street were placed in charge of the till.

Bush leaves office with Iraq still in a parlous and much wounded state, the situation in Afghanistan bad and deteriorating, Pakistan racked by Taliban and al Qaeda violence, Islamist insurgents from Pakistan striking India in Mumbai, Somalia falling to other extreme Islamist insurgents, and the world financial system having come a hairsbreadth from total collapse. Not all but a great deal of this can be laid to George Bush's account, particularly his decision to avoid any serious effort to finally put paid to Osama bin Laden and his organisation in the early years of this decade, but to concentrate America's power on invading and occupying Iraq instead. None dare call it treason, you say? Wrong -many do. And where is the evidence to prove them wrong?

So it's goodbye and very much good riddance to outgoing President George Bush from the vast majority of humanity worldwide (not forgetting those in New Orleans). A disaster of a Presidency indeed.

 

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Where are we now?

Reports of secret British talks with leaders of the Iraqi insurgency in the last months of PM Blair's leadership, following the failure of earlier US talks with rebels, admitted by default that US and British policy in Iraq has been a mess that the Bush Administration will be extremely lucky to extricate itself from. The British under their new leader, however,may soon be sensible enough to leave Iraq.

The fact that people who are at one moment called terrorists who must be crushed can then become negotiating partners in the next minute is an insight into how the "War on Terror" has been a political con-trick from the start. A con-trick, indeed, used by the Bush Administration as a cover to pursue its own real agenda. For in May 2007 a White House spokesman indicated that the presence of US forces in Iraq for as long as they have been in Korea (currently over half a century!) was regarded by Team Bush as an acceptable outcome for its Iraq adventure.

The "War on Terror" as a nebulous "for ever" concept is the same trick as the permanent war in George Orwell's revealing masterpiece 1984. You can use it to denounce opponents, destroy civil liberties, justify unspeakable torture and control society to your own ends. The worst thing possible would be to win it, because then all the benefits an elite group seizes in its name can no longer be justified.

So what exactly is The War on Terror? Is it opposition to all anti-government groups anywhere that use violence? In that case the founders of America - revolutionaries who rebelled against oppressive authority and took to arms against British colonial rule - were terrorists without a doubt. Given the awful record of human warfare since, all people of good will can of course agree that we should try to persuade all advocates of violence everywhere towards peaceful means instead, and work against the injustices that stir people to violence.  But you don't invade Iraq to do that.

Or is The War on Terror simply opposition to the Islamist fundamentalists of Al Qaeda and similar groups, who attacked America and who preach their own religious "crusade" against the West? In that case, why was the attempt to crush them let slide almost at the moment of victory, in favour of an invasion of Iraq? Whatever kind of misbegotten hoodlum Saddam Hussein was without a doubt, he was also an enemy of Islamist fundamentalists, not their friend. Instead of securing the peace in Afghanistan, America's foolish action in first invading and then continuing to occupy Iraq has stirred up a hornet's nest of violent fundamentalism that may plague the world for many years to come.

So Osama bin Laden lives on to plot further. The irony of the War in Iraq is that it not only rallies new supporters to his and similar organisations, it in effect guarantees more Islamist terrorism in the future. The invasion and continuing military occupation of an Arab Muslim land is used as an inspiration in Iraq by groups who voluntarily affiliate themselves with Al Qaeda, and by recruiters to terrorism around the world from Amsterdam to Indonesia. As a result, Australian, British and American lives are lost abroad or at home and the world is made unsafe for travellers. What kind of a policy is it that breeds new enemies and guarantees future problems? It will take the removal of foreign forces from Iraq, not a "forever war", to strengthen Islamic moderates everywhere and make a "peace between civilisations" possible.

Meanwhile, due to the concentration of attention and resources in Iraq by "coalition forces", the situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Rampant warlordism, a resurgent Taliban, pitiful success in reconstruction and the rapid development of a narco-state increase the evidence that President Bush has not so much constructed a policy as committed a series of enormous strategic blunders in the Middle East.

Only when you see that all this is an excuse, not a reason, for more military heroics like an attack on Iran does any of it make any sense. Like the "WMD" lies for the attack on Iraq, the real purpose here is not to promote peace and stability, but only to help further the Team Bush goal of total US world dominance. For what? To benefit the likes of Haliburton and the rest of the corporate gravy train, the "haves and have mores" that George Bush so proudly represents. We can only hope that the citizens of the USA will take up the motto "We won't be fooled again."

Bush Administration figures everywhere tour the globe lecturing about freedom. But despite a claimed huge fall in their crime rate the US now imprisons more than two million people in its own society, far, far more than any other free nation. It's the hypocrisy of Bush America, evident in this and so many other areas - from environmental vandalism to economic bullying to the many examples of deceitful foreign policy - that the rest of the world rejects with indignation.

At this point, it may be educational to review Iraq's history since the founding of the modern Iraqi state. A consistent thread has been regular interference in its affairs, first by Britain and more recently by the United States. When we examine what has led us to this moment, we see that both nations bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the current "mess in Iraq". Read below to learn how it all came about.

 

Click below for

A brief modern political
History of Iraq

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US Special Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld greets Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Dec. 20 1983

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Notable in Iraqi Politics

Nuri al-Said, longtime Iraqi politician.

Originally an Ottoman (Turkish Empire) army officer, Nuri became an Arab nationalist who then threw in his lot with British Imperial interests. At first Army chief of staff, he became Iraqi Prime Minister eight times between 1930 & 1958, and was generally attempting to manipulate events from the sidelines when not officially in office. Nuri always aspired to be the power behind the throne, & was regarded by most Iraqis as a collaborator and quisling for the British. He was widely believed to have arranged the murder of King Ghazi I in 1939, to further British interests. Nuri was killed, & then literally hacked to pieces by an angry mob during the 1958 anti-colonial revolution.

" Almost the new Nuri?"
Ahmad Chalabi.

Chalabi's wealthy family was forced to flee Iraq as British & Nuri al-Said collaborators in 1958, when Chalabi was 13 years old. Although Chalabi had never been inside Iraq proper for forty-five years, he was flown there in April 2003 by the US Army, & touted as the future President. However he received almost nil support inside the country, & his promotional posters were generally torn down. Nevertheless the Bush Administration appointed him to the "Governing Council" set up later in 2003. Despite his abysmal track record as head of the "Iraqi National Congress" (INC) in the 1990s, and prior convictions for embezzlement, some neo-conservatives in the US government still hoped to set Chalabi up as the new Iraqi leader of an obedient, pro-US regime.

In 2004, however, Chalabi fell out of favour with the occupying forces. He had courted the Shi'ite religious establishment in an attempt to broaden his support, but apparently went further than was acceptable to US governor Bremer. Chalabi was also accused of betraying US secrets to Iran, e.g. that the US had broken Iran's intelligence code (something he could only have learnt from a high-level figure in the Bush administration). The US administration switched to Plan B, and as interim Iraqi Prime Minister arranged the appointment of an alternative exile figure. This was Iyad Allawi, the leader of the Iraqi National Accord, a rival group to Chalabi's INC.

Chalabi, a perennial opportunist, energetic and a clever negotiator, was however by no means down for the count. His estrangement from the US administration earned him unexpected allies elsewhere. Soon he emerged as a member of the (Shi'ite) United Iraqi Alliance list in the January 2005 election, and even contested the successful list's nomination for the post of executive Prime Minister, losing however to Dawa party leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

In the lead up to the pre-constitution Government he was briefly acting Oil Minister in May 2005, and became one of three deputy prime ministers. After that Chalabi steadily consolidated his power and influence, with a finger in oil policy as Chairman of the government's Energy Council, regulating lucrative rebuilding contracts in another chairmanship, directing the purge of Ba'athists, and even controlling the composition of the tribunal prosecuting Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile he forged clever alliances with both Kurds and radical Shi'ites.

His lobbying and new alliances also earned him representations to King Abdullah of Jordan by the new Iraqi President and Foreign Minister, to have his conviction there for corruption and embezzlement (of $US288 million from the Petra Bank) quashed on the grounds of his new official status (the Jordanians offered a possible amnesty). US leaders such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condolezza Rice began again to call Chalabi, and a trip to America seemed to rehabilitate him further.

Chalabi however fell out with the (Shi'ite) United Iraqi Alliance and contested the December 15 2005 election with his own separate list, in alliance with the royalists. His list was trounced however and received less than one per cent of the votes. Nevertheless he put himself forward for a position in the new government, and on 30 December 2005 was appointed acting Oil Minister, after Iraq's oil industry slid deep into crisis. Although now without a seat in the National Assembly, he continued as a caretaker Deputy Prime Minister while prolonged negotiations for a new Government were under way.

In October 2007 Chalabi was named by PM al Maliki as head of a "services committee " intended to bring better electricity, health, education and other services to Baghdad, possibly as a political poisoned chalice. Watch this man however, his ambitions to be ruler of Iraq are limitless.

 

 

Iyad Allawi (appointed interim Iraqi Prime Minister in June 2004)

Born in 1945, Iyad Allawi comes from a wealthy family of Shi'ite merchants. A Ba'athist before the party came to power, he fell out with Saddam Hussein and went into exile. Allawi survived an assassination attempt by Saddam's agents, in England, in 1978. Later he became leader of the Iraqi National Accord exile grouping, a secular party founded in 1991 & dominated by former Baathists and army officers who had turned against Saddam. The group attempted unsuccessfully to promote an army coup against Saddam's regime.

Allawi has been supported by both the CIA and Britain's MI6. His grouping did poorly in the January 2005 election however, gathering only about 14% of the votes cast. As interim leader he remained executive Prime Minister until replaced by Ibrahim al-Jaafari in April 2005. Arrest warrants have now been issued by the new Iraqi government for several ministers of Allawi's regime on the grounds of corruption.

Although these corruption issues involving more than $US2 billion and at least five of his government's ministries now dog his name, Allawi remains on the comeback trail politically. He contested the December 2005 parliamentary election at the head of a new political grouping, the Iraqi National List. This coalition included his own party, the Iraqi National Accord, plus other secular groups including socialists, the Communist Party and some nationalist and tribal elements. His platform was that his group transcends ethnic and religious divisions, while the present government has failed to unite Iraqis but has in fact exacerbated sectarian divisions and presided over a slide towards civil war.

Despite predictions by neo-conservative commentators that he might sweep the polls, the broadened Allawi list did much worse in the December 2005 election than in the January one, and achieved a reasonable showing only in Baghdad.

His grouping remained outside the al-Jaafari and al-Maliki governments, but he has continued to be active politically. By December 2006 political paralysis within Iraq had led to active consideration by some Iraqi politicians of a possible new coalition of so-called "moderates", including the Allawi faction, and this idea was being promoted by the US Government. By early March 2007 Allawi was reported setting up a new alignment to include Sunni MPs and a Shi'ite faction for a bid for power. Later that month however, having failed to gain Kurdish support, the new bloc project collapsed.

Some commentators have suggested that Allawi may be installed by the Bush Administration as a "temporary" military dictator if the political process in Iraq collapses altogether.

Ibrahim al Jaafari, Iraqi Prime Minister from 3 May 2005 - May 2006

As United Iraqi Alliance list candidate for interim executive Iraqi Prime Minister, al Jaafari was confirmed in that post by the "Presidential Council" and the interim National Assembly for the interim government that took office to December 2005. Following the December 15 2005 election he was reconfirmed as UIA candidate for PM in a "permanent" (four year) government (2006-2009). However his leadership was opposed by Kurdish, religious Sunni and secular political groups and by US and British leaders, and in the end his position became untenable.

 Although leader of the Dawa Party, a long-established Islamist Shi'ite force, al Jaafari was regarded as a relative "moderate", whose diverse influences include a long period in Iran and study and work in the West. He depended however on assent from the Shi'ite religious establishment, the Marjaiya, and on support from a majority of parties in the UIA to maintain his position. He is 59 years old, a medical doctor by profession and was a vice-president in an earlier interim government. From 8 May 2005 he led a cabinet of 36 (Prime Minister, 3 Deputy Prime Ministers, and 32 ministers dominated by 17 Shi'ite and 8 Kurdish list members). His notable policy was to establish an alliance with Iran that appeared to confound US aims.

Although unpopular among Sunnis and regarded by some as a weak leader, al Jaafari nevertheless narrowly defeated (by one vote) the rival UIA prime ministerial candidate, interim Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, in February 2006.  The latter was actively favoured by US and British diplomats, who were alarmed by the pro-Iranian direction of al Jaafari's foreign policy, and considered Adel Abdul-Mahdi more amenable to their interests.

Al Jaafari's continuance as the UIA candidate for Prime Minister was mainly due to support from the extremist Shi'ite cleric and Mahdi Army militia leader Moqtada al Sadr, who had emerged as a much stronger influence in the UIA. The strength of Al Jaafari's position therefore did not flow naturally from his own power base; rather he was an agreed "front man" for stronger Shi'ite forces.

However Kurdish, Sunni and secular political groups continued to oppose his leadership and in the end openly called for al Jaafari to be removed as the UIA candidate. As well, US diplomats supported - some claim orchestrated - a push to have the embattled al Jaafari replaced. President Bush even wrote to the supreme Iraqi Shi'ite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani seeking this aim. For some time the struggle caused a political stalemate that added to delays in forming a new Government. The incumbent government remained in place in the meantime, but later in April 2006 al Jaafari agreed to accept any decision by the UIA to replace him, and the candidature of Jawad al Maliki was put forward instead.

Al Jaafari's political star now seemed to be eclipsing, especially after he fell out with al Maliki and was replaced as Dawa Party secretary-general in 2007. However early in 2008 he formed a new National Reform movement. In June al Maliki responded by having him expelled from the Dawa Party. This move split the party, and al Jaafari took with him a large though minority chunk of party offices and MPs.

 

Nuri ("Jawad") al Maliki, current Iraqi Prime Minister

Jawad al Maliki (real name Nuri Kamil Muhammad Hasan Abu al Mahasin) was born in 1950 in a village near Karbala in the Babil province of Iraq. He is well-educated, his qualifications including a master's degree in Arabic literature. During the Saddam era he fled to Iran (in 1980) and then spent over 20 years in exile, much of it in Syria.

After his return to Iraq in 2003, al Maliki was active in drafting the new permanent constitution and as deputy head of the de-Baathification Commission. In the recent interim government he was a deputy speaker of the National Assembly.

As a senior member of the Dawa Party, an Islamist group that is an important member of the seven parties in the UIA Shi'ite alliance, Nuri al Maliki was a close ally of interim PM Ibrahim al Jaafari. His approval as Prime Minister therefore meant that although al Jaafari was "rolled" from leadership, the underlying Iraqi political landscape had not really changed much. Indeed al Maliki has a reputation as a Shi'ite hardliner, and his relationship with Sunni and secular groups has been tense, despite the "national reconciliation plan" he put forward. The latter has failed to the extent that the March 2008 reconciliation conference was boycotted by many factions.

Al Maliki took almost the whole month available to form a government, and even then his proposed Cabinet lacked ministers for the three critical security portfolios (posts subsequently filled). However he early received more cooperation from other parties than al Jaafari did, although that changed later. A major security plan for Baghdad enjoyed little success, and "sectarian cleansing" in fact increased in Baghdad and other areas during the early part of his tenure..

As he originally opposed foreign control of Iraq's oil sector and other key infrastructure, al Maliki was unlikely to prove popular with the big business backers of the Bush administration. He was enthusiastic for a rise in education standards as a means to national recovery in Iraq. Al Maliki was not in favour of the US and its allies invading in 2003, and has criticized the occupation in the past. However as PM he has had to tread a delicate path in the face of the continued US presence, which in reality he was powerless to evict.

By December 2006 al Maliki was out of favour with the Bush Administration, which appeared to be supporting moves to replace him. Meanwhile the Moqtada al Sadr faction, a key element of his political base, had also temporarily withdrawn its support in the Iraqi parliament in protest against al Maliki's meeting with President Bush in Amman, Jordan, leading to a functional paralysis in the National Assembly.

Al Maliki's political situation at the beginning of 2007 was extremely insecure, with only the difficulty involved in obtaining agreement on a replacement seeming to preserve it for the moment. By March 2007 his longer-term political survival seemed unlikely. His support base in the UIA was itself under severe strain, with one of its parties - the Fadhila - withdrawing, followed by the resignation of ministers of the al Sadr bloc from the government.

However the collapse of a mooted alternative political bloc that month secured his position for the moment, and by mid 2007 he had surprised everyone - himself probably included - by continuing in office. He remained as PM thoughout August despite the collapse of the "national unity" government, following the further resignations of Sunni bloc and Allawi group ministers.

Maintaining his diminished government with a "rump" minority coalition of two Shi'ite and two Kurdish parties, al Maliki was further undermined when the Sadrist bloc withdrew from the UIA in September, leaving the government unable to pass most legislation. With however no challenger capable of gathering enough votes to replace him he was still in office as 2007 drew towards a close.

The Sunni insurgency was gradually ground down by both relentless US attacks during fifteen months of the "surge," and by the decision of most western and central Sunni tribes to oppose the Al Qaeda in Iraq group and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and to ally with US forces to that end.. Meanwhile the sectarian battle for Baghdad was now largely over, with the Shi'ites having gained a decisive upper hand. As a result, al Maliki's position seemed stronger by early 2008, despite his continued broader political isolation.

In March 2008 al Maliki decided to go on the political (and military) offensive. He managed to secure the agreement of major Sunni and Kurdish factions to attack the Basra militia of the Mahdi Army movement of militant Shi'ite leader Moqtada al Sadr, who al Maliki had once been allied with, but from whom he had become progressively estranged. Al Maliki's major Shi'ite supporters apart from his own smaller Dawa Party were now the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council faction and its militia the Badr Corps, bitter rivals of the Mahdi Army.

The offensive launched in Basra went seriously awry, and led to widespread fighting in other southern towns and Baghdad, and eventually a ceasefire in Basra under Iranian auspices. Heavy fighting continued in Baghdad into May, with al Maliki placing Sadrist suburbs under siege and announcing that the Sadrist movement would be stripped of political rights unless its Mahdi Army militia was dissolved. After punishing American attacks a ceasefire was obtained in Sadr City too and government troops moved in. With physical dominance of these key Sadrist strongholds gained, the long-term political outcome was still unclear. Al Maliki appeared to be aiming to prevent success by Sadrist rivals in proposed provincial elections and to break the influence of the Mahdi Army movement.

Although his negotiations to return Sunnis to the government broke down in May al Maliki emerged stronger for the moment, with rising concerns over a proposed treaty with the USA his principal liability. He then launched a further offensive against Mahdi Army control of Maysan province to weaken the Sadrist trend, arresting political opponents there.

A split in his own party in June 2008 caused by rivalry with his predecessor led however to further defections from the Government ranks. This left al Maliki once again in the position that the absence of a rival contender able to gain sufficient support among the multiple parliamentary factions was his chief political strength. A wily operator though, his position seemed nevertheless secure for the moment. In July 2008 he finally secured the return of the largest Sunni faction to the Cabinet, and by extending negotiations for the US treaty beyond the end of July cut-off date asked for by President Bush, demonstrated a growing independence that enhanced his popularity in Iraq.

To the immense frustration of the Bush presidency, al Maliki played hardball on treaty negotiations throughout August and September 2008, disrupting Republican party political considerations. At the same time he began dismantling some Sunni Awakening Council militias and pushing Kurdish peshmerga forces out of Diyala province. These strongman tactics enhanced his reputation with his core Shi'ite constituency. By early September a politically strengthened al Maliki was said to be ready to submit a draft treaty to the Iraqi parliament, but cannily wthheld his hand into October.

In the event, the draft treaty was rejected within Iraq before even reaching the parliament, and further amendments were demanded by the Iraqi cabinet. Al Maliki himself was said to have opposed approving the draft, a position popular in Iraq but causing dismay in official Washington.

Calculated delays until after the US Presidential election enabled al Maliki to potentially seek a new deal from President-elect Obama. However, having secured further amendments al Maliki suddenly endorsed the latest treaty version and gained Cabinet approval for it. A wider political consensus was needed though, and al Maliki had to offer Sunni factions a Charter of Political Reform plus a public referendum on the treaty in 2009 to secure their support. In a resulting parliamentary vote only 54% of MPs actually voted for the treaty, but the crucial backing of the largest Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurdish blocs was obtained.

By December 2008 al Maliki was in his strongest position to date, although splits were widening with his Kurdish and Shi'ite allies in government. The end of January provincial elections were likely to bring these tensions to a head, and provoke the next showdown in Iraq and the next test of his political advance.

===============================================================

No Weapons of Mass Destruction found in Iraq - official

Monday 25 April 2005
A final,almost 1000 page report from the Iraq Survey Group, recently led by weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, found that the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent UN sanctions had destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capabilities, and for the most part Saddam had not tried to rebuild them. There was no evidence to support the last-gasp claim by some US officials that such material was moved to Syria for safekeeping before the war.

March 31 2005
A US presidential commission delivering a 600-page report on US intelligence lapses at the end of March 2005 said that "the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction", and that "the harm done to American credibility by our all too public intelligence failures in Iraq will take years to undo." The commission, however, was not permitted to examine how politicians made use of the intelligence.

7 October 2004
The substantive report of chief US weapons inspector Charles Duelfer concludes that Saddam Hussein had destroyed most of his chemical and biological weapons after his 1991 Gulf War defeat, and that his nuclear program had "progressively decayed". No stockpiles of WMDs were located.

3 October 2003. After searching for three months with a huge team of 1,400 inspectors and a more than $US300 million budget, the special "coalition" weapons inspection team in Iraq reports that it has discovered nil weapons of mass destruction there. The report of the "Iraq Survey Group" is an interim one, and more than $US600 million extra has been requested of the U.S. Congress for the team to continue its massive search effort in future, in the hope of discovering something that might validate in some way the increasingly discredited Iraq war rationale. However the failure so far to substantiate the proclaimed reason for the Iraq invasion is hugely embarrassing to the Bush, Blair and Howard administrations in the three countries that formed the invasion force.

The search team head, CIA adviser David Kay - himself an invasion advocate - presented the theoretically classified report to U.S. lawmakers behind closed doors. However the gist of the report had already been released by the CIA, and substantive quotes from the report were soon available. While admitting the WMD search failure so far, Kay went on to declare " we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war".

On nuclear arms, Kay stated " to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material". He added that his team had determined that Iraq's nuclear programme was in only "the very most rudimentary" state. His findings contrasted sharply with the claim of the Bush administration before the invasion that Iraq had a well-developed nuclear programme that presented a threat to the U.S.A.

On chemical weaponry, Mr. Kay reported that multiple sources have told the team that "Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW (chemical warfare) program after 1991," and that information found so far suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce and fill new chemical warfare weapons was "reduced - if not entirely destroyed." He said that the team has also not found any evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Saddam's military was prepared to use chemical warfare against US-led forces. In the area of biological weapons, Kay indicated that after 1996 Iraq kept only small, secret " capabilities" to manufacture such weapons in the future should a decision be taken to do so. Overall his conclusion was that "it clearly does not look like a massive, resurgent programme, based on what we discovered".

Kay did find some information relating to previous weapons programmes, and spoke of possible deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documents. He also reported that Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons programme, and painted a picture of sporadic equipment preservation consistent with a regime hope of someday recommencing some weapon programmes. He said the team has discovered significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during inspections that began in late 2002. However much evidence had been "irretrievably lost," Kay said. "It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions and in some areas, we may never reach that goal," he said. He said that despite the group's negative findings so far he was "not prepared to close the file" on the WMD search yet.

Kay implicitly acknowledged that the intelligence used by the coalition to justify the war may have been faulty, declaring in his conclusion that "whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of time, distance and information."

 

Worse, even the weak claims are wrong - comment

5 October 2003. David Kay's WMD report has already given the lie to many Bush Administration statements, for instance reporting that aluminium tubes have not been used for the enrichment of uranium in Iraq, an allegation made at length by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council in February this year. Nor have any suspicious activities or residues been found at the seven sites within Iraq described in British PM Tony Blair's "dodgy dossier" of September 2002. Biological Weapons trailers, weapons of mass destruction on a 45 minute leash and other allegations all turn out to be fantasies based on misinterpretation or invention.

However Mr. Kay's report makes a few claims that those desperate for a vindication of sorts have tried to latch onto, like the proverbial drowning men clutching at straws. But Cambridge WMD expert Dr. Glen Rangwala has said that even the few diluted claims made by the "Iraq Survey Group" for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't in fact stand up to support WMD allegations.

For example British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw did a bit of clutching of his own after the report's release. He claimed of a " vial of live C botulinum Okra B" that the report noted an Iraqi biologist had at his home, that this agent was "15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX".   Wrong Mr. Straw, says the learned doctor. It is botulinum type A that is the real nasty, while botulinum B is much weaker, and can be used to make an antidote to common botulinum poisoning - and for that reason is kept in many laboratories around the world.

Also seized on as a last-gasp shred of war justification by "coalition" politicians whose exposure as liars is nearly complete, is a missile issue. In respect of missiles, much of the ISG report deals with claims Iraq had been acquiring designs and undertaking research programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of 150 km. However Iraq was never prohibited from doing so, only from actually making and deploying such missiles or possessing "major parts, and repair and production facilities" for them while under UN embargo. The Kay report does not confirm any such illegalities. We can also recall that Iraq readily destroyed a large number of missiles declared marginally illegal before the U.S. attack, in a fruitless attempt to satisfy a "coalition" hell-bent on war.

None of this excuses the very real unpleasantness of the Saddam Hussein regime. But for the three nations of the "coalition" to go to war based on a lie -and for their governments to deliberately conspire to deceive their own peoples in the matter - can never be excused either. Worse, such deceit and hubris breeds a policy in which dishonesty is the keynote, and disaster the probable outcome. There is for example no evidence to show that the Bush Administration has any genuine intention of allowing the people of Iraq to decide their own future if they choose something their occupiers do not want. To the contrary, already we see a Bush Administration decision to put most of the Iraq economy "up for grabs" to foreign business without the consent of the people. Claims that the invasion would bring peace between Israel and the Palestinians have proved equally bogus, with that situation now worse than ever.

This war has instead opened a new festering sore in the Middle East. The dishonesty and hypocrisy that underlie it have caused countless millions the world over to be deeply suspicious of America & its close allies, and resentful of the West. This is not a war that can bring peace or security to the United States or any country. The Bush administration has instead created a maelstrom for which the whole world will pay the price. All civilisations are the losers, and all people of good will are the poorer. Only a change of heart and a change of policy can begin to right the wrong. The "coalition of the willing" should now show their willingness to cease imposing themselves on Iraq, and aid a solution instead of continuing to be the problem.

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Uncensored News

Background

Analysis & Opinion

Australian Anti-war movements

New Zealand Anti-war movements

U.S. & World Anti-war movements

Donate to the victims

Uncensored News

Very latest relevant news
http://www.antiwar.com/latest.html

Asia-Stat.
News, Maps & Resources, & Access to lots more news sources
http://www.asia-stat.com

Indymedia.org
is a "collective of independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists
offering grassroots, non-corporate coverage. Indymedia is a democratic media
outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth".
Which is a heck of a lot more than you can say for FOX TV.
http://indymedia.org

Alternet is a project of the Independent Media Institute,
a nonprofit organization dedicated to strengthening
and supporting independent and alternative journalism.
An online magazine and information resource.
http://www.alternet.org

Electronic Iraq
Exposes the hypocrisy & evasion of much
"mainstream" news.
http://www.electroniciraq.net/news

Al Jazeera in English.
The only fully free & frank news source in the Middle East.
NB: This site may sometimes be difficult to access due to
server problems. Interference by U.S. Govt. psyops types
& amateur U.S. pro-war hackers (as in freedom of speech
is only for pro-war Americans???) has also been reported.
http://english.aljazeera.net/HomePage

Uncensored News
http://www.antiwar.com

Background

Iraq Study
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/irqindx.htm

Columbia University Iraq background page
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/country/iraq

How dissent is being suppressed in the "land of the free".
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/27/1048653806506.html

Your folks' lives lost for their profitable wargames.
From President Bush down, most of the ardent hawks of Washington made damn sure they themselves never saw
war service. Nor will their children. In the loaded game of the U.S. (plus British & Australian) leadership elite,
it's the sons & daughters of ordinary people who are to risk everything & do the killing & the dying for their "brave" leaders.
Profits not patriotism is more the leader's game, as with U.S.Vice-President Cheney's involvement with Haliburton,
the intended contractor for U.S.-occupied Iraq, & U.S.Defence Board Richard Perle's lucrative deals.
. At least the "debauched" Roman Emperors followed their swords and led from the frontline, but not so this new "imperial elite".
Check out the "chickenhawks" database of these scam-meisters.
http://www.nhgazette.com/chickenhawks.html

Secrets exposed:
They've been there before - and they gassed the Kurds!
When orating with maximum self-righteousness, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair is careful not to mention
any of Britain's dirty colonial secrets from its own Iraq past. Such as gassing the Kurds
just like Saddam did. That's right, the British themselves once gassed the Kurds (1922)!

Read the following eye-openers

Irakkrieg.info (auf Deutsch - in German)
http://www.irakkrieg.info

Antiwar articles and essays, organizations,
tools, information, inspiration, more.
http://garbl.home.attbi.com/nowar.htm

War posters
http://www.spectrumz.com/z/pr_posters.html

Some Iraq maps
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/iraq

Analysis & Opinion

WEBDIARY
The frankest & most revealing column concerning the war
in the Australian mass media. Browse the archive for lots of links
to eye-openers that give the lie to George Bush's cant & Howard's sycophancy.
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/webdiary/index.html

"The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War With Iraq:
A Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Analysis of the
Unspoken Truth" by W. Clark, January 2003
(revised 20 February) A private analysis that contains
many relevant points plus some useful further references.
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html

"The Enemy Within" by Gore Vidal, The Observer
London, Sunday 27 October 2002. The famed
American writer takes a blowtorch to U.S. foreign policy.
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/EnemyWithin.html

"Oil, Currency and the War on Iraq" Cóilín Nunan looks at use of the US$
as a world reserve currency. Read how Iraq began selling oil for Euros
(Iran is talking about it), how this is a significant threat to
U.S. currency dominance & world economic supremacy,
and how this may help explain the rush to war with Iraq.
http://www.feasta.org/documents/papers/oil1.htm

The manipulated Murdoch press toes a strict party line on Iraq.
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/19/1045330657523.html

The think tank war & other insights.
Yes, Virginia, there are conspiracies about, centring on world domination, oil & religion.
And the names can be named - in fact they glory in it.

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/07/1046826528748.html

http://truthout.org/docs_03/022803A.shtml

http://www.observer.co.uk/bush/story/0,8224,901116,00.html

www.endthelies.net

*

DONATE to the victims

Contribute to Australian Iraq relief charity (Oxfam CAA) untainted by aggressor Government links. http://www.caa.org.au/world/eurasia/iraq/donations.htm

NO WAR

A memorable image that caught the imagination of millions...

Chronology

On Friday 30th Jan. 2004, Will Saunders and Dave Burgess appeared in the District Court of NSW and were sentenced for “maliciously damaging” the Sydney Opera House, by painting NO WAR on it. They were sentenced to 9 months of periodic detention, plus ordered to pay $151,000 damages to the Opera House (someone seems to have made an awful lot of money on the clean-up!)

Their detention began, but an appeal was lodged. Meanwhile PM John Howard appears to have got off scot-free so far for his own serious offences. These include: recklessly endangering the Australian public by supporting an unprovoked attack upon a sovereign state, in the process generating much unneccessary hatred against our country in large parts of the world; maliciously damaging our good name abroad by being the only other leader in the whole world to order armed forces to join the US-British invasion of Iraq; and committing a gross fraud upon the Australian public, by wilfully making a deceptive claim (about weapons of mass destruction).

Update August 27, 2005

Will Saunders tonight celebrated his full freedom at a party at historic Ferndale Lodge, Newtown, Sydney.

We're also happy to report that thanks to the genorosity of the Australian public,
the “Opera House No War Clean-Up Fund” has now covered the expenses
of Will & Dave's appeal & their damages.

Thank you Australia!

*****

For trivia buffs: is the Opera House No War snow dome the rarest snow dome in the world?