Iraq Page, 2008

http://www.iraqbodycount.net

The Iraqi civilian death toll caused by the Bush administration-led invasion and occupation continues to mount.
These figures are a conservative, verified minimum and probably far less than the true total.

for July 2008 Editorials & updates click here

Including: The Unequal Treaty Part (2)- Descent into the Dark Side

NO WAR : A memorable image that caught the imagination of millions...

July 2008 Editorials

1. The Unequal Treaty Part (2)- Descent into the Dark Side 

Resistance builds throughout Iraq

Al Maliki twists in the wind

The Drama Unfolds

The Black Ops Raid - a descent into the Dark Side?

One Possibility

2. Iraqi Internal Politics - the cauldron bubbles

3. Meanwhile, a War Continues

The Oil Spoils begin to come on line

Terror and War Crimes - who defines?

4.The Mahdi Army under pressure

Amara - Maysan

 

 

 1. The Unequal Treaty - Part (2)- Descent into the Dark Side?

Resistance builds throughout Iraq     

Much of June in Iraq was dominated by uproar over the US- proposed "security pact", which Team Bush has been anxious to secure by the end of July. A part of this is that the US side wants a status of forces agreement in place by the end of the year, otherwise a renewed UN mandate for a foreign military presence will be required, a step itself now generally opposed in Iraq. 

However the Bush plan goes much further, with the initial draft keeping Iraq under effective "protectorate" control. Demands have included continuation of the authority to independently detain and hold Iraqis without reference to Iraqi law, permission for U. S. forces to conduct military operations without Iraqi approval, and immunity from Iraqi prosecution for both U. S. troops and private contractors.

Any powerful military force that possesses such rights in another country is of course an army of occupation, no matter what euphemisms are attached to try and hide the fact. Recent reports indicate that the American side has also asked to maintain no less than 58 military bases in Iraqi on an indefinite basis. Moreover it has been said that earlier more than 200 were requested. It's possible of course that both of these large figures are ambit claims, thrown in so that huge apparent "concessions" can be made over the numbers to bamboozle critics.

The proposed strategic framework agreement is not just about troops and bases. As originally conceived it will ensure that the Iraqi economy is governed by an American plan and is wide open for US business. It will also entrench US influence over Iraqi culture, science and education. All of which has Iraqis in an uproar.

The objections come from all sides except the Kurds (and even some of them), and include many members of the PM's own Dawa Party and the strongest Shi'ite party, the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council. Some of their leaders argue that from next year US forces should be confined to their bases unless called upon by the Iraqi government, and that the latter should control Iraqi airspace, hold the sole power of arrest and detention of Iraqi civilians and so on. These leaders point out that Iraq could still ask for a six months or 1 year extension of the UN mandate rather than buckle under to Team Bush demands.

Even Shi'ite politicians close to Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki are leading the opposition charge. Said one such, Sami al-Askary, "The Americans are making demands that would lead to the colonisation of Iraq… if we can't reach a fair agreement, many people think we should say, 'Good-bye U. S. troops! We don't need you here anymore."

In Baghdad, Kufa, Karbala and Basra, Shi'ites held Friday prayers and demonstrations denouncing the negotiations between Washington and Baghdad. Down in Karbala Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Taqqi al Mudaressi, one of the council of four top Shi'ite clerics within Iraq, said he expected "the agreement would fail if the details of the deal remained as they are in the current draft". He added more heatedly that the agreement was " a sort of US blackmailing and a sword strangling Iraqis".

Later, the representative of senior Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Karbala, Sheik Abdul Mahdi al Karbala'i, preached a sermon in which he laid down the expectations of al Sistani and the Shi'ite religious leadership in respect of any agreement. Two key points apart from the principle of respect for Iraqi sovereignty were that an agreement must not allow Iraq to be used as a springboard for an attack on a third country, and that it must be submitted for approval to the parliament.

Visiting Washington meanwhile, two Iraqi MPs - Sheikh Khalaf al Ulayyan of the (Sunni) National Dialogue Council and Dr. Nadim al-Jaberi of the (Shi'ite) al-Fadhila - testified to the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight on 4 June. They submitted a letter from parties representing the majority of Iraqi members of Parliament, (the National Dialogue Front, the Sadrist Movement, both branches of the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Iraqi National List, the al Fadhila Party, some Kurdish members and the Shabak representative).

The letter stated that any international agreement not approved by the Parliament would be "unconstitutional and illegal", in accordance with Article 61 Section 4 of the Iraqi Constitution. It added that the majority of MPs "strongly reject" any agreement not linked to a declared timetable for withdrawal, "without leaving behind any military bases, soldiers or hired fighters."

Unwilling to appear as Team Bush puppets, Iraqi government ministers strained to give the impression that many of the US demands would indeed be refused. "What I can confirm now, with no hesitation, is that there will not be freedom of movement for American (forces) in Iraq … ... any American military movements should be in the framework of Iraqi approval and decisions and through consultations with the Iraqi side," Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih declared, adding that the United States wanted its forces to operate with no restrictions, but this was not acceptable to Iraq.

These statements also addressed Iraqi concerns that US bases in Iraq may soon be used to attack Iran or to support an Israeli attack there. Indeed, some Iraqis feel that such an attack may come even before any such agreement is signed, given the recent large-scale Israeli air exercise and the visit of a clutch of top-level US military leaders to Tel Aviv. The Iraqi PM himself joined the chorus of opposition on this issue, declaring at a June 7 meeting in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki that "We will not allow Iraq to become a platform for harming the security of Iran and neighbours".

The Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, also attempted to mollify wider concern by announcing that teams had recently been sent to Germany, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and other nations to study their status of forces agreements with the USA. (The Kurds are the group in Iraq most in favour of a continuing US presence, seeing it as a guarantee of their semi-independence).

Zebari defended the proposed agreement by firstly saying "There has been no agreement yet,' and secondly that "most of the statements are coming from people who are unaware or not involved in the heart of this negotiating procedure …the recent statements you've heard, the recent politicking you heard by different groups has really been very unhelpful."  However he did not at this stage improve that perceived ignorance by disclosing any of the negotiation.

Al Maliki twists in the wind

On 12 June the Iraqi parliamentary committee on legal affairs recommended to the Government negotiators that they reject the latest agreement draft, reportedly the fourth (since March). A last straw came when even a leading Kurdish MP, Mahmoud Othman, declared "we will not sign" the agreement as proposed by Washington.

By the next day Iraqi PM al Maliki had cracked under the nation-wide pressure. He declared, "We have reached a deadlock, because when we started the talks, we found that the US demands hugely infringe on the sovereignty of Iraq, and this we can never accept."

Al Maliki singled out as unacceptable the US demands that its troops have freedom to conduct operations independent of Iraqi control, and that US personnel and contractors have immunity from the Iraqi legal system. The PM added: "If parliament does not ratify it, it will not be." Later on a visit to Jordan he went further, claiming "Iraq has another option that it may use… the Iraqi government, if it wants, has the right to demand that the UN terminate the presence of international forces on Iraqi sovereign soil."

It was difficult to take al Maliki's posturing seriously given his own utter dependence so far on the occupation. But by such public counter-pressure on Team Bush al Maliki sought to divest himself of the label "mere US puppet", and forced the US side to come up with at least the appearances of a better offer.

The Drama Unfolds

Under this spotlight the Bush crew assumed a posture of wounded innocence, claiming that they were in fact trying to promote Iraqi sovereignty and that all areas of difficulty were negotiable. Few believed them. The negotiations reportedly became so tense that President Bush intervened personally to sweet-talk the Iraqi PM, allegedly promising to "reconsider" unacceptable parts of the US-proposed draft agreement.

Nevertheless the Washington side put forward a public face of optimism. The senior State Department adviser on Iraq, David Satterfield, claimed that the two sides would still meet an end of July target date to finish the agreement. President Bush himself, on a farewell tour of Europe, declared he was also confident of a deal being reached.

One strategy to do that in the face of the massive opposition inside Iraq appeared to be the "weasel words" and "weasel acts" route. American bases might not even be referred to, only an "American presence". There might be no words like "indefinite" much less "permanent" for the US presence, just an absolute avoidance of any date or timetable for withdrawal beneath pious expressions of eventual intent. The Iraqi flag could be flown at a higher level than the US one over American bases, thus placing them under Iraqi "sovereignty". And so on. Another possibility is "joint" control of areas of sovereignty, or Iraqi membership of joint committees, which in the past has meant Iraqis listening while Americans explain what is going to happen.

All this might fool some. But the Iraqi intelligentsia and body politic is so aroused on the subject and the folk memory of the humiliating 1930 treaty with Britain so strong it seemed unlikely that this usual Bush chicanery would pass master with most.

PM al Maliki wants the deal however, and he was soon twisting in the wind again. By 20 June his tune had changed entirely. President Bush spoke with him the night before, and suddenly the negotiations were reported to be "proceeding well". President Talabani was also called to Washington, meeting President Bush on June 25. Afterwards he declared that an agreement could be reached "very soon."

Whether the Iraqi PM had actually succumbed to Presidential glad-handing, or whether he believed his earlier dramatic statements now gave him plenty of wriggle room was unclear. Many suspected the latter, but if al Maliki is to fall into line with the impatient Team Bush timetable for an agreed treaty by the end of July, someone is going to have to make major concessions. Despite his statements al Maliki seemed the more likely party, but his difficulty was that "selling a sellout" to an angry and anxious people would be no sweet ride, more like running a particularly fierce and murderous gauntlet. For the Iraqi PM it was an excruciating dilemma. A past master of delaying negotiations, doing just that was his obvious next resort.

The Black Ops Raid - a descent into the Dark Side?

There then occurred a very strange incident. On 27 June in the early hours of the morning, US Special Forces raided the town of Janaja in Karbala province, allegedly in search of Shi'ite militants. At first four Apache helicopters and a jet fighter flew over the area, then about 60 US soldiers stormed the town, "terrifying the families," according to the Iraqi military commander of Karbala.

The US special forces arrested one man and killed another. Allegedly "in error". Wrong Intel, it was claimed (a bit like the whole war, really?). Or at least, that was the cover story. The real story seems more sinister by far.

Janaja is no mere anonymous village. It is populated mostly by members of the Maliki tribe, the clan of the Iraqi Prime Minister. The person killed, Ali Abdul-Hussein Razak al Maliki, was a cousin of the Prime Minister and was moreover the bodyguard of the Prime Minister's sister. He was killed at the guardhouse of her villa. According to his brother Ahmed, the special forces soldiers first captured the PM's cousin and three other bodyguards and handcuffed them. Ten minutes later, he says, they shot the PM's cousin dead and just left.

What would be the point of such a raid as a genuine military operation? Certainly the raid made a mockery of the alleged "handover" of the province to Iraqi military control. In violation of the terms of such handovers the Iraqi authorities were not informed of the raid, and clearly would never have allowed it under any circumstances. Fumed Mohamed Hussein al Musawi, a senior member of the PM's Dawa Party, "Handing over security in provinces doesn't mean anything to the American troops …we condemn these barbaric actions not only when they target a relative of Maliki's, but when any Iraqi is targeted in the same way."

The US military command in Baghdad would not comment. How could they, for what could they say that would not have been either a lie or self-incriminating? The lies would come later. The problem for the US command appeared to be a potential scandal of black operations in the service of ruthless foreign policy, a scandal that could lead back to the top levels of the US government.

If it was murderous hardball of the "see, we could kill your family anytime" variety, it may well have worked. By July 1st the Iraqi foreign minister was reported urging the Iraqi Parliament in closed session to pass an agreement by the end of July, saying that there was little choice in the matter.

One Possibility

We asked one analyst to comment. Mocking the invidious habit of the US corporate press in continually quoting anonymous "senior officials" who forever cannot be identified for any reason going, he said. "Of course you cannot identify me. Otherwise I might be killed." Joking aside (we hope), here is his take.

" I'd say it's as much to do with Iran as Iraq. The proposed treaty won't take effect until the beginning of 2009. So what's the rush to push it through? Maybe for a very good reason. Say that Israel plans to attack Iranian nuclear facilities quite soon. Probably not long after the end of July, therefore that deadline. They'll be assisted by the US on an "invisible " basis. By which I mean that Iraqi air space will be opened to them, American ships and planes will make threatening manoeuvres to draw off Iranian forces, and so on."

"The essential military problem with such an attack is that it will prompt frantic attempts at retaliation. Inevitably. Therefore US forces will in the course of this exercise provoke the Iranians to attack American ships or planes during or after the Israeli attack. That'll give the Bush crowd an excuse to in turn pound the hell out of Iranian air and naval bases, missile sites and any other facilities that could pose a threat in the near future. America bases in Iraq will be vital to that massive after-attack if it is to be adequate. They'll then hope that the Iranian hardline leadership will lose so much face from this defeat it will fall from within."

"Now, what will be the political effect of all this in Iraq? The Sunnis will cheer from the sidelines, but the Shi'ites will go absolutely bananas. There will not be a snowflake's chance in hell of passing a security treaty on terms favourable to the USA after that."

"Therefore such a treaty must be pushed through before the end of July - or by whatever date their real deadline is for the attack on Iran. To get that they'll do whatever it takes. If it takes executing a member of the Iraqi PM's family and terrorizing his relatives to show him he'd better hop to or else, they'll do it. This thing was a hit squad op, an assassination designed to intimidate the whole leadership strata of Iraqi politics. It's a Mafia-type message. As in, we can kill your whole family if we want to and there's nothing you can do to stop us, therefore give us this specific thing that we want. Or else. Works on most people."

Is this just an opinion, or a shrewd and accurate insight? The latter possibility cannot be excluded from a fundamentalist Administration whose Vice President once urged that US policy get more involved with the "dark side" of human behaviour. Team Bush is anxious to wrap up in Iraq to its own satisfaction, in case Obama wins the US presidential poll. They need to pin down their oil gains and to tie Obama's hands as much as possible with done deals. As well, they may also be hoping that a "great victory" against Iran is the ace for McCain to win by, so ensuring a continuation of the war feast & gravy train of profits for Bush's "have and have more" base of corporate supporters.

Supporting evidence for this thesis can be seen in the barely noticed Resolution 362 in the US House of Representatives and the parallel Resolution 580 in the Senate. When passed these resolutions will enable President Bush to impose a search blockade of "all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran." This is legally an act of war, unless specifically authorised by the UN Security Council. So this will be part of the provocation available to Bush to ensure the Iranians strike at US planes or ships illegally blockading them, and give him the excuse to launch a massive air and naval blitzkrieg against them.

The lesson is that George Bush should not be discounted yet as a lame duck leader. He may yet have one more war to start, thoughtless of the long-term consequences. One more monumental blunder to make to blacken America's reputation throughout the world and ensure that violence in the middle East is a never-ending cauldron. The prospects for peace may be grimmer than ever.

 

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2. Iraqi Internal Politics - the cauldron bubbles

The Iraqi PM had other problems close to hand following the announcement of a split in his own party. Former PM (and al Maliki predecessor as Dawa secretary general) Ibrahim Jaafari is reported leading a new Dawa National Reform offshoot, apparently supported by at least 10 members of parliament and several Dawa city offices, including the Najaf branch.

The split had larger implications. The Dawa rebels have reportedly joined a loose new political grouping including the Sadrists, the secular Iraqi List, the (Sunni) National Dialogue Council and the (Shi'ite) Islamic Virtue Party, Fadhila. Together this grouping, where it adheres, can muster around 90 MPs. Although from different folds and described as a "coordination of trends" rather than a unified bloc, the front's common interest appears to be Iraqi nationalism and a desire to end the US occupation sooner rather than later. The possibility of a joint nationalist alliance for the forthcoming provincial elections has also been mentioned.

Meanwhile the "other" Dawa party offshoot that has long existed (the Dawa Party - Iraqi Organisation led by Abdul Karim Aniz) , announced it was suspending its participation in the UIA Shi'ite alliance. Al Maliki's minority government bloc had shrunk even further, and could in theory be voted out at any time. However the absence of any other potential candidate for PM who could gain majority support was the Iraqi leader's greatest advantage in holding onto his job.

Al Maliki has one new source of support however - it appears that the National Accordance Front, the largest Sunni party in the Parliament with 44 MPs, is to rejoin the government this month. They will apparently receive five or six cabinet posts (including higher education, culture, minister of state for foreign affairs, minister of state for women's affairs and a deputy prime ministership). The recent prisoner amnesty (see next paragraph) plus al Maliki's offensives against the Mahdi Army (a group which has driven many Sunnis out of Baghdad and created Shi'ite dominance of the capital) evidently fulfilled their largest demands.

In a major action later in June the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council ordered the release of around 20,000 mostly Sunni prisoners, under an amnesty law passed last February. Another almost 45,000 on bail and a further nearly 32,000 accused but not arrested also had their charges dropped, so the amnesty will cover close to 100,000 Iraqis. It is a huge boost to the feelings of the Sunni community, which has often felt humiliated since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the coming to power of a Shi'ite & Kurdish government.

Bickering continued over the forthcoming "October" provincial elections, which are still date uncertain. The Kurdish bloc in Parliament has been stalling the laws because of the Kirkuk issue. An apparent breakthrough in June was an agreement that Kirkuk will not be included in the voting until after a referendum is held there on whether Kirkuk city and region should accede to the Kurdistan Regional Government. But such a referendum has itself already been postponed, and the postponement period has now expired too. Many doubt that the referendum will ever take place even though it is in the Constitution, since many Arab Iraqis of all factions oppose it. UN special envoy to Iraq Steffan de Mistura is in fact working on alternative proposals for the regions claimed by various ethnic groups.

De Mistura presented a UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) plan to the Iraqi government on June 5, but it was criticised by Sunni and Shia Arabs, Turkoman and Kurdish representatives alike - all the major parties affected. The plan essentially divides up four disputed areas, with two to be granted to the Kurds. A proposal on Kirkuk has yet to be presented.

The three Kurdish provinces will also not vote in the provincial elections at present - in fact they have already been combined into a single statelet. However by the end of June the election law had not been finalised, and November looked to be the earliest the elections could take place.

From out of left field, the Kurdistan Alliance also proposed a resolution asking that Iraq apply for membership of NATO. There is no chance the idea will be accepted, and it is not clear whether the Kurds were serious or merely making mischief because of their frustrations over Kirkuk.

Closer to reality the prime minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, presented new proposals over the stalled national oil law. Meanwhile his administration further annoyed the Iraqi government by signing more oil deals deemed illegal in Baghdad. The new contracts are with the Korea National Oil Company and a Canadian company, Talisman Oil, and bring the total of such agreements to date to fifteen.

One piece of good news - Jordan followed Syria in returning artefacts looted from Iraq after the US invasion and identified by Jordanian authorities. Some 2,466 items including gold coins, jewellery and Islamic and ancient manuscripts were returned later in June.

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 3. Meanwhile, a War Continues

US fatal casualties in June in Iraq rose to around 30 from 19 in May, a figure however still below the monthly average so far this year. The number of Iraqi civilians reported killed in the war during June according to Iraqi Health Ministry figures was 448, a welcome drop from 505 in May and 968 in April.

In Washington the US Senate approved US$161.8 billion in new funds to continue fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next year.

"Total security incidents have fallen to their lowest level in over four years." This statement in a quarterly Pentagon report on Iraq may be true, but if interpreted to mean there is hardly any war going on now is very wide of the mark.

The continuing level of violence is often not realised. For example here is a list of some of the incidents that took place on Wednesday June 11th in the Iraqi capital alone: a parked car bomb struck a police commando patrol in the Aalawi district of central Baghdad; there was a bomb attack on a US military convoy in the Kadhamiya district in north-western Baghdad; a roadside bomb exploded near a police commando patrol on Palestine Street in north-eastern Baghdad; another roadside bomb exploded near Beirut Square in north-eastern Baghdad; a grenade was thrown at an Iraqi army checkpoint in western Baghdad; and a further roadside bomb exploded in the Shaab district of northern Baghdad. In these six incidents 9 people were killed and 53 wounded, the casualties including sixteen Iraqi police & soldiers, 2 US soldiers and six bodyguards. These were all regarded as relatively minor incidents, but they don't sound anything like a pacified city.

Other, larger attacks also occurred in the capital. A truck packed with rockets blew up near the home of an Iraqi police general in north-east Baghdad on 4 June, killing 18 and wounding 75 (it was disputed as to whether the attack was deliberate or an insurgent bungle). On 8 June a mortar attack on the Green Zone killed three people and wounded seven. On 24 June a bomb attack in Sadr City killed four Americans (two US soldiers and two civilian officials). The month's worst outrage was a massive bomb that on 17 June exploded in a Shi'ite market in the Hurriya neighborhood of north Baghdad, killing 63 people and injuring 75.

The violence was certainly not confined to Baghdad. In "pacified" al Anbar province a June 1st attack on a police checkpoint in the town of Hit, killed nine - the US Army subsequently reported 49 arrests of suspects. In the same province in the town of Garma, a suicide bomb at a tribal council meeting on 27 June killed 20 Iraqis, including two local leaders and three policemen; three US marines also died there and 25 Iraqis were wounded. Three more US soldiers were killed by a small-arms fire attack in Al Hawijah, near Kirkuk, on June 4, while a suicide car bomber killed one US soldier and wounded 18 near Tikrit on June 9.  A female suicide bomber blew herself up outside a court building in Baquba, Diyala province on 22 June, killing 15 and wounding 35. On the second to last day of June a car bomb in Dhuluiya, Salaheddin province, killed seven policemen and wounded three more.

In Mosul, despite a major crackdown operation that has been proceeding for some time there were a large number of insurgent attacks, including many bombings and a string of actual and attempted assassinations. During one of many counter raids US forces claimed to have killed Al-Qaeda in Iraq's top leader in Mosul. It was clear though that the insurgency is far from over in the north.

One of the worst incidents for its potential for civilian mayhem was on June 14, when another female suicide bomber tried to commit mass murder in a crowd of soccer fans. They were celebrating Iraq's win in a soccer World Cup qualifying match, in the city of Qara Tappa north-east of Baghdad, in Diyala province. Fortunately a police officer spotted her and shouted a warning, so although 34 people were wounded none were killed. The incident did typify however why the majority of Sunnis in Iraq and worldwide have rejected al Qaeda and the organisations that have pledged loyalty to it, like "Al Qaeda in Iraq", because its behaviour is barbaric and unworthy of religion.

Terror has two sides of course. An east Baghdad resident described in detail how on May 21st US forces shot dead three local civilians including a 19 year-old university student trying to attend his campus. Twenty-three more were reported slain by US forces nearby, a series of tragedies which US commanders invariably described as "insurgent" casualties. If we shoot you you must be bad, get it?

On the whole, although there were still many bombings in Iraq during June - and many civilians killed by US forces - it is true that the scale of most of these incidents was smaller than previously, and that violence is reduced overall. A genuine peace, however, seems nowhere near in sight. There is also a major question of what will happen with all the Sunni "Awakening Forces" gunmen once the US stops paying them, as the Shi'ite-controlled Iraqi government wants it to.

A small boost for the ever-dwindling "coalition of the willing" in June was when tiny Bosnia agreed to send 49 more soldiers to Iraq (it has 36 there already). Bosnia itself, though, still hosts a 2,500-strong force of European peace-keepers since the disastrous war there over a decade ago. So it is amazing that the US President's men are still out there twisting the arms of small nations to bolster their image in Iraq even now in the dying months of the Bush II presidency.

On the sidelines, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, the No. 2 US military commander in Iraq said that while Iraqi forces have improved they cannot operate without significant "help", and declared flatly that Iraqi troops are not ready to take full responsibility for security and combat operations in any part of the country.

It's curious that a nation where the army was formerly able to invade neighbouring countries and even fight an eight-year war of attrition at a WWI Western Front level with a more populous neighbour, and which now also has the great advantage of American tutelage, should need so much "help" for so long. Maybe their job description is really "do just what the US command wants, to Team Bush's specifications". In that case perhaps the reported insistence by one of those ever-present anonymous "senior officials", who says that US military assistance will still be required "for years" in Iraq, expresses more a colonial foreign policy in the Middle East than a military reality.

The Oil Spoils begin to come on line

The Iraqi Oil Minister, Hussein al Shahristani, announced during June that 2008 Iraqi oil revenues are expected to reach $70 billion if present conditions continue. Average daily production has now exceeded 2.5 million barrels, while the amount exported was over 2 million barrels per day in May. Shahristani predicted a further increase in total production to 2.9 million bpd by the end of 2008, with a goal of 4 million bpd further down the track.

A major reason for increased exports from the northern oil fields has been a much lower rate of sabotage attacks by Sunni insurgents this year, with "awakening councils" protecting pipelines in their areas. Iraqi military offensives against the Mahdi Army in the south may also clear the way for expanded production there.

On June 30th al Shahristani also announced a hitch in releasing the names of the large Western oil companies that have won technical service contracts for Iraqi oil fields, a short-term arrangement to boost production while the national oil law is negotiated. The Oil Ministry said it was negotiating short-term deals with five major foreign oil companies: Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP, Shell and Total. However agreement has been delayed, he said, because the companies refused to offer consulting deals based on fees and instead wanted payment in oil production. A resolution of the issue is expected this month.

The US state department was involved in drawing up the contracts, providing template contracts and detailed suggestions on drafting them. Advisers from the US departments of Commerce, Energy, Interior & State, have been assigned to work with the Iraqi Oil Ministry.

So "the "war for oil" is finally paying off for corporate America and Britain. Bids for long-term development projects for the same fields after the two years elapses may be opened during July. Some 41 foreign oil companies have already been identified as pre-qualified to bid for these. The deadline for bidding is March 2009, with preliminary contracts to be signed next June.

By offering huge, easy- to-develop oil fields into a short-supplied market the Iraqi oil future beckons as a financial bonanza for big oil and its backers in the Bush administration. Iraqi oil reserves are enormous, and the blue sky opportunities are obvious - if only those pesky locals can be persuaded to toe the line.

Terror and War Crimes - who defines?

In another indication of the fictitious nature of Iraqi sovereignty, Team Bush has continued to refuse Iraqi government demands for the expulsion from Iraq of the Iranian Mujahedeen Khalq Organisation (MKO). This armed faction has a large base in Iraq in Diyala province, and it is clear that Team Bush wants to keep them primed for possible use in a strike against Iran, even though Iraqi governments from the so-called "Interim Governing Council" in 2004 onwards have been asking for the group to be expelled.

The group, originally hosted by Saddam Hussein against the rule of the Ayatollahs in Iran, is alleged to have assisted Saddam in suppressing the 1991 Shi'ite uprising against him in the Iraqi south.

The MKO is a curious example of how the Bush administration supports selected organizations that have been classified as terrorist despite the allegedly universal nature of the "War on Terror". Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the largest party in the Iraqi government, was moved to a rare broadside against the US on the issue on 22 June, complaining that "US troops continued protecting MKO in defiance of the Iraqi constitution that prohibits the presence of any terrorist organization active against any neighbouring country of Iraq."

Meanwhile, briefs have been sent to the International Criminal Court (ICC) alleging former Australian prime minister John Howard and former UK prime minister Tony Blair committed war crimes by sending troops to Iraq for a war not sanctioned by the United Nations. Neither of their countries had been attacked, and there is evidence the leaders colluded with US President George Bush to present false claims to justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In the case of Australia an additional ground of complaint may be that special forces were actually engaged in an offensive there before a US ultimatum to Iraq had expired.

It is not known whether the ICC will actually consider the briefs, although immense pressures will likely be exerted behind the scenes to prevent that outcome. Ironically the chief instigator of the war, George W. Bush, cannot be indicted since the United States is not a signatory to the ICC protocol. Any prosecution of President Bush in this regard would need to be an internal US affair.

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4. The Mahdi Army under pressure

So far this year Mahdi Army leader Moqtada al Sadr has looked like a man without a strategy, being repeatedly caught on the lam by aggressive moves from PM al Maliki and the US military. On 13 June however, in what he clearly hoped would be a black Friday for the occupiers, he finally announced a set of new policies.

Firstly, the bulk of the Mahdi Army would now stand down as a military group and become a civilian movement instead. This would be in a "social and religious role" aimed to resist "Western ideology" through "cultural, religious and ideological means."

However separate "special companies" would be formed to "continue to resist against the occupiers until liberation or death". The declaration made it clear that al Sadr was narrowing his fight to limit it strictly to "occupying Americans" only.

In reality there may be little change with the "special companies", except to bring them more directly under al Sadr's control. Up till now the US military has persisted for tactical reasons with a fiction that Shi'ite "special groups" that attack them are not controlled by the Mahdi Army. Now however it has been spelt out that they will be. Paradoxically the statement that these armed groups are a completely separate and independent force may represent a hope of al Sadr that it will be more difficult for the US military and the official Iraqi forces to continually attack the Mahdi Army under the claim that they are only targeting "rogue units" rather than the Mahdi Army itself.

Politically, al Sadr added, his group would not directly contest the upcoming provincial elections. This decision is presumably to outfox threatened moves by PM al Maliki to disenfranchise them. However the caveat that they would instead endorse independent candidates is an indirect strategy that might leave them equally or more influential.

Meanwhile in Sadr City the US has now created a small "Neighborhood Guards" militia, comprised of young Shi'ite men paid $300 per month and armed with AK-47s. The group operates along the lines of the Sunni local militias the US military pays for elsewhere. Such a group is clearly intended to help displace the Mahdi Amy from al Sadr's Baghdad stronghold.

Amara - Maysan

Emboldened by his advances in Basra and Sadr City, PM al Maliki used June to launch a takeover of Maysan province and its capital Amara. Maysan has been the only province in Iraq officially run by the Sadr Movement, and the PM decided to forget such trifles as "elected authorities" and run the Mahdi Army out of the province. US commanders also say that Amara is a major centre for arms smuggling from Iran, an additional reason they wanted it targeted.

After setting a deadline of June 18 for militiamen there to surrender their heavier weapons, Iraqi government forces backed by US troops occupied Amara on 19 June and searched neighbourhoods for weapons and Mahdi Army militiamen. The Mahdi Army offered no resistance to the takeover however, on instructions from its leader Moqtada al Sadr. Instead, hundreds of members are reported to have fled.

Al Maliki's troops quickly proceeded to arrest political opponents as well as alleged militia fighters. Those immediately arrested included the deputy provincial governor and mayor of Amara Rafa Abdul Jabbar, five members of the provincial council (allegedly for "aiding the militia"), and even 20 policemen. Later on 2 July the PM's men followed this up by arresting the Governor, Adel Muhoder al-Maliki, and three more members of the provincial council including its chairman Sheikh Abduljabbar Wahid al Ukayli.

There appeared to be several goals to the Amara occupation and its blatant deposition of the elected authorities there. Firstly as part of PM al Maliki's grand plan to smash Mahdi Army and Sadrist power in Iraq, with the enthusiastic support and assistance of his American backers. Secondly to further one side of intra-Shi'ite politics. Control of the province by nationalist Sadrists has prevented the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the largest party in the rump government, from establishing a semi-independent Shi'ite statelet in the south similar to the Kurdish one in the north. If in forthcoming provincial elections one slate can sweep all the southern Shi'ite provinces, then establishing such a "provincial Confederacy" should become plain sailing.

A third reason for the move was about control of oil. Maysan is an important oil-producing region, and undoubtedly figures in the Team Bush "grand plan" for Iraq as well as PM al Maliki's local calculations. The connection was shown in short order when the government announced it will set up a Maysan Oil Company to explore, develop, produce and export oil and gas in Maysan province (oil in Maysan was formerly under the control of the long-established Southern Oil Company).

 

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Back

 

Where are we now?

Reports of secret British talks with leaders of the Iraqi insurgency in the last months of PM Blair's leadership, following the failure of earlier US talks with rebels, admit by default that US and British policy in Iraq has been a mess that the Bush Administration will be extremely lucky to extricate itself from. The British under their new leader, however,may soon be sensible enough to leave Iraq.

The fact that people who are at one moment called terrorists who must be crushed can then become negotiating partners in the next minute is an insight into how the "War on Terror" has been a political con-trick from the start. A con-trick, indeed, used by the Bush Administration as a cover to pursue its own real agenda. For in May 2007 a White House spokesman indicated that the presence of US forces in Iraq for as long as they have been in Korea (currently over half a century!) was regarded by Team Bush as an acceptable outcome for its Iraq adventure.

The "War on Terror" as a nebulous "for ever" concept is the same trick as the permanent war in George Orwell's revealing masterpiece 1984. You can use it to denounce opponents, destroy civil liberties, justify unspeakable torture and control society to your own ends. The worst thing possible would be to win it, because then all the benefits an elite group seizes in its name can no longer be justified.

So what exactly is The War on Terror? Is it opposition to all anti-government groups anywhere that use violence? In that case the founders of America - revolutionaries who rebelled against oppressive authority and took to arms against British colonial rule - were terrorists without a doubt. Given the awful record of human warfare since, all people of good will can of course agree that we should try to persuade all advocates of violence everywhere towards peaceful means instead, and work against the injustices that stir people to violence.  But you don't invade Iraq to do that.

Or is The War on Terror simply opposition to the Islamist fundamentalists of Al Qaeda and similar groups, who attacked America and who preach their own religious "crusade" against the West? In that case, why was the attempt to crush them let slide almost at the moment of victory, in favour of an invasion of Iraq? Whatever kind of misbegotten hoodlum Saddam Hussein was without a doubt, he was also an enemy of Islamist fundamentalists, not their friend. Instead of securing the peace in Afghanistan, America's foolish action in first invading and then continuing to occupy Iraq has stirred up a hornet's nest of violent fundamentalism that may plague the world for many years to come.

So Osama bin Laden lives on to plot further. The irony of the War in Iraq is that it not only rallies new supporters to his and similar organisations, it in effect guarantees more Islamist terrorism in the future. The invasion and continuing military occupation of an Arab Muslim land is used as an inspiration in Iraq by groups who voluntarily affiliate themselves with Al Qaeda, and by recruiters to terrorism around the world from Amsterdam to Indonesia. As a result, Australian, British and American lives are lost abroad or at home and the world is made unsafe for travellers. What kind of a policy is it that breeds new enemies and guarantees future problems? It will take the removal of foreign forces from Iraq, not a "forever war", to strengthen Islamic moderates everywhere and make a "peace between civilisations" possible.

Meanwhile, due to the concentration of attention and resources in Iraq by "coalition forces", the situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Rampant warlordism, a resurgent Taliban, pitiful success in reconstruction and the rapid development of a narco-state increase the evidence that President Bush has not so much constructed a policy as committed a series of enormous strategic blunders in the Middle East.

Only when you see that all this is an excuse, not a reason, for more military heroics like an attack on Iran does any of it make any sense. Like the "WMD" lies for the attack on Iraq, the real purpose here is not to promote peace and stability, but only to help further the Team Bush goal of total US world dominance. For what? To benefit the likes of Haliburton and the rest of the corporate gravy train, the "haves and have mores" that George Bush so proudly represents. We can only hope that the citizens of the USA will take up the motto "We won't be fooled again."

Bush Administration figures everywhere tour the globe lecturing about freedom. But despite a claimed huge fall in their crime rate the US now imprisons more than two million people in its own society, far, far more than any other free nation. It's the hypocrisy of Bush America, evident in this and so many other areas - from environmental vandalism to economic bullying to the many examples of deceitful foreign policy - that the rest of the world rejects with indignation.

At this point, it may be educational to review Iraq's history since the founding of the modern Iraqi state. A consistent thread has been regular interference in its affairs, first by Britain and more recently by the United States. When we examine what has led us to this moment, we see that both nations bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the current "mess in Iraq". Read below to learn how it all came about.

 

Click below for

A brief modern political
History of Iraq

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US Special Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld greets Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Dec. 20 1983

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Notable in Iraqi Politics

Nuri al-Said, longtime Iraqi politician.

Originally an Ottoman (Turkish Empire) army officer, Nuri became an Arab nationalist who then threw in his lot with British Imperial interests. At first Army chief of staff, he became Iraqi Prime Minister eight times between 1930 & 1958, and was generally attempting to manipulate events from the sidelines when not officially in office. Nuri always aspired to be the power behind the throne, & was regarded by most Iraqis as a collaborator and quisling for the British. He was widely believed to have arranged the murder of King Ghazi I in 1939, to further British interests. Nuri was killed, & then literally hacked to pieces by an angry mob during the 1958 anti-colonial revolution.

" Almost the new Nuri?"
Ahmad Chalabi.

Chalabi's wealthy family was forced to flee Iraq as British & Nuri al-Said collaborators in 1958, when Chalabi was 13 years old. Although Chalabi had never been inside Iraq proper for forty-five years, he was flown there in April 2003 by the US Army, & touted as the future President. However he received almost nil support inside the country, & his promotional posters were generally torn down. Nevertheless the Bush Administration appointed him to the "Governing Council" set up later in 2003. Despite his abysmal track record as head of the "Iraqi National Congress" (INC) in the 1990s, and prior convictions for embezzlement, some neo-conservatives in the US government still hoped to set Chalabi up as the new Iraqi leader of an obedient, pro-US regime.

In 2004, however, Chalabi fell out of favour with the occupying forces. He had courted the Shi'ite religious establishment in an attempt to broaden his support, but apparently went further than was acceptable to US governor Bremer. Chalabi was also accused of betraying US secrets to Iran, e.g. that the US had broken Iran's intelligence code (something he could only have learnt from a high-level figure in the Bush administration). The US administration switched to Plan B, and as interim Iraqi Prime Minister arranged the appointment of an alternative exile figure. This was Iyad Allawi, the leader of the Iraqi National Accord, a rival group to Chalabi's INC.

Chalabi, a perennial opportunist, energetic and a clever negotiator, was however by no means down for the count. His estrangement from the US administration earned him unexpected allies elsewhere. Soon he emerged as a member of the (Shi'ite) United Iraqi Alliance list in the January 2005 election, and even contested the successful list's nomination for the post of executive Prime Minister, losing however to Dawa party leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

In the lead up to the pre-constitution Government he was briefly acting Oil Minister in May 2005, and became one of three deputy prime ministers. After that Chalabi steadily consolidated his power and influence, with a finger in oil policy as Chairman of the government's Energy Council, regulating lucrative rebuilding contracts in another chairmanship, directing the purge of Ba'athists, and even controlling the composition of the tribunal prosecuting Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile he forged clever alliances with both Kurds and radical Shi'ites.

His lobbying and new alliances also earned him representations to King Abdullah of Jordan by the new Iraqi President and Foreign Minister, to have his conviction there for corruption and embezzlement (of $US288 million from the Petra Bank) quashed on the grounds of his new official status (the Jordanians offered a possible amnesty). US leaders such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condolezza Rice began again to call Chalabi, and a trip to America seemed to rehabilitate him further.

Chalabi however fell out with the (Shi'ite) United Iraqi Alliance and contested the December 15 2005 election with his own separate list, in alliance with the royalists. His list was trounced however and received less than one per cent of the votes. Nevertheless he put himself forward for a position in the new government, and on 30 December 2005 was appointed acting Oil Minister, after Iraq's oil industry slid deep into crisis. Although now without a seat in the National Assembly, he continued as a caretaker Deputy Prime Minister while prolonged negotiations for a new Government were under way.

In October 2007 Chalabi was named by PM al Maliki as head of a "services committee " intended to bring better electricity, health, education and other services to Baghdad, possibly as a political poisoned chalice. Watch this man however, his ambitions to be ruler of Iraq are limitless.

 

 

Iyad Allawi (appointed interim Iraqi Prime Minister in June 2004)

Born in 1945, Iyad Allawi comes from a wealthy family of Shi'ite merchants. A Ba'athist before the party came to power, he fell out with Saddam Hussein and went into exile. Allawi survived an assassination attempt by Saddam's agents, in England, in 1978. Later he became leader of the Iraqi National Accord exile grouping, a secular party founded in 1991 & dominated by former Baathists and army officers who had turned against Saddam. The group attempted unsuccessfully to promote an army coup against Saddam's regime.

Allawi has been supported by both the CIA and Britain's MI6. His grouping did poorly in the January 2005 election however, gathering only about 14% of the votes cast. As interim leader he remained executive Prime Minister until replaced by Ibrahim al-Jaafari in April 2005. Arrest warrants have now been issued by the new Iraqi government for several ministers of Allawi's regime on the grounds of corruption.

Although these corruption issues involving more than $US2 billion and at least five of his government's ministries now dog his name, Allawi remains on the comeback trail politically. He contested the December 2005 parliamentary election at the head of a new political grouping, the Iraqi National List. This coalition included his own party, the Iraqi National Accord, plus other secular groups including socialists, the Communist Party and some nationalist and tribal elements. His platform was that his group transcends ethnic and religious divisions, while the present government has failed to unite Iraqis but has in fact exacerbated sectarian divisions and presided over a slide towards civil war.

Despite predictions by neo-conservative commentators that he might sweep the polls, the broadened Allawi list did much worse in the December 2005 election than in the January one, and achieved a reasonable showing only in Baghdad.

His grouping remained outside the al-Jaafari and al-Maliki governments, but he has continued to be active politically. By December 2006 political paralysis within Iraq had led to active consideration by some Iraqi politicians of a possible new coalition of so-called "moderates", including the Allawi faction, and this idea was being promoted by the US Government. By early March 2007 Allawi was reported setting up a new alignment to include Sunni MPs and a Shi'ite faction for a bid for power. Later that month however, having failed to gain Kurdish support, the new bloc project collapsed.

Some commentators have suggested that Allawi may be installed by the Bush Administration as a "temporary" military dictator if the political process in Iraq collapses altogether.

Ibrahim al Jaafari, Iraqi Prime Minister from 3 May 2005 - May 2006

As United Iraqi Alliance list candidate for interim executive Iraqi Prime Minister, al Jaafari was confirmed in that post by the "Presidential Council" and the interim National Assembly for the interim government that took office to December 2005. Following the December 15 2005 election he was reconfirmed as UIA candidate for PM in a "permanent" (four year) government (2006-2009). However his leadership was opposed by Kurdish, religious Sunni and secular political groups and by US and British leaders, and in the end his position became untenable.

 Although leader of the Dawa Party, a long-established Islamist Shi'ite force, al Jaafari was regarded as a relative "moderate", whose diverse influences include a long period in Iran and study and work in the West. He depended however on assent from the Shi'ite religious establishment, the Marjaiya, and on support from a majority of parties in the UIA to maintain his position. He is 59 years old, a medical doctor by profession and was a vice-president in an earlier interim government. From 8 May 2005 he led a cabinet of 36 (Prime Minister, 3 Deputy Prime Ministers, and 32 ministers dominated by 17 Shi'ite and 8 Kurdish list members). His notable policy was to establish an alliance with Iran that appeared to confound US aims.

Although unpopular among Sunnis and regarded by some as a weak leader, al Jaafari nevertheless narrowly defeated (by one vote) the rival UIA prime ministerial candidate, interim Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, in February 2006.  The latter was actively favoured by US and British diplomats, who were alarmed by the pro-Iranian direction of al Jaafari's foreign policy, and considered Adel Abdul-Mahdi more amenable to their interests.

Al Jaafari's continuance as the UIA candidate for Prime Minister was mainly due to support from the extremist Shi'ite cleric and Mahdi Army militia leader Moqtada al Sadr, who had emerged as a much stronger influence in the UIA. The strength of Al Jaafari's position therefore did not flow naturally from his own power base; rather he was an agreed "front man" for stronger Shi'ite forces.

However Kurdish, Sunni and secular political groups continued to oppose his leadership and in the end openly called for al Jaafari to be removed as the UIA candidate. As well, US diplomats supported - some claim orchestrated - a push to have the embattled al Jaafari replaced. President Bush even wrote to the supreme Iraqi Shi'ite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani seeking this aim. For some time the struggle caused a political stalemate that added to delays in forming a new Government. The incumbent government remained in place in the meantime, but later in April 2006 al Jaafari agreed to accept any decision by the UIA to replace him, and the candidature of Jawad al Maliki was put forward instead.

Al Jaafari's political star now seemed to be eclipsing, especially after he fell out with al Maliki and was replaced as Dawa Party secretary-general in 2007. However early in 2008 he formed a new National Reform movement. In June al Maliki responded by having him expelled from the Dawa Party. This move split the party, and al Jaafari took with him a large though minority chunk of party offices and MPs.

 

Nuri ("Jawad") al Maliki, current Iraqi Prime Minister

Jawad al Maliki (real name Nuri Kamil Muhammad Hasan Abu al Mahasin) was born in 1950 in a village near Karbala in the Babil province of Iraq. He is well-educated, his qualifications including a master's degree in Arabic literature. During the Saddam era he fled to Iran (in 1980) and then spent over 20 years in exile, much of it in Syria.

After his return to Iraq in 2003, al Maliki was active in drafting the new permanent constitution and as deputy head of the de-Baathification Commission. In the recent interim government he was a deputy speaker of the National Assembly.

As a senior member of the Dawa Party, an Islamist group that is an important member of the seven parties in the UIA Shi'ite alliance, Nuri al Maliki was a close ally of interim PM Ibrahim al Jaafari. His approval as Prime Minister therefore meant that although al Jaafari was "rolled" from leadership, the underlying Iraqi political landscape had not really changed much. Indeed al Maliki has a reputation as a Shi'ite hardliner, and his relationship with Sunni and secular groups has been tense, despite the "national reconciliation plan" he put forward. The latter has failed to the extent that the March 2008 reconciliation conference was boycotted by many factions.

Al Maliki took almost the whole month available to form a government, and even then his proposed Cabinet lacked ministers for the three critical security portfolios (posts subsequently filled). However he early received more cooperation from other parties than al Jaafari did, although that changed later. A major security plan for Baghdad enjoyed little success, and "sectarian cleansing" in fact increased in Baghdad and other areas during the early part of his tenure..

As he originally opposed foreign control of Iraq's oil sector and other key infrastructure, al Maliki was unlikely to prove popular with the big business backers of the Bush administration. He was enthusiastic for a rise in education standards as a means to national recovery in Iraq. Al Maliki was not in favour of the US and its allies invading in 2003, and has criticized the occupation in the past. However as PM he has had to tread a delicate path in the face of the continued US presence, which in reality he is powerless to evict.

By December 2006 al Maliki was out of favour with the Bush Administration, which appeared to be supporting moves to replace him. Meanwhile the Moqtada al Sadr faction, a key element of his political base, had also temporarily withdrawn its support in the Iraqi parliament in protest against al Maliki's meeting with President Bush in Amman, Jordan, leading to a functional paralysis in the National Assembly.

Al Maliki's political situation at the beginning of 2007 was extremely insecure, with only the difficulty involved in obtaining agreement on a replacement seeming to preserve it for the moment. By March 2007 his longer-term political survival seemed unlikely. His support base in the UIA was itself under severe strain, with one of its parties - the Fadhila - withdrawing, followed by the resignation of ministers of the al Sadr bloc from the government.

However the collapse of a mooted alternative political bloc that month secured his position for the moment, and by mid 2007 he had surprised everyone - himself probably included - by continuing in office. He remained as PM thoughout August despite the collapse of the "national unity" government, following the further resignations of Sunni bloc and Allawi group ministers.

Maintaining his diminished government with a "rump" minority coalition of two Shi'ite and two Kurdish parties, al Maliki was further undermined when the Sadrist bloc withdrew from the UIA in September, leaving the government unable to pass most legislation. With however no challenger capable of gathering enough votes to replace him he was still in office as 2007 drew towards a close.

The Sunni insurgency was gradually ground down by both relentless US attacks during fifteen months of the "surge," and by the decision of most western and central Sunni tribes to oppose the Al Qaeda in Iraq group and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and to ally with US forces to that end.. Meanwhile the sectarian battle for Baghdad was now largely over, with the Shi'ites having gained a decisive upper hand. As a result, al Maliki's position seemed stronger by early 2008, despite his continued broader political isolation.

In March 2008 al Maliki decided to go on the political (and military) offensive. He managed to secure the agreement of major Sunni and Kurdish factions to attack the Basra militia of the Mahdi Army movement of militant Shi'ite leader Moqtada al Sadr, who al Maliki had once been allied with, but from whom he had become progressively estranged. Al Maliki's major Shi'ite supporters apart from his own smaller Dawa Party were now the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council faction and its militia the Badr Corps, bitter rivals of the Mahdi Army.

The offensive launched in Basra went seriously awry, and led to widespread fighting in other southern towns and Baghdad, and eventually a ceasefire in Basra under Iranian auspices. Heavy fighting continued in Baghdad into May, with al Maliki placing Sadrist suburbs under siege and announcing that the Sadrist movement would be stripped of political rights unless its Mahdi Army militia was dissolved. After punishing American attacks a ceasefire was obtained in Sadr City too and government troops moved in. With physical dominance of these key Sadrist strongholds gained, the long-term political outcome was still unclear. Al Maliki appeared to be aiming to prevent success by Sadrist rivals in proposed provincial elections and to break the influence of the Mahdi Army movement.

Although his negotiations to return Sunnis to the government broke down in May al Maliki emerged stronger for the moment, with rising concerns over a proposed treaty with the USA his principal liability. He then launched a further offensive against Mahdi Army control of Maysan province to further suppress the Sadrist trend, arresting political opponents there.

A split in his own party in June 2008 caused by rivalry with his predecessor led however to further defections from the Government ranks. This left al Maliki once again in the position that the absence of a rival contender able to gain sufficient support among the multiple parliamentary factions was his chief political strength. A wily operator though, his position seemed nevertheless secure for the moment.

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No Weapons of Mass Destruction found in Iraq - official

Monday 25 April 2005
A final,almost 1000 page report from the Iraq Survey Group, recently led by weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, found that the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent UN sanctions had destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capabilities, and for the most part Saddam had not tried to rebuild them. There was no evidence to support the last-gasp claim by some US officials that such material was moved to Syria for safekeeping before the war.

March 31 2005
A US presidential commission delivering a 600-page report on US intelligence lapses at the end of March 2005 said that "the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction", and that "the harm done to American credibility by our all too public intelligence failures in Iraq will take years to undo." The commission, however, was not permitted to examine how politicians made use of the intelligence.

7 October 2004
The substantive report of chief US weapons inspector Charles Duelfer concludes that Saddam Hussein had destroyed most of his chemical and biological weapons after his 1991 Gulf War defeat, and that his nuclear program had "progressively decayed". No stockpiles of WMDs were located.

3 October 2003. After searching for three months with a huge team of 1,400 inspectors and a more than $US300 million budget, the special "coalition" weapons inspection team in Iraq reports that it has discovered nil weapons of mass destruction there. The report of the "Iraq Survey Group" is an interim one, and more than $US600 million extra has been requested of the U.S. Congress for the team to continue its massive search effort in future, in the hope of discovering something that might validate in some way the increasingly discredited Iraq war rationale. However the failure so far to substantiate the proclaimed reason for the Iraq invasion is hugely embarrassing to the Bush, Blair and Howard administrations in the three countries that formed the invasion force.

The search team head, CIA adviser David Kay - himself an invasion advocate - presented the theoretically classified report to U.S. lawmakers behind closed doors. However the gist of the report had already been released by the CIA, and substantive quotes from the report were soon available. While admitting the WMD search failure so far, Kay went on to declare " we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war".

On nuclear arms, Kay stated " to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material". He added that his team had determined that Iraq's nuclear programme was in only "the very most rudimentary" state. His findings contrasted sharply with the claim of the Bush administration before the invasion that Iraq had a well-developed nuclear programme that presented a threat to the U.S.A.

On chemical weaponry, Mr. Kay reported that multiple sources have told the team that "Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW (chemical warfare) program after 1991," and that information found so far suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce and fill new chemical warfare weapons was "reduced - if not entirely destroyed." He said that the team has also not found any evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Saddam's military was prepared to use chemical warfare against US-led forces. In the area of biological weapons, Kay indicated that after 1996 Iraq kept only small, secret " capabilities" to manufacture such weapons in the future should a decision be taken to do so. Overall his conclusion was that "it clearly does not look like a massive, resurgent programme, based on what we discovered".

Kay did find some information relating to previous weapons programmes, and spoke of possible deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documents. He also reported that Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons programme, and painted a picture of sporadic equipment preservation consistent with a regime hope of someday recommencing some weapon programmes. He said the team has discovered significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during inspections that began in late 2002. However much evidence had been "irretrievably lost," Kay said. "It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions and in some areas, we may never reach that goal," he said. He said that despite the group's negative findings so far he was "not prepared to close the file" on the WMD search yet.

Kay implicitly acknowledged that the intelligence used by the coalition to justify the war may have been faulty, declaring in his conclusion that "whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of time, distance and information."

 

Worse, even the weak claims are wrong - comment

5 October 2003. David Kay's WMD report has already given the lie to many Bush Administration statements, for instance reporting that aluminium tubes have not been used for the enrichment of uranium in Iraq, an allegation made at length by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council in February this year. Nor have any suspicious activities or residues been found at the seven sites within Iraq described in British PM Tony Blair's "dodgy dossier" of September 2002. Biological Weapons trailers, weapons of mass destruction on a 45 minute leash and other allegations all turn out to be fantasies based on misinterpretation or invention.

However Mr. Kay's report makes a few claims that those desperate for a vindication of sorts have tried to latch onto, like the proverbial drowning men clutching at straws. But Cambridge WMD expert Dr. Glen Rangwala has said that even the few diluted claims made by the "Iraq Survey Group" for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't in fact stand up to support WMD allegations.

For example British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw did a bit of clutching of his own after the report's release. He claimed of a " vial of live C botulinum Okra B" that the report noted an Iraqi biologist had at his home, that this agent was "15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX".   Wrong Mr. Straw, says the learned doctor. It is botulinum type A that is the real nasty, while botulinum B is much weaker, and can be used to make an antidote to common botulinum poisoning - and for that reason is kept in many laboratories around the world.

Also seized on as a last-gasp shred of war justification by "coalition" politicians whose exposure as liars is nearly complete, is a missile issue. In respect of missiles, much of the ISG report deals with claims Iraq had been acquiring designs and undertaking research programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of 150 km. However Iraq was never prohibited from doing so, only from actually making and deploying such missiles or possessing "major parts, and repair and production facilities" for them while under UN embargo. The Kay report does not confirm any such illegalities. We can also recall that Iraq readily destroyed a large number of missiles declared marginally illegal before the U.S. attack, in a fruitless attempt to satisfy a "coalition" hell-bent on war.

None of this excuses the very real unpleasantness of the Saddam Hussein regime. But for the three nations of the "coalition" to go to war based on a lie -and for their governments to deliberately conspire to deceive their own peoples in the matter - can never be excused either. Worse, such deceit and hubris breeds a policy in which dishonesty is the keynote, and disaster the probable outcome. There is for example no evidence to show that the Bush Administration has any genuine intention of allowing the people of Iraq to decide their own future if they choose something their occupiers do not want. To the contrary, already we see a Bush Administration decision to put most of the Iraq economy "up for grabs" to foreign business without the consent of the people. Claims that the invasion would bring peace between Israel and the Palestinians have proved equally bogus, with that situation now worse than ever.

This war has instead opened a new festering sore in the Middle East. The dishonesty and hypocrisy that underlie it have caused countless millions the world over to be deeply suspicious of America & its close allies, and resentful of the West. This is not a war that can bring peace or security to the United States or any country. The Bush administration has instead created a maelstrom for which the whole world will pay the price. All civilisations are the losers, and all people of good will are the poorer. Only a change of heart and a change of policy can begin to right the wrong. The "coalition of the willing" should now show their willingness to cease imposing themselves on Iraq, and aid a solution instead of continuing to be the problem.

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How dissent is being suppressed in the "land of the free".
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Your folks' lives lost for their profitable wargames.
From President Bush down, most of the ardent hawks of Washington made damn sure they themselves never saw
war service. Nor will their children. In the loaded game of the U.S. (plus British & Australian) leadership elite,
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Profits not patriotism is more the leader's game, as with U.S.Vice-President Cheney's involvement with Haliburton,
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. At least the "debauched" Roman Emperors followed their swords and led from the frontline, but not so this new "imperial elite".
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Secrets exposed:
They've been there before - and they gassed the Kurds!
When orating with maximum self-righteousness, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair is careful not to mention
any of Britain's dirty colonial secrets from its own Iraq past. Such as gassing the Kurds
just like Saddam did. That's right, the British themselves once gassed the Kurds (1922)!

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War posters
http://www.spectrumz.com/z/pr_posters.html

Some Iraq maps
http://www.nationalgeographi